



THE OCCULT WAR ★ ★

LÉON DE PONCINS & EMMANUEL MALYNSKI

THE OCCULT WAR

THE JUDEO-MASONIC PLAN TO CONQUER THE WORLD

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THE OCCULT WAR: THE JUDEO-MASONIC PLAN TO CONQUER THE WORLD

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Editor's Note

The original edition of *La Guerre occulte: Juifs et Francs-Maçons à la conquête du monde* (The Occult War: The Judeo-Masonic Plan to Conquer the World) was published in French by Gabriel Beauchesne et ses Fils in Paris in 1936. The Italian traditionalist philosopher Julius Evola translated the book into Italian, and published it with Hoepli in Milan in 1939 under the title of *La guerra occulta: armi e fasi dell'attacco ebraico-massonico alla tradizione europea* (The Occult War: The Weapons and Phases of the Jewish-Masonic Attack on the European Tradition), adding his own Introduction. We have based our translation on both editions, including Evola's Introduction as well.

During the process of translating the book, we discovered that Evola made a number of interesting alterations to the text, occasionally adding, removing, or rewriting small parts of the French original. We have noted these changes in the footnotes, as they offer an insight into the different ways in which de Poncins and Evola approached the same issues. We have likewise added two appendices: Evola's essay 'Considerations on the Occult War', which is a 1938 essay on this topic; and a review of the French edition of the book that was published by the first traditionalist philosopher, René Guénon, in 1936.

Both versions of the text contained their own footnotes. Following each note, I have added either 'Poncins' or 'Evola' to indicate whose footnote it is, and those which were added by me for the present edition are denoted with an '—Ed.'. Where sources in other languages have been cited, I have attempted to replace them with existing English-language editions.

John B Morgan

PREFACE

Emmanuel Malynski spent thirty years of his life directly observing the development of the modern revolutionary movement around the world, devoting an almost visionary intelligence and clear-mindedness to this task.

Born in Russian Poland in an age in which the social organisation was still largely feudal, he witnessed the birth and rise of industrial capitalism, paving the way to Bolshevism. In practical terms, he lived through several centuries of history, since this development first began in our lands during the Renaissance, only to reach its flowering after the French Revolution.

He directly experienced the collapse of Tsarism and was a first-hand witness to the triumph of Bolshevism. After becoming a Polish citizen with the re-establishment of Poland, he witnessed the implementation of the agricultural reforms that followed the Great War.

A sportsman, renowned fencer, and one of the first pilots, he had perfect spoken and written command of many languages and possessed an extraordinary and wide-ranging culture. There was hardly a corner of the world he had not visited and studied: from India to Japan, he travelled through ancient Asia before it had become completely perverted by contact with the West. In America he directly observed the triumph of capitalism and industrialisation in its various stages; he got to know the main ghettos of eastern Europe, also saw them in New York, and observed Zionism at work in Palestine.

He gazed at everything with the objectiveness of a thinker who sees things *sub specie Aeternitatis*,¹ and the conclusions he reached regarding the crisis of the modern world are the most profound ever formulated.

Years in advance, he foresaw and heralded what is now occurring. Indeed, he was so ahead of contemporary thought that he was misunderstood in his own day.

He was one of the first – even ahead of Max Weber and Werner Sombart – to grasp the profoundly Jewish essence of modern capitalism and to show its affinities with Bolshevism.

He was one of the first to realise what support certain exaggerated forms of nationalism unwittingly lend themselves to international subversion.

He was one of the first to fathom the metaphysical essence of the revolutionary movement, showing that what is taking place is actually a religious war, an age-old and worldwide clash between two antagonistic worldviews.

In 1935, an old man weakened by a serious illness, he entrusted me with carrying on and completing his work that had been interrupted. For this purpose, he left me the observations, notes, manuscripts, articles, and books he had collected throughout a life of travel and research, giving me a free hand to use them as I deemed fit. From our mutual

collaboration this book has sprung, which explores the secret history of subversion, a terrifying history that has never been written before, but which is starting to come to light.

I could have supported this work's claims through documentary evidence, but this would only have weighed down a text that is already rich enough. Those interested will find most of this evidence in my other works.²

Because of its innovative historical insights and of Malynski's bold, yet carefully thought-out ideas, this book has elicited both heated enthusiasm and violent criticism, as witnessed by the many letters I have received from readers. It would have been interesting to publish some of these, along with a reply, but this would have required considerable research and would have further lengthened a book that is already dense enough.

I have limited myself to re-editing the text without changing anything, but with the intention of complementing it with another work which will not – as in this case – be a history of the revolutionary principles at work in the modern world, but rather a study of such principles in themselves.

Thus, loyal to the memory of Count Malynski, I will endeavour to complete his task and to carry it on into the future.

August 1938

Léon de Poncins

¹ Latin: 'from the viewpoint of eternity'.—Ed.

² In *Société des Nations, Super État Maçonnique*, I have drawn from a passage of *La Guerre Occulte* that squares perfectly with the Masonic text that provides the foundations for the other work. Those readers interested in the chapter about the Paris Peace Conference will find all the documentary evidence they need in *S.D.N., Super Etat Maçonnique*, which was published by Beauchesne in 1936.

INTRODUCTION

The fight which has broken out in various parts of the West against the dark forces of contemporary subversion, against Communism, collectivism, Jewry, and Freemasonry, cannot be waged to the full until we learn to view history from a very different angle – recent history, as well as the most remote, which actually contains the causes of the former.

For each movement of renewal, the domain of culture constitutes the last bastion of resistance on the part of that which must be overcome. In this domain, mental suggestions and deformations are given free rein in a way, since they are presented under the hypocritical and deceitful guise of 'technicalities'. The reactionary forces which, due to a combination of circumstances, tend to focus their fight on the political and material sectors, believe the cultural domain is essentially harmless and hence to be tolerated, when it actually contains the primary causes of that disorder and subversion which they are simply fighting in its most tangible outer manifestations.

