Balder Ex-Libris - Brzezinski ZbigniewReview of books rare and missing2024-03-27T00:16:02+00:00urn:md5:aa728a70505b2fae05796923271581c2DotclearBrzezinski Zbigniew - The permanent purgeurn:md5:3e841574a1f34bf3dee75bfb5f1330ae2020-07-19T14:07:00+01:002020-07-19T13:09:47+01:00balderBrzezinski ZbigniewJewRitual murderSatanismTalmudUnited States <p><img src="https://balderexlibris.com/public/img4/Brzezinski_Zbigniew_-_The_permanent_purge.jpg" alt="" /><br />
Author : <strong>Brzezinski Zbigniew</strong><br />
Title : <strong>The permanent purge</strong><br />
Year : 1956<br />
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Introduction. THIS is a study of the totalitarian purge, one of the most challenging and baffling phenomena of totalitarianism in action. This study does not claim to provide the key to the enigma. It does, however, aspire to probe it. In doing so, it will attempt to develop some general theoretical insights into the nature of totalitarian purges and to provide some additional information on the actual experience of the Soviet purge. In this way, it is our hope, some further light may be shed on the character and dynamics of Soviet totalitarianism. <strong>...</strong></p>Brzezinski Zbigniew - Strategic visionurn:md5:08b508f9438535e27813b9cb4a0461552020-07-19T14:04:00+01:002020-07-19T13:06:15+01:00balderBrzezinski ZbigniewCreativityEuropeRacialismRevueUnited StatesUnited States <p><img src="https://balderexlibris.com/public/img4/Brzezinski_Zbigniew_-_Strategic_vision.jpg" alt="" /><br />
Author : <strong>Brzezinski Zbigniew</strong><br />
Title : <strong>Strategic vision America and the crisis of global power</strong><br />
Year : 2012<br />
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Introduction. THE WORLD IS NOW INTERACTIVE AND INTERDEPENDENT. IT IS ALSO, for the first time, a world in which the problems of human survival have begun to overshadow more traditional international conflicts. Unfortunately, the major powers have yet to undertake globally cooperative responses to the new and increasingly grave challenges to human well-being—environmental, climatic, socioeconomic, nutritional, or demographic. And without basic geopolitical stability, any effort to achieve the necessary global cooperation will falter. <strong>...</strong></p>Brzezinski Zbigniew - Second chanceurn:md5:82404ffce6bde9437eb38dccf303e58b2020-07-19T14:02:00+01:002020-07-19T13:03:23+01:00balderBrzezinski ZbigniewCreativityEuropeRacialismRevueUnited StatesUnited States <p><img src="https://balderexlibris.com/public/img4/Brzezinski_Zbigniew_-_Second_chance.jpg" alt="" /><br />
Author : <strong>Brzezinski Zbigniew</strong><br />
Title : <strong>Second chance</strong><br />
Year : 2007<br />
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Three presidents and the crisis of american superpower. <strong>...</strong></p>Brzezinski Zbigniew - Scowcroft Brent - America and the worldurn:md5:8bec0148b84dffe4f6ec632c3a3f6b0f2020-07-19T13:59:00+01:002020-07-19T13:00:14+01:00balderBrzezinski ZbigniewIranUnited StatesUnited States <p><img src="https://balderexlibris.com/public/img4/Brzezinski_Zbigniew_-_Scowcroft_Brent_-_America_and_the_world.jpg" alt="" /><br />
Authors : <strong>Brzezinski Zbigniew - Scowcroft Brent</strong><br />
Title : <strong>America and the world</strong><br />
Year : 2008<br />
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Introduction. This book is an invitation to join a conversation with two of the wisest observers of American foreign policy, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft. Over many mornings and afternoons in the spring of 2008, they sat down together to talk through our country’s current problems—and to look for solutions. The result is an intellectual journey, led by two of the nation’s best guides, into the world of choices the next president will confront. As readers turn the pages of this book, they should imagine themselves sitting around a big conference table in an office building overlooking Pennsylvania Avenue. A few blocks up the street is the White House, where these two men managed the nation’s statecraft in their years as national security advisor. They arrive for each session immaculately dressed, as if heading for the Oval Office to brief the president. We start each conversation with a big cup of coffee or maybe a diet soda—and sometimes a jolt of sugar from some cookies or cake brought from home—and then we turn on the tape recorder. <strong>...</strong></p>Brzezinski Zbigniew - Russia and the commonwealth of independent statesurn:md5:f38be603d89c6d4456dc5ce72b7755ed2020-07-19T13:56:00+01:002020-07-19T12:57:15+01:00balderBrzezinski ZbigniewRussiaUnited States <p><img src="https://balderexlibris.com/public/img4/Brzezinski_Zbigniew_-_Russia_and_the_commonwealth_of_independent_states.jpg" alt="" /><br />
Author : <strong>Brzezinski Zbigniew</strong><br />
Title : <strong>Russia and the commonwealth of independent states</strong><br />
Year : 1997<br />