A way of 'doing' history exists and persists, therefore, which is less the product of a mental limitation than of a carefully spread suggestion, whose influence its very victims are the first to ignore. This verdict may be applied to the positivist prejudice, the method which is adopted by so-called 'serious' people and authorised scholars who are 'no visionaries': it follows one rule, which is that of making people believe that there is no such thing as a third dimension of history; that historical events are self-evident, which is to say that they may be explained on the basis of purely social, cultural and political factors; and that there is no 'intention' behind them, no general plan preordained by forces operating behind the scenes. The aim of this 'objective' method is evident: it seeks to prevent people's gaze from falling where it ought to, so that the real forces which make history may continue their underground work without raising any suspicions or being disturbed.

Yet in writing history in modern times, it is difficult for the alleged objectivity of the positivist method not to go hand in hand with another prejudice, namely that of the *evolutionist*. This consists exclusively in presenting the accelerating race towards the abyss as an enthusiastic and free race towards 'progress' and a sequence of increasingly grand and glorious achievements on the part of mankind. We had to find ourselves almost on the brink of the abyss in order to wake up from this hypnosis, which had been created in the workshops of humanism and encyclopaedism. But make no mistakes: while the social and cultural forms of this myth, which are almost invariably connected to the Masonic, rationalist, scientific, and democratic ideology, may now have lost some points in the stock exchange of contemporary values, they endure in more subtle forms, again under the protection of 'technicality'. And once we leave aside the most recent history – where the very force of events, as we have mentioned, has led to an awakening, so that any insistence on the enemy's part would be unwise – and turn to consider more ancient history, what we find is more or less the *statu quo ante*: this history is still presented in the light of 'modern' thought, i.e. the 'aware', 'critical', and 'scientific' thought which, as is

well known, claims to have the last word on human civilisation and still has its followers.

This is why most people are unaware of the history that has unfolded behind visible history; and this is also why the secret history of world subversion still waits to be written, no matter how dismaying or even dreadful the impression it will make upon unprepared spirits.

A group of writers across various countries has today set this as its task. We believe it is crucial for the new Fascist Italy to take due account of the contributions that have already been made to an action the importance of which can hardly be over-emphasised.

In this respect, we ourselves have done and continue to do what we can. René Guénon's masterpiece *The Crisis of the Modern World*,¹ which we have recently translated (Hoepli, Milan 1937), already contains the fundamental points of reference for a historical and cultural revision of this sort and broadly indicates the chief remote causes of contemporary corruption. Another book, which carries our name and yet is not so much a personal work as a timely collection of traditional data, is *Revolt against the Modern World*² (Hoepli, Milan, 1935). This book systematically sheds light on the civilisation which modern subversion has overrun, while at the same time indicating the nature, rhythm, and phases of those processes which have led from the world of our origins and the luminous cycle of the great Aryan and Hyperborean civilisations to the modern world of anti-Tradition and the demon of collectivism. Now, after collaborating with Giovanni Preziosi³ and Roberto Farinacci⁴ in their fight against the most modern forms of subversion, which are closely linked to Jewry, we wish to introduce the Italian public to a third work: the present *The Occult War*, a work jointly written by Count Emmanuel Malinsky and Viscount Léon de Poncins, which readers may want to examine in close connection with the two aforementioned books.

Few Italians nowadays have not heard of the famous *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, the latest edition of which (Baldini e Castoldi, Milan 1938) includes an introduction we ourselves have written in an attempt to clarify the meaning and significance of this important document.⁵ The book we are now presenting may be seen as providing irrefutable historical evidence for the truthfulness of the *Protocols*. We have preferred it to many other, similar works because of its radical character, accuracy, broad perspective, and capacity to really investigate the secret history of the world revolution without stopping at its latest effects, but rather going back to those which in the most recent period – the critical phase proper – have served as their antecedents and prerequisites. It is not a matter of isolated attacks or sweeping accusations: it is the central trunk of Western history itself, as it has been unfolding ever since the Holy Alliance,⁶ which is here made the object of merciless scrutiny.

There is also one other reason why we have chosen this book: its aristocratic and Catholic radicalism. The anti-Jewish and counter-revolutionary approach does not find justification here merely in contingent reasons, such as particular national interests, which are principles betraying the same illness that is allegedly being fought, or compromises

due to notorious 'circumstances beyond one's control'; rather, it is rooted in a genuinely traditional view of the world and the state. One of the great merits of this work is that it emphasises the *metaphysical* essence of the revolutionary movement, by showing how that which is being fought nowadays is not so much a political and social war as a religious one – a battle between two supra-national fronts more than one for the interests of individual nations, races, or parties; that what we are witnessing today, then, is a possibly decisive phase in the clash between two antagonistic worldviews, with more than simply human forces at work on both sides.

Hence, this is not merely a book of rebuke and anti-Semitic or anti-Masonic polemic: rather it directly or indirectly offers the reader many cues to develop a positive, constructive, or re-constructive orientation focused on the essential rather than the accessory, and devoid of any attenuation. Everything the authors say regarding what ought to have been done to curb the initial progression of world subversion, and was not, applies not only to the past but the future as well. The great European and traditional ideal of a bloc of hierarchically arranged nations closing ranks, with lances pointed against the 'infidel', who is one and the same, whatever forms he may take to conceal himself – this return to the great spirit of the Crusades and the need to oppose the single world front of subversion by means of an equally vast front which is as spiritual and imperial as the former is materialistic, international, and anti-national. All this represents a value not only for the past, but for the future as well, and – we have no hesitations in saying so – is the precondition for any genuine victory and reconstruction.

Positive ideas, as a counterpart to the investigation of destructive and subversive processes, are also to be found in the details of this book. If the authors linger, for instance, on the work of Stolypin⁷ – an almost forgotten figure who may have saved Russia from the Bolshevik infection – this is because they take the opportunity to shed light on the essence of a normal and healthy economy, as opposed to the profoundly Judaised economy of modern capitalism, while revealing the causal as well as tactical connections between the latter and Marxism and Bolshevism. The final section of the book not only contains a gripping eyewitness account of the Russian events and what lay behind them, but also provides a paradigm for the slippery slope which 'moderate' liberal, democratic, and socialistic regimes are bound to take sooner or later, thereby unmasking the forces these regimes serve, as they pave the way for the final collapse. In other words, the authors remind us of a historical lesson which, regrettably, many compromising European regimes continue to ignore. The fundamental or indeed – to use a mathematical expression – 'vectorial' unity of the revolutionary phenomenon in all of its forms represents the central thesis of the book. This thesis goes hand in hand with the idea that the phenomenon in question is not spontaneous but induced, not casual but directed by obscure, if nonetheless specific, forces. A 'demonic' tradition of subversion for subversion's sake – Guénon would speak of 'counter-initiation' – runs throughout history, in parallel and eternal opposition to that of genuine spirituality; in it lie the deepest roots of the revolutionary phenomenon.

We have advised the reader to combine his reading of *The Occult War* with that of the

two other books we have mentioned: should he also choose to leaf through the aforementioned introduction to the *Protocols*, he would effortlessly gain an overall view that would allow him to naturally and easily rectify the occasional one-sidedness of the two authors of the present volume. For instance, the reader will soon recognise what can truly and legitimately be ascribed to Jewry alone – a major force of world subversion whose most recent forms, however, have only been made possible by previous involutions of our own civilisation. Secondly, while the reader will grow aware of the possibility of resting the anti-Jewish and anti-Masonic campaign on a Christian and Catholic basis, he will not rule out the idea that, in relation to other civilisations, and possibly certain sections of our own as well, a different formulation of the traditional spirit – itself transcending all particular historical manifestations – may serve as an equally valid basis. The notion of divine right, for instance, which is correctly stressed by the authors, may be found in no less rigorous a form in non-Christian (e.g., Japan) or non-Catholic civilisations (e.g., ancient Russia). The reader will thus have the chance to broaden his horizons: on the one hand, he will be able to identify *all* the forces operating on the front of world subversion, and not simply some of them, however important or striking they may be; and on the other, he will be able to grasp the prerequisites to establish a common counter-revolutionary front – one traditional rather than confessional – fully opposed to the former. In addition, what the author will learn from this book regarding the strategy by which certain forces in the past, blinded by their own particular interests and lack of sensitivity towards a superior idea, have been led to play their enemy's game, may possibly help prevent this same game being played in the future, and cause the bloc of European defence and offence to become truly inaccessible.

We would like to add a few words about the lives of the two authors of *The Occult War*, a work sprung from de Poncins' elaboration of a vast corpus of material gathered by Malinsky.

Count Emmanuel Malinsky, who passed away in May 1938 in Lausanne, was born in Russian Poland. A sportsman and fencer, he had also been one of the first pilots. He had perfect spoken and written command of many languages, and possessed an uncommon and universal sense of culture. There was no corner of the world he had not visited and studied: from India and Japan to America and the various ghettos of Eastern Europe. For thirty years, he examined the essence of the revolutionary phenomenon throughout the world and of the processes concomitant to it, with so sharp an intelligence as to appear almost visionary.

Already many years ago, Malinsky had foreseen and heralded what is now occurring. Indeed, he was so ahead of contemporary thought that he remained unacknowledged in his own day. Even before Max Weber and Werner Sombart, he denounced the secret forces at work behind international capitalism, as well as the latter's essential relation to Judaism and its tactical connections to the proletarian international. His observations regarding the true face of America remain of striking relevance to this day.

In the last years of his life, when he had grown weak due to a serious operation, Count Malinsky entrusted the French viscount Léon de Poncins with continuing the work he had left off by collecting the material he had gathered through his many travels and studies.

De Poncins has been fighting in the struggle against the secret forces of the revolution, and especially Freemasonry and Jewry, for years. He is the author of several works on the matter, which may be regarded as documentary evidence for what is illustrated in the present book in the form of a historical overview. To mention but a few titles: *The Occult Forces of the Revolution*⁸ (translated into six languages), *Freemasonry According to Its Own Secret Documents*,⁹ *The League of Nations: The Masonic Superstate*,¹⁰ *The Mysterious Jewish International*,¹¹ *The Secret History of the Spanish Revolution*,¹² and *Storms over the World*.¹³ What's more, de Poncins has also founded and is the editor of an interesting international magazine called *Contre-Revolution*. In France he is fighting a strenuous battle against the forces which are controlling his country and are destined to drag it down into the abyss, unless an adequate reaction takes place in short order. A staunch traditionalist and Catholic, de Poncins nicely combines a lack of compromise with great understanding: he is one of the precious few men who may be relied upon in the eventuality of establishing a sort of new Order to unite the elite forces of different countries in spirit against the common enemy.

Italy, which is now fully awakening to the Judeo-Communist peril, will certainly appreciate the contribution which this representative of those uncorrupted forces which remain in France is offering to our common action with the present work, together with his late Polish comrade. For our part, we sincerely wish for his difficult struggle to gain ground and find increasingly worthy allies in his home country.

*Quod bonum, felix, faustumque sit.*¹⁴

Rome, 23 November 1938-XVII¹⁵

Julius Evola

¹ *The Crisis of the Modern World* (Hillsdale: Sophia Perennis, 2001).—Ed.

² *Revolt against the Modern World* (Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions, 1995).—Ed.

³ Giovanni Preziosi (1881-1945) was an early Fascist who favoured an adoption of racial measures in Italy to mirror those of the Third Reich. He published the first Italian translation of *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* in 1920, and Evola wrote an introduction to the second edition in 1937. Preziosi always remained faithful to Mussolini and served in the government at Saló. In April 1945, he committed suicide rather than be captured by the Allies.—Ed.

⁴ Roberto Farinacci (1892-1945) was a First World War veteran who joined the Fascists in 1919. He quickly became a radical leader in the Party, and Mussolini appointed him as Secretary in 1925. He resigned his position in 1926 following policy disagreements with Mussolini. He later fought in the Abyssinian War and the Spanish Civil War, and in 1935 he became a member of the Fascist Grand Council, where he favoured adopting anti-Semitic measures in Italy. In July 1943, he backed Mussolini, and as a result was forced to flee to Germany following the Duce's arrest. The Nazis considered placing him at the head of the Italian Social Republic, but appointed Mussolini after the latter's rescue by Otto Skorzeny. He returned to Italy but remained out of politics, and was executed by anti-Fascist partisans in 1945.—Ed.

[5](#) Available in English at web.archive.org/web/20141108100743/http://thompkins_cariou.tripod.com/id68.html.—Ed.