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Introduction: Last Gasp or Renewal ? Zbigniew Brzezinski. Will the Russian empire be the first in history to have experienced both dissolution and restoration? This is the key question posed by the formation and the inner dynamics of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the successor to the Soviet Union. The answer will have vital significance for the geopolitical shape of the world. The Soviet Union was the successor to the tsarist Russian empire. In both, the inner and dominant core of imperial might was the Russian state, with the Kremlin as its seat of power. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the question consequently arises: What in fact is Russia? Most importantly, how does Russia define itself: as a multinational empire or as a national state? That issue perplexes modem Russians as much as it affects their immediate non-Russian neighbors. A Russia that defines itself as a national state might not always live in peace with its neighbors, but such a selfdefinition would thereby acknowledge the separate political identity of the non-Russians. <strong>...</strong></p>Brzezinski Zbigniew - Gates Robert Michael - Iran Time for a new approachurn:md5:fc1e8439c6fc82014ecb40289ab991202020-07-19T12:52:00+01:002020-07-19T11:53:59+01:00balderBrzezinski ZbigniewConspiracyIranKennedyUnited States <p><img src="https://balderexlibris.com/public/img4/Brzezinski_Zbigniew_-_Gates_Robert_Michael_-_Iran_Time_for_a_new_approach.jpg" alt="" /><br />
Authors : <strong>Brzezinski Zbigniew - Gates Robert Michael</strong><br />
Title : <strong>Iran Time for a new approach</strong><br />
Year : 2004<br />
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Report of an Independent Task Force. Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations. <strong>...</strong></p>Brzezinski Zbigniew - The grand chessboardurn:md5:a84e6138e331a4e9859f95880a57e9d02013-04-11T01:48:00+01:002013-04-11T00:49:14+01:00balderBrzezinski ZbigniewAmericaConspiracyJewPropagandaUnited States <p><img src="https://balderexlibris.com/public/img2/.Brzezinski_Zbigniew_-_The_grand_chessboard_s.jpg" alt="" /><br />
Author : <strong>Brzezinski Zbigniew</strong><br />
Title : <strong>The grand chessboard</strong><br />
Year : 1997<br />
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INTRODUCTION. Superpower Politics EVER SINCE THE CONTINENTS started interacting politically, some five hundred years ago, Eurasia has been the center of world power. In different ways, at different times, the peoples inhabiting Eurasia—though mostly those from its Western European periphery—penetrated and dominated the world's other regions as individual Eurasian states attained the special status and enjoyed the privileges of being the world's premier powers. The last decade of the twentieth century has witnessed a tectonic shift in world affairs. For the first time ever, a non-Eurasian power has emerged not only as the key arbiter of Eurasian power relations but also as the world's paramount power. The defeat and collapse of the Soviet Union was the final step in the rapid ascendance of a Western Hemisphere power, the United States, as the sole and, indeed, the first truly global power. Eurasia, however, retains its geopolitical importance. Not only is its western periphery—Europe—still the location of much of the world's political and economic power, but its eastern region— Asia—has lately become a vital center of economic growth and rising political influence. Hence, the issue of how a globally engaged America copes with the complex Eurasian power relationships— and particularly whether it prevents the emergence of a dominant and antagonistic Eurasian power—remains central to America's capacity to exercise global primacy. It follows that—in addition to cultivating the various novel dimensions of power (technology, communications, information, as well as trade and finance)—American foreign policy must remain concerned with the geopolitical dimension and must employ its influence in Eurasia in a manner that creates a stable continental equilibrium, with the United States as the political arbiter. Eurasia is thus the chessboard on which the struggle for global primacy continues to be played, and that struggle involves geostrategy—the strategic management of geopolitical interests. It is noteworthy that as recently as 1940 two aspirants to global power, Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin, agreed explicitly (in the secret negotiations of November of that year) that America should be excluded from Eurasia. Each realized that the injection of American power into Eurasia would preclude his ambitions regarding global domination. Each shared the assumption that Eurasia is the center of the world and that he who controls Eurasia controls the world. A half century later, the issue has been redefined: will America's primacy in Eurasia endure, and to what ends might it be applied? The ultimate objective of American policy should be benign and visionary: to shape a truly cooperative global community, in keeping with long-range trends and with the fundamental interests of humankind. But in the meantime, it is imperative that no Eurasian challenger emerges, capable of dominating Eurasia and thus also of challenging America. The formulation of a comprehensive and integrated Eurasian geostrategy is therefore the purpose of this book. Zbigniew Brzezinski Washington, D.C. April 1997. <strong>...</strong></p>Brzezinski Zbigniew - The geostrategic triadurn:md5:a6731b1ee4ae2b7431bb8e538ba2547c2013-04-11T01:46:00+01:002013-04-11T01:46:00+01:00balderBrzezinski ZbigniewAmericaChinaEuropeRussia <p><img src="https://balderexlibris.com/public/img2/.Brzezinski_Zbigniew_-_The_geostrategic_triad_s.jpg" alt="" /><br />
Author : <strong>Brzezinski Zbigniew</strong><br />
Title : <strong>The geostrategic triad Living with China, Europe, and Russia</strong><br />
Year : 2000<br />