[6](#) The Holy Alliance was a coalition of Austria, Prussia and Russia which was signed in Vienna in 1815. Originally it was intended to defend Christian values in Europe, but, as it was used by Austrian Prince Metternich, it became a force to counter the influence of the French Revolution, and opposed both democracy and secularism. Eventually, all the European states of the time signed onto it, except for Great Britain, the Ottoman Empire, and the Vatican. It is generally regarded to have ceased functioning after the death of Czar Alexander I in 1825.—Ed.

[7](#) Piotr Stolypin (1862-1911) served as both Prime Minister and as Minister of Internal Affairs in Russia. His main focus was on countering revolutionary subversion, toward which end he attempted to institute land reform for the peasant farmers and to improve conditions of urban workers. He was assassinated in Kiev in 1911 by a revolutionary.—Ed.

[8](#) Translated as *Freemasonry and Judaism: Secret Powers Behind Revolution* (Brooklyn, New York: A & B Books, 1994).—Ed.

[9](#) *La Dictature des Puissances Occultes: La F.M. d'après ses Documents Secrets* (Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1934).—Ed.

[10](#) *Société des Nations, Super État Maçonnique* (Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1936).—Ed.

[11](#) *Le Mystérieuse Internationale Juive* (Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1936).—Ed.

[12](#) *Histoire Secrète de la Révolution Espagnole* (Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1938).—Ed.

[13](#) *Tempête sur le Monde; ou, La Faillite du Progrès* (Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1934).—Ed.

[14](#) Latin: 'May it be good, prosperous, and auspicious!'—Ed.

[15](#) Designating year 17 of the Fascist Era, the Italian Fascist calendar whose commencement coincided with the March on Rome in 1922.—Ed.

The Nineteenth Century: The Revolution Awakens

The entire history of the nineteenth century was shaped by the evolution of the revolutionary movement, from 1879 down to Russian Bolshevism.

This underground struggle began with the French Revolution, which was backed by the 'Illuminati' assembled at the Congress of Wilhelmsbad under the presidency of the Bavarian professor, Weishaupt. This city had been under siege for a few decades: since the time of Voltaire, Rousseau, the *Encyclopédie*, and the spread of Masonic lodges. One of its most beautiful districts was stormed and its inhabitants were drafted in order to attack the surrounding areas.

As might have happened during an actual siege, this part of the citadel was taken back by those people who had been put under siege after fierce fighting during Napoleonic times. The assailants then withdrew and took cover. In the stronghold, however, they left a contagious germ which spread, to the point of making France the *enfant terrible* of Europe in the nineteenth century.

France witnessed the birth of revolutions which progressively and imperceptibly altered the appearance of the Christian world and the inner structure of European society under the pseudonyms of liberal, noble, and generous ideas. Revolutionary elements benefitted from this, starting with the Jews. The deep history of the nineteenth century, down to the World War, is the history of this struggle – largely a mute and deaf one – between the attackers, who knew well what they were doing, and the besieged, who were unaware of what was taking place.

This process lasted exactly one hundred and two years – 1815 to 1917 – and has led to two results.

The first is the transformation of one-sixth of the inhabited world into a revolutionary hotbed steeped in Freemasonry and Judaism, in which the infection is developing and growing aware of what forces it has easily managed to organise in view of the second phase of its plan.

The second result consists in the transformation of the rest of the planet into a weak and divided realm in which – much like the house Christ described – is inwardly torn by resentful rivalries and petty hatreds. The world was rendered incapable – at least until just recently, as new anti-Marxist currents have emerged after the War – of any offensive or even defensive initiative against an enemy whose forces and daring had considerably increased and which, confident of its immunity, believed it could continue to attack without ever having to defend itself.

Ultimately, the cause of all this is the fact that the world was so dominated by capitalism, so drained by democracy, so shaken by socialism, and divided by misunderstood nationalisms that it was no longer capable of offering any firm resistance to such an attack.

In 1813, traditional and Christian Europe had finally chosen to firmly react against the revolution, as embodied by Napoleon. The fight was against the revolution, not France:

just as one will fight against the illness a person is suffering from, and not the person himself. The greatest proof of this may be found in the fact that the winners at the Congress of Vienna in no way took advantage of their victory against France, which lost none of its territories when it reverted to being an honourable and highly esteemed monarchy.

The divinely-appointed monarchs of Europe were merely expiating their guilt: for they had risked losing their crowns and plunging their peoples in the turmoil of democracy a century before the date allotted by fate.

The sovereigns' guilt lay in the fact that, as far as short-sightedness goes, they had all managed to outdo Louis XVI.¹ The latter had insisted on merely seeing casual movements of revolt due to contingent dissatisfactions in his country, where the revolutionary age was in fact dawning. Similarly, European monarchs yielded to petty nationalistic rivalries instead of standing as one man and forgetting about their ongoing differences – mere family squabbles by comparison – in such a way as they could have nipped the germ threatening the world in the bud, before it could show itself and spread. Like far too many of our contemporaries, these rulers appear not to have realised that a new chapter of history was in the making.

The nineteenth-century war *par excellence* was that between overlapping social strata; the war of universal democracy against the universal elite; the war of the Low against the High. The war of the Most Low against the Most High² must follow on as a logical consequence. Where democracy triumphed, there the Low became the High and then had to defend itself against something lower still, which in turn was destined to find itself in the same situation as soon as it had attained power and supremacy. In principle, this was always the war of democracy against a relative aristocracy; and things were fated to continue in this way until we hit rock bottom.

To this day, only Russia has reached absolute zero, below which there is nothing. Thus it is the only country in history in which the revolution has come to a standstill and is not spreading any deeper. Instead, it is merely spreading – nor could things be any different.

Against our claim that the Bolshevik revolution has reached the deepest level, one might point out that, on the contrary, it has yet to win the hearts of the vast majority of Russians. Anyone resorting to a similar argument, even in good faith – for many only adopt it to conceal the truth – shows he is no different from those who consider the modern revolution or democracy (which is nothing but an extension of the latter) as an expression 'of the people, by the people, and for the people'. Actually, the revolution and democracy are only means employed as part of an overall conspiratorial plan aimed at stripping the positively aristocratic group and idea that have always been above and beyond most of humanity of their power over the people.