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HOW SHOULD THE UNITED STATES DEFINE ITS INTERNATIONAL engagement with the rest of the world? More than a decade after the abrupt collapse of the Soviet Union, and more than a decade after the renunciation of authoritarian political systems and statist economic policies in key developing countries, a national consensus on how the United States as "hyperpower" should navigate in the world is as elusive as ever. How can we explain the irony that the United States, at the moment of uncontested geostrategic preponderance, has no comprehensive basis for engaging the rest of the world? There are a number of reasons. First, much of the public debate on American international engagement is cast in iconic terms that may satisfy embedded political interests but do little for positioning the United States to capitalize on a dynamic global environment. In the post-Cold War period, the critical issues have become increasingly complex. New challenges have been superimposed on traditional issues. A constellation of global forces is calling long-standing sovereign prerogatives and capabilities into question. All this defies bumpersticker articulation. Second, the absence of a broad consensus has provided a greater opportunity for special interest groups to impose their priorities on the policymaking process. The result is a centrifugal process that cuts into the capacity of leaders to formulate and carry out balanced and consistent policies. Third, in the context of today's real-time news culture, political leaders are confronted with making complicated decisions based on a multitude of factors in ever shorter time frames. The "CNN effect" makes crises across the world immediately relevant to leaders who in the past would not have been affected by those developments. The pressure for instant policy declarations and formulation has grown tremendously. As a consequence, leaders have less time to think carefully about longer-range trends, confer with knowledgeable individuals, and contemplate approaches that are longer term and integrated in nature. Fourth, the organizational "stovepipe" phenomenon of specialized jurisdictions, competencies, and interests across the U.S. government (as well as other governments) is creating increasingly segmented analyses of developments across the world. It is also generating turf battles and gridlock, infighting and paralysis, and lack of constancy of purpose. The constraints created by these organizational rigidities certainly apply to the range of traditional national security and foreign policy issues confronting the United States. But they are most pronounced when it comes to crosscutting global issues such as globalization, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, HIV/AIDS and the cross-border movement of other infectious diseases, and other similar forces. Fifth and last, the debate in both academia and the public policy community on how to position the United States relative to the rest of the world has been no more productive. Despite Herculean attempts to identify paradigms for U.S. engagement within a broader strategic framework, no overarching theory has emerged, no comprehensive strategy has succeeded in attracting political consensus, and no approach has enabled the systematic prioritization of American interests and objectives. Together, these five elements have limited the capacity of leaders to think in "strategic" terms—to assess relations with key states in a comprehensive fashion, weigh both primary and derivative effects of proposed policies, cast relations in a long-term time frame, and develop nn integrated approach to how Washington can and should define its relations with the world. The challenge is clear: American leaders must weigh all dimensions of complex relationships, assign priorities to highly complex and sometimes competing objectives, and fashion a strategy through which those priorities can be achieved. For these reasons, Zbigniew Brzezinski's unique geopolitical insight is all the more valuable. Over the course of his remarkable career in government and the public policy arena, Dr. Brzezinski has consistently distinguished himself as a truly strategic thinker by grounding his analysis in historical understanding, exploring how sets of relations between countries can and should be calibrated with other sets of relationships, advancing conclusions that are global in scope, and focusing on longer-range developments and trends. In addition, he has consistently attacked the questionable assumptions and iconic thinking that have characterized public debate on some of the big issues of our times. Dr. Brzezinski's analysis is testament to the fact that even in today's real-time decisionmaking environment, it is possible to formulate and prosecute a strategy based on a forward-looking, interdisciplinary approach. This monograph captures such an approach. The conceptual staging point for the analysis that follows is that the success of U.S. international engagement in the early twenty-first century will be conditioned largely by the United States' relations with Eurasia—the world's central arena of world affairs—and in particular with China, Japan, Russia, and Europe. In short, Dr. Brzezinski asserts, the United States needs a well-defined transcontinental strategy to maneuver effectively in the twenty-first century. More specifically, he points to two "Eurasian power triangles" that Washington must develop as an organizing structure for its future engagement: the first between the United States and the European Union and Russia, and the second between the United States and Japan and China. This monograph lays out Dr. Brzezinski's thinking on the considerations that should underlie each of these power triangles. For obvious reasons, each of these relationships involves separate and independent considerations. But they also share an important