The bourgeois revolution, democracy, the 'social' revolution, and Communism are but episodes in the vast conflict between two great principles: one embodied by integral Christianity and the other by the anti-Church. If Satan rebelled in the name of freedom and equality vis-à-vis God, this was not merely so as 'not to serve'; rather, it was in order to

subjugate others by replacing the legitimate authority of the Most High.

The people, therefore, are not the subject but the object of this evolution of alleged democratic progress, punctuated by violent revolutions accelerating its march.

Human hierarchies remained after people had started to break away from Christ: the Renaissance. Princes and kings endured after breaking away from the Pope and the Emperor: the Reformation. The bourgeoisie remained after turning away from the aristocracy, headed by its kings and princes: the French Revolution. The people remained after transcending the plans of the bourgeoisie: 1848-1917. Once the masses themselves had been transcended, all that remained was scum led by the Jew: 1917.

Once the revolution will have arrived at its lowest depth, as in Russia – and by extension, as will be the case once the entire world ends up looking like the decayed empire of the Tsars – it will not be concerned with what the people thinks any more than we might be concerned with what our rams or oxen have in mind: for we know that a few pieces of artillery would be quite enough to exterminate all herd animals put together without the slightest risk on our part.

¹ Louis XVI (1754-1793) was the King of France at the time of the Revolution, and was executed.—Ed.

² Evola translated this passage as ‘the war of the underworld against the divine world’.—Ed.

The Holy Alliance: Metternich, Champion of the Counter- Revolution¹

After a century of bitter experiences and utter disappointments, only a very few among our contemporaries have grasped the true meaning of revolution and democracy. Hence, we should not be surprised to find that in 1815 the Allies, for whom this monster was still something new, felt rather confused.

Still, the most intelligent statesman of this period, and the least short-sighted one of the nineteenth century, Prince Metternich,² appears to have realised what a terrifying nightmare was looming on the horizon. Metternich never ceased doing his best to make the Congress of Vienna something more than merely a pretty sunset for sovereigns.

Of all those gathered in this assembly – which was exclusively comprised of noblemen – Metternich alone managed to rise above the contingent interests of his own country in an attempt to establish a united and enduring front for facing not so much external dangers, as the inner peril threatening all European nations.

The measures taken to forestall the possibility of Napoleon's comeback were directed less against the great commander than against the man who had proclaimed himself to be the 'Messiah of the Revolution' from the rocks of Saint Helena. Napoleon's myth had been usurped by democracy, which had confiscated his laurels in order to conceal its sordid rags under a heroic mantle.

Metternich held nothing against France as such – the old, traditional France of the Bourbons; what he mistrusted was the country in which the 'new' mentality appeared to have its headquarters. The future was destined to prove just how right Metternich was.

The tragedy of the French Revolution had not taken place in vain before Metternich's eyes. He was never to forget this lesson, which had proven useless for many others. He had witnessed the 'liberal and enlightened' Constitution pave the way for the Gironde³ and the Terror, which had started with embraces and ended with beheadings. He had seen how liberalism is nothing but a prelude to Jacobinism,⁴ and harboured no illusions concerning the high-flown words that charmed feeble and suggestible minds.

Because of his foresight, Metternich became the greatest *bête noire* of all the 'noble, sensitive, and generous hearts' who devotedly rallied under the banner of the 'immortal principles' upheld by the faithless and lawless 'giants' of the French Revolution. To this day, when so much evidence can be found to confirm Metternich's ideas, they still blame him for having lumped together Jacobinism and liberalism, free thought, and the nationality principle, as expressions of the same sect, plague, and volcano.

Metternich was not as blind as many of our contemporary conservatives and nobles. While having been offered so many occasions to study these symptoms in all their apparent diversity – phenomena carefully differentiated so as to only progressively deliver small shocks – these men have failed to realise the intrinsic unity and causal relationships

among things that, for over a century, have been mutually distinguished merely as a way of fooling and confounding the short-sighted with a range of different names: liberalism, humanitarianism, tolerance, free thought, modernism, constitutionalism, and parliamentarism – idyllic preludes to Jacobinism, radicalism, Communism, the Committee of Public Safety, and the Cheka.

Metternich's superiority compared to all other statesmen of his century – not to mention those of later times – lies precisely in the fact that he grasped the evil of the future as a united whole and synthesis. Having gained awareness of this united front which carries many different names, Metternich sought to assemble all the forces on his side – all those which the Revolution regarded as future obstacles – in order to form another united front, transcending national differences and capable of facing the former everywhere in Europe.

This unprecedented and creative innovation in the political domain may be summed up as follows: 'Now in Europe there is no enemy to the Right' – the corollary of this being: 'All that which is on the Left, or even outside the integral Right, is the enemy'.

From this perspective, Metternich agrees with Lenin, but not with any contemporary conservative.

The two other men of state from this period whom history books tend to put on the same level as Metternich, namely Cavour⁵ and Bismarck, were a great Italian and a great Prussian – or great German at most – whereas Metternich was not so much a great Austrian as a great European.⁶ Steeped in the traditions of the Holy Roman Empire, which for centuries had been ruled by his sovereign's forefathers, Metternich was less concerned with his own country of Austria than he was with Europe. He was certainly one of the greatest Europeans after Charlemagne. Metternich was not one of those senseless men for whom the highest diplomatic refinement lies in complacently gazing at a neighbour's house as it catches fire. Men of this sort do not realise they are living in an age in which all houses in the city of Europe conceal explosive material in their basements, their own homes being no exception.

Metternich would never have struck an alliance with the Carbonari⁷ and the Freemasons, as Cavour did to serve contingent patriotic interests. In drawing this pact with subversion, Cavour placed re-established Italy on a slippery slope that was gradually drawing it towards Bolshevism. The country would already have been engulfed, had it not been saved, against all hopes at a time when everything seemed lost, by a genuine miracle which Cavour could never have foreseen.⁸

Metternich would never have encouraged the establishment of a republican democratic regime in a neighbouring country under the pretext that it represented a potential rival to be weakened and demeaned.

This, however, is precisely what Bismarck did with France, despite being a monarchist and conservative. An unconscious tool of subversion, he found nothing better to do than wage war against the Catholic Church and join the Jew Lassalle.⁹ The latter's state socialism was presented as being non-international and capable of reinforcing the

administrative and economic centralisation of the German Empire.

Things were intended to continue in this way until the process of centralisation would have reached completion. Then a simple change in personnel would have sufficed to transform this empire, governed by an aristocratic oligarchy apparently as powerful as ever, into a republic governed – far more despotically – by a Jewish oligarchy.

Lenin has described this process in his works, and Lassalle himself alludes to it in his correspondence with his coreligionist Karl Marx.

Nationalism leads to its own suicide when it has reached this level of intensity and density.

Metternich saw the ultimate peril, but no one else did: for this reason, he hardly trusted anyone else, from France down to Russia. And how could things have been any different, when he had realised he was the only one to see the point of intersection of all the various forces corroding society in his day?

For what reason, then, did a plan of this sort – stemming from such exceptional foresight and such detailed evaluation of the overall character of an age – not attain the results one might have legitimately expected?

Before answering this question, we should hasten to point out that it would be unjust not to consider the uninterrupted peace which Christian Europe enjoyed between 1815 and 1853 as a great blessing for the peoples of the continent. During this time there were no wars or serious crises, and none of the nervous tension among nations that has ruined our contemporaries' nerves over the course of subsequent years.

Complete pacification for forty years in a row represents a good record. Our grandfathers owed this to Metternich's anti-democratic view of international relations. Certainly, it was great; but it might have come to much more.

The reason for the ultimate failure of the work conceived at Vienna lies in the fact that a plan will only bear fruit if it is fully adopted and implemented, not if it strikes any sort of compromise, including a partial one. While far more consistent and complete than that of all later congresses and conferences, the work of the Congress of Vienna remained a compromise between the view of the Austrian Chancellor and the idiosyncrasies of the other participants.

Metternich's thesis concerned a defensive and offensive alliance among all the Christian and absolutist¹⁰ monarchs of Europe. These rulers were to regard themselves as fathers to their peoples and brothers to one another. They were to mutually secure one another's frontiers, as defined by the Treaty, so as to avoid all discord, and jointly strive to oppose all subversive moves that might have threatened – or simply challenged – their shared dignity as absolute and divinely appointed sovereigns. This was the 'Each for all and all for each' of the kings; in other words, a White International or League of Nations of the Right – an imperial and royal anticipation of President Wilson's democratic and Masonic dream.

The Holy Alliance was doomed to failure right from the start for two reasons which ultimately coincide, but which we shall treat separately.

The first reason already contains the second as a potential. We shall start from it, as it possesses a more general character.

If we were to imagine ourselves standing by the banks of the blue Danube in the year 1815, in that place where the Holy Alliance was first established, we would discover to our amazement that someone was missing among its many and highly distinguished godfathers. This was someone who by all reason ought to have acted as the keystone of the new political and social edifice that was then being built. It was the 'cornerstone' Christ mentions in the Gospel, and without which the kind of unity in diversity the Holy Alliance was aspiring towards cannot be attained. It was the rock – Peter – that ensured the unity in diversity of Christian nations from Constantine the Great down to Luther, Calvin, and their disciples.

Since the late fifteenth century, there has no longer been any spiritual unity: only confessional and ideological divergences.

The Reformation was the first revolutionary offensive, the first attack against Order. The latter rests not on mere force but on Faith, which follows no criterion but itself. What we mean by this is that Faith may resort to force but ought not to be confused with any force seeking to artificially create a faith for itself which it might then make use of. There is a veritable gulf between these two conceptions.

While the Reformation, as a religious revolution, may not have killed the letter of divine right, it killed its spirit, leaving the second act of the subversive work up to social and political revolution. The Reformation killed it as far as the constitutional guarantee of absolute regimes is concerned, which rests on the moral Law drawn from the Gospel.

This moral Law, which is the ultimate resource for man and independent individuals against force and sheer numbers – which amount to the same thing – possesses absolute and universal value. It is always the same regardless of time and place, and is above the whims of the masses, as well as those of princes and elites.

To claim that authority is necessary for order is to speak only half the truth. Authority must also rest on something unchangeable and universal – not on what will be true today but wrong tomorrow (nationalism).¹¹ Otherwise, conflict will necessarily arise between today's truth and tomorrow's, between this truth and that. In such a case, paradoxical as it may seem, as local and temporal authorities become stronger and more confident in their truths, the more universal anarchy will spread. This may easily be observed today by gazing at the world from a bird's-eye view, rather than by looking through a magnifying glass to see what is taking place within an area of a few square kilometres only in a particular season.

For authority to rest on something solid, it must rest on the notion of divine right, for this is the only thing solid and enduring, like God himself.

Divine right – as the name itself suggests – is not the right of kings, nor that of the Pope.

Rather, it is the right of the Christian God, as it has been expressed through his Law. Heads of state are but its vicars, the Pope merely being the first among all vicars. Joseph de Maistre,¹² who lived at the time of the Congress of Vienna, was only half right in arguing that the Pope should be the moderator of kings. The Pope and the kings are merely interpreters of the Law, each in their respective domains; in this regard, they act as its sovereign executors. The Pope nonetheless represents the only visible rallying symbol, a symbol of unity in diversity, which is to say of what is true and unchangeable across time and space.

Herein lies the essence of divine right.

One might respond that monarchies of divine right have their origin in acts of force. While this is certainly the case, if such acts of force became divine right, or rather *the* divine right, it means they became subordinate to it – and this implies a duty as well as a right. In such manner, monarchies made their way back into the universal and unchangeable order of the great fold, abiding to the same creed and uniform catechism – the latter being but the creed in action. What more is needed, in practice?

At the very antipodes of divine right stands national will,¹³ which will be precisely true here but wrong there, true today but wrong tomorrow.

The kings who chose the Reformation voted for what was destined to do away with the very principle in virtue of which they were reigning by God's grace to begin with. In wishing to free themselves from the yoke of God's Word, they fell under the yoke of the incoherent words of men. Without realising it, by bartering their divine right for national will, they sold their birthright for a plate of lentils.

The demolition work begun by Protestantism was carried on by philosophising, atheism, democratism, civicism, nationalism,¹⁴ and capitalism.