characteristic: Of the two countries other than the United States in each triangle, only one recognizes its stake in international stability. In the United States-Japan-China triangle, Tokyo clearly is pursuing regional and international policies that reflect an interest in security. Beijing, however, continues to favor more or less drastic alternations in the geopolitical calculus. The same applies to Russia in the context of the United States-European Union-Russia triangle. The European Union, conversely, serves with the United States as the axis of global stability. Also significant, as Dr. Brzezinski notes, is the important contrast between the two "non-stake" countries in the respective triangles. Beijing's economic progress suggests an altogether different set of priorities than the dire challenges—ranging from economic to health and demographic—facing Moscow. In managing these differing sets of relationships, the challenge to Washington is to fashion a longer-range vision of its interests and role in Eurasia. That implies, of course, an outward-based strategy building on relations with our allies in Europe and Japan. In this context, a number of looming policy issues—NATO expansion, European integration, the development of an autonomous European defense capacity, the balance between Washington, Tokyo, and Beijing, cross-Strait relations—are likely over time to test traditional security, political, and economic relations. A longer-range vision also implies detailed and differentiated strategies for dealing with Russia and China. What makes Dr. Brzezinski's analysis so significant is the clear and comprehensive conceptual road map he offers to address these issues. With these essays, he has articulated a strategy for the cornerstone of U.S. policy—our relations with Eurasia—as we move forward into the millennium. In so doing he has made a significant contribution at ë significant time, and CSIS is pleased and proud to be able to publish this volume. The three chapters that make up this volume were first published in successive issues of the National Interest, and we thank its editor, Owen Harries, who is also a senior associate at CSIS, for permitting us to incorporate those separate articles into a single volume. JOHN J. HAMRE President and CEO, CSIS January 2001. <strong>...</strong></p>Brzezinski Zbigniew - Between two agesurn:md5:a788fb9a1a400b7e6244b2a7f7dbbb812013-04-11T01:39:00+01:002013-04-11T00:40:10+01:00balderBrzezinski ZbigniewAmerica <p><img src="https://balderexlibris.com/public/img2/.Brzezinski_Zbigniew_-_Between_two_ages_s.jpg" alt="" /><br />
Author : <strong>Brzezinski Zbigniew</strong><br />
Title : <strong>Between two ages America's Role in the Technetronic Era</strong><br />
Year : 1970<br />
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Introduction. Perhaps the time is past for the comprehensive "grand" vision. In some ways, it was a necessary substitute for ignorance, a compensation in breadth for the lack of depth in man's understanding of his world. But even if this is so, the result of more knowledge may be greater ignorance—or, at least, the feeling of ignorance— about where we are and where we are heading, and particularly where we should head, than was true when in fact we knew less but thought we knew more. I am not sure that this need be so. In any case, I am not satisfied with the fragmented, microscopic understanding of the parts, and I feel the need for some—even if crude—approximation of a larger perspective. This book is an effort to provide such a perspective. It is an attempt to define the meaning—within a dynamic framework—of a major aspect of our contemporary reality: the emerging global political process which increasingly blurs the traditional distinctions between domestic and international politics. In working toward that definition, I shall focus particularly on the meaning for the United States of the emergence of this process, seeking to draw implications from an examination of the forces that are molding it. Time and space shape our perception of reality. The specific moment and the particular setting dictate the way international estimates and priorities are defined. Sometimes, when the moment is historically "ripe," the setting and the time may coalesce to provide a special insight. A perceptive formula is easier to articulate in a moment of special stress. Conditions of war, crisis, tension are in that sense particularly fertile. The situation of crisis permitssharper value judgments, in keeping with man's ancient proclivity for dividing his reality into good and evil. (Marxist dialectic is clearly in this tradition, and it infuses moral dichotomy into every assessment.) But short of that critical condition—which in its most extreme form involves the alternatives of war or peace— global politics do not lend themselves to pat formulations and clearcut predictions, even in a setting of extensive change. As a result—in most times—it is extraordinarily difficult to liberate oneself from the confining influence of the immediate and to perceive—from a detached perspective—the broader sweep of events. Any abstract attempt to arrive at a capsule formula is bound to contain a measure of distortion. The influences that condition relations among states and the broad evolution of international affairs are too various. Nonetheless, as long as we are aware that any such formulation inescapably contains a germ of falsehood— and hence must be tentative—the attempt represents an advance toward at least a partial understanding. The alternative is capitulation to complexity: the admission that no sense