With the advent of the Reformation, divine right ceased to exist. For some time, it continued to subsist as pure virtuality, as in the case of those extinguished or vanished stars whose light still reaches us; divine right, however, will never return to being reality.

The Revolution was already contained in the Reformation, as there was a direct relation of cause and effect between the two. In the countries where the Reformation has triumphed, what has occurred is not any visible revolution, but rather a latent and progressive revolution which has led to the same result: namely, the worship of abstraction and ideas in place of God, according to a sort of mythological divine right.

As what stands at the summit of this new right is not what is superior but what is inferior, what we literally have is a house built upside-down.¹⁵

¹ Evola entitled this chapter 'The Holy Alliance: The Last European'.—Ed.

² Prince Klemens Wenzel von Metternich (1773-1859) was an Austrian statesman who was one of the most important European diplomats of the nineteenth century. He was involved in the negotiation of the Treaty of Paris in 1814, which marked the end of the Napoleonic Wars. At the Congress of Vienna in 1815, he was instrumental in establishing the new map of Europe, and the balance of power between the Great Powers which was to last, more or less intact, until the First

World War. Although he was generally a reactionary, he did believe that the Austro-Hungarian Empire needed to protect equal rights for all its ethnic groups, and even proposed the creation of a parliament to this end, but he was unable to enact such reforms. He was forced to resign during the Revolution of 1848.—Ed.

[3](#) The Gironde was a political party during the early years of the French Revolution. Most of them were sentenced to death and executed after they came into dispute with the revolutionary government, favouring a more moderate course of action.—Ed.

[4](#) The Jacobin Club, a political group in eighteenth-century France, was one of the driving forces of the French Revolution. Since then, ‘Jacobin’ has often been used as a generic term for Left-wing radicals.—Ed.

[5](#) Camillo Benso, Count of Cavour (1810-1861) was the founder of the Liberal Party in Italy, and he became the first Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Italy, although he died after only three months in office.—Ed.

[6](#) Evola’s version: ‘The other men of state from this period whom history books tend to put on the same level as Metternich, essentially appear to have been great representatives of their own nations.’—Ed.

[7](#) The Carbonari were a secret society in nineteenth-century Italy that was dedicated to bringing about liberal reforms.—Ed.

[8](#) Evola’s version: ‘Metternich would never have struck an alliance with Carbonari and the Freemasons, as Cavour did. It is true that Cavour drew a pact with subversion for specific tactical reasons, in the name of the unity of the Italian fatherland. In doing so, re-established Italy was placed on a slippery slope that was gradually drawing it towards Bolshevism. It might have already been engulfed, had it not been saved, against all hopes at a time when in many people’s minds everything was lost, by a genuine miracle – the Fascist counter-revolution – which Cavour could never have foreseen.’—Ed.

[9](#) Ferdinand Lassalle (1825-1864) was a German-Jewish Hegelian philosopher and political activist who first introduced the idea of universal socialism into Germany. He and Bismarck corresponded and had a number of secret meetings regarding political ideas.—Ed.

[10](#) Evola has ‘authoritarian’ here instead.—Ed.

[11](#) Evola version: ‘...not on what will be truth today but error tomorrow (democracy), or part truth and part error (misunderstood nationalism).’—Ed.

[12](#) Joseph de Maistre (1753–1821) was a French Counter-Enlightenment philosopher who fled the Revolution and lived the remainder of his life in Italy. He always remained a staunch opponent of democracy and supported monarchical rule.—Ed.

[13](#) Evola adds: ‘the will of deconsecrated and materialised nations’.—Ed.

[14](#) Evola has ‘collectivist nationalism’.—Ed.

[15](#) Evola has, ‘is an overturning of the traditional edifice’.—Ed.

The Holy Alliance: Nationalism and Universalism

Our contemporaries, including those who are directly threatened by subversion, realise no more than our great-grandfathers did that in order to effectively react against this global peril, one must return not to the outlook of the eighteenth, seventeenth, or even the sixteenth century, but to the spirit of the Crusades.

We should add that it is not a matter of returning to the use of tallow candles, coaches, serfdom, and witch-hunting, but of reverting to that spirit which did for the forces of good what subversion is doing today for those of evil: a united Christian front, headed by its leader; a single unit with lances raised, set in square formation against the infidel, which is also one – although it is everywhere, and, like certain tropical insects, knows how to change its colour to match that of the leaves it is gnawing and the place where it is.

The Restoration, strictly speaking, was not a counter-revolution that made a blank sweep of all that had taken place – and herein lies its weakness.

Forgetful of the Gospel's warning, this feeble and overly cautious reaction did its best to pour the old wine of traditional royalty, that which had shaped the kingdom of France, into the new, bloody flasks left by the regicides.

The result, as we all know, was what had been predicted in the Gospel. This chiefly defensive plan, far from leading to any triumphs, led only to disasters. It was drawn by the kind of 'moderates' who sluggishly hold back but never make any about-face or reverse turn, so that those following them always end up treading on their corpses.

In 1815, Austria alone practically and realistically grasped the historical truth. It alone, through the eyes of its Chancellor, saw that the only way to react against a historical, conspiratorial plan conceived long before 1789, a total conspiracy both religious and profane, was a total reaction – not a partial one simply targeting contingent symptoms.

One is not cured of a poison by the administration of the same poison diluted in sugar water.

When a household turns to the spiritual descendants of Louis XVI's killers for help against those of Nicholas II,¹ how can it not perish? Likewise, when the European household turned to the spiritual descendent of Charles I's² murderers in 1815 for help against those of Louis XVI, how could it not have collapsed?³

Once the seamless robe of Christ was torn by the Reformation, the acute xenophobia of modern nationalism ensued, with its short-sighted self-interest, which only increased the advantage of the common enemy. Christian Europe thus became unmanageable. It can no longer express unity in diversity, no matter how much care may be taken to respect such diversity – which is certainly respectable in itself. Let imbeciles continue to scream from their rooftops that religion is nothing now: religion is in fact all, and everything follows from it. This is why the Holy Alliance failed to become a new Holy Roman Empire.

The Holy Alliance is to the Holy Roman Empire what the League of Nations is to the

Holy Alliance.

The League of Nations is a demagogy of demagogies and an incoherence of incoherences. It thus amounts to a demagogy and incoherence squared: in other words, it is a parliament of parliaments, a nation of nations, and a crowd of crowds.