can be extracted from what is happening. The consequent triumph of ignorance exacts its own tribute in the form of unstable and reactive policies, the substitution of slogans for thought, the rigid adherence to generalized formulas made in another age and in response to circumstances that are different in essence from our own, even if superficially similar. Today, the most industrially advanced countries (in the first instance, the United States) are beginning to emerge from the industrial stage of their development. They are entering an age in which technology and especially electronics—hence my neologism "technetronic" *—are increasingly becoming the principal determinants of social change, altering the mores, the social structure, the values, and the global outlook of society. And precisely because today change is so rapid and so complex, it is perhaps more important than ever before that our conduct of foreign affairs be guided by a sense of history—and to speak of history in this context is to speak simultaneously of the past and of the future. Since it focuses on international affairs, this book is at most only a very partial response to the need for a more comprehensive assessment. It is not an attempt to sum up the human condition, to combine philosophy and science, to provide answers to more perplexing questions concerning our reality. It is much more modest than that, and yet I am uneasily aware that it is already much too ambitious, because it unavoidably touches on all these issues. The book is divided into five major parts. The first deals with the impact of the scientifictechnological revolution on world affairs in general, discussing more specifically the ambiguous position of the principal disseminator of that revolution—the United States—and analyzing the effects of the revolution on the socalled Third World. The second part examines how the foregoing considerations have affected the content, style, and format of man's political outlook on his global reality, with particular reference to the changing role of ideology. The third part assesses the contemporary relevance of communism to problems of modernity, looking first at the experience of the Soviet Union and then examining the overall condition of international communism as a movement that once sought to combine internationalism and humanism. The fourth part focuses on the United States, a society that is both a social pioneer and a guinea pig for mankind; it seeks to define the thrust of change and the historical meaning of the current American transition. The fifth part outlines in very broad terms the general directions that America might take in order to make an effective response to the previously discussed foreign and domestic dilemmas. Having said what the book does attempt, it might be helpful to the reader also to indicate what it does not attempt. First of all, it is not an exercise in "futurology"; it is an effort to make sense of present trends, to develop a dynamic perspective on what is happening. Secondly, it is not a policy book, in the sense that its object is not to develop systematically a coherent series of prescriptions and programs. In Part V, however, it does try to indicate the general directions toward which America should and, in some respects, may head. In the course of developing these theses, I have expanded on some of the ideas initially advanced in my article "America in the Technetronic Age," published in Encounter, January 1968, which gave rise to considerable controversy. I should add that not only have I tried to amplify and clarify some of the rather condensed points made in that article, but I have significantly revised some of my views in the light of constructive criticisms made by my colleagues. Moreover, that article addressed itself to only one aspect (discussed primarily in Part I) of the much larger canvas that I have tried to paint in this volume. It is my hope that this essay will help to provide the reader with a better grasp of the nature of the political world we live in, of the forces shaping it, of the directions it is pursuing. In that sense, it might perhaps contribute to a sharper perception of the new political processes enveloping our world and move beyond the more traditional forms of examining international politics. I hope, too, that the tentative propositions, the generalizations, and the theses advanced here—though necessarily speculative, arbitrary, and in very many respects inescapably inadequate—may contribute to the increasing discussion of America's role in the world. In the course of the work, I have expressed my own opinions and exposed my prejudices. This effort is, therefore, more in the nature of a "think piece," backed by evidence, than of a systematic exercise in socialscience methodology. Finally, let me end this introduction with a confession that somewhat anticipates my argument: an apocalypticminded reader may find my thesis uncongenial because my view of America's role in the world is still an optimistic one. I say "still" because I am greatly troubled by the dilemmas we face at home and abroad, and even more so by the social and philosophical implications of the direction of change in our time. Nonetheless, my optimism is real. Although I do not mean to minimize the gravity of America's problems—their catalogue is long, the dilemmas are acute, and the signs of a meaningful response are at most ambivalent—I truly believe that this society has the capacity, the talent, the wealth, and, increasingly, the will to surmount the difficulties inherent in this current historic transition. <strong>...</strong></p>