Besides, the Holy Alliance does not really stand halfway between the Holy Roman Empire and the League of Nations. It is rather closer to the latter, for let us not forget that two of its members, France and Britain, were already constitutional regimes at the time, with parliaments their leaders had to reckon with.

To sum up, the illness which was destined to lead the Holy Alliance to its death was an original one, inherent in its moment of history. No one could do a thing against it in 1815, as there was no way of retroactively suppressing Luther, Voltaire, Calvin, and Rousseau. It was the ghosts of these men – along with those of Cromwell and Robespierre, united in the fight against their common enemy – that ultimately murdered the Holy Alliance: for the Alliance had failed to suppress them a second time, in their graves.

An outward sign of this original sin was the absence of the Pope.

The Pope would have been a rallying symbol of unity. The Pope is the only person on Earth who can claim to be above all and stand out like a common banner, without anyone down here feeling humiliated or belittled: for he is only a defenceless moral principle, an unarmed old man who represents He whose ‘kingdom is not of this world’. Once the Pope is not there to say *pax vobiscum*,⁴ instead of the silence of bowed crowned heads all we have is the voice of people singing *France d’abord*, *Italia sopra tutto*, or *Deutschland über Alles* – so loudly as to make their neighbours inaudible.⁵

Right from its birth, the Holy Alliance carried a deadly illness in its bosom. As we shall see later on in this work, the two states which had sprung from the Reformation and which nourished the memory of the Revolution were its *enfants terribles*, and ultimately tore it to pieces. This process lasted some time, almost forty years, during which the void grew bigger and bigger; imperceptibly, the Holy Alliance – or what was still left of it on paper – became a myth whose only tangible expression was Austria.

With its kingdoms, principalities, and earldoms, and its peoples, languages, and races, all peacefully united under the same sceptre, this vestige of the Holy Roman Empire already embodied – albeit on a lesser scale – the form and character of a Holy Alliance, in which Catholicism held primacy over nationalism.⁶

Both politically and religiously, Austria was thus the Catholic state *par excellence*. This is why it became an object of hatred for all forms of Protestantism, nationalism, and democracy.⁷

Austria alone might have continued to be the driving force behind the Holy Alliance, which it assimilated to the Holy Roman Empire, without having managed to include the Pope within it – for what could it do against three, or even four other states?

Austria remained such until the day when its former partners inevitably turned against her. The voice of historical affinities – freed from contingencies and from the accident of the Holy Alliance, and revamped by the untiring action of modern subversion – ultimately made itself heard. It had been stifled by fear for forty years, but the natural inclination that had been suppressed came back with a bang.

The Revolution of 1830 marks the historical failure of the Holy Alliance.

Bearing in mind what we have said so far, let us now examine why Metternich's idea failed, after having given the peoples of Europe forty years of peace and prosperity.

Metternich's great salvation plan failed because, despite the agreements signed, a united front against the return of the revolution existed only on paper. If the most important clause of these agreements – the right, or rather duty, to intervene – had been followed,⁸ it is most likely that after 1789 – which was swept away by 1815 – there would have been no 1848. Consequently, as everything is linked, there would have been no 1866, no 1870, and finally no 1914 or 1917 – years that have plunged us⁹ into the deadly doldrums in which we lay dying, and all for the greater glory of the Masonic triangle and the star of Israel.

If the solidarity among kings, at a time when they were still in control of the situation, had been anything like that among the Jews, the latter would never have suppressed the former. Yet despite the lessons of the French Revolution, after averting imminent dangers, monarchs returned to thinking and acting as they had in the eighteenth century, that is: according to contingent, self-serving interests.

Leaving aside the case of Belgium and that of the Spanish colonies in South America, which are not as relevant to our subject, it was France which delivered the first blow against the pact of Vienna.

The Revolution of 1830¹⁰ was a case foreseen by the principle of intervention. Legitimate sovereigns ruling 'by grace of God' had mutually ensured their own legitimacy.

This time, the insurrection ousted a legitimate king ruling 'by grace of God', a sovereign whom God alone ought to have called to himself, or a legitimate successor should have replaced. A legitimate successor indeed existed, yet another one was chosen.

This new successor embodied the 'happy medium' mentality, the bourgeois and mediocre mentality *par excellence*. He stood for the monarchical tradition and the revolutionary one simultaneously.

This man had been chosen because the people liked them: he was the King of the French, not the King of France – not the hereditary holder of France, but rather the first civil servant of the country. Like all civil servants, he could be dismissed.

On an official level too, he was described not as ruler 'by grace of God', but 'by grace of the nation': a new formula which clearly applied not to a monarchy, but to a republic posing as a monarchy. The kingdom was thus stripped of the principle that constituted its

very *raison d'être*.

The distinction between these two formulas is no mere nuance, for a chasm exists between the two worlds they embody: that of logic and that of illogic. Logically speaking, what is above cannot be straightforwardly subordinated to what is below, without ceasing to be above. The claim that the People is not the sum of the individuals it is comprised of, but rather a quasi-metaphysical entity beyond and above all, is nothing but sophistry – or, to put it more simply, a bad joke.

This claim is extremely dangerous, despite its apparent moderation, whose aim is not to frighten moderate milieus. We should not forget that even socialists and Bolsheviks are mostly saying the same thing: factory workers in industrial countries such as Britain and workers and farmers in rural countries such as Russia make up the majority of the people; hence, by the democratic virtue of numbers, they make up the People with a capital P.

Once we accept the thesis that power stems from the will of the people, there is no longer any need to theoretically proceed on to Bolshevism: there is only a logical and progressive development of the doctrine. An actual chasm exists only between the idea of rule 'by grace of God' and that of rule 'by the will of the nation'; it is here that the slippery slope starts. The entire history of the nineteenth century proves it.

Leaving Switzerland aside, France was the first country on the continent to cross this chasm for the second time, in 1830. This was a repetition of the Revolution, yet it was so discretely carried out that no one foresaw its consequences and no one suspected that France had in principle ceased to be a monarchy.

With the return of the tricolour in place of the *fleurs-de-lys*,¹¹ France reverted to its revolutionary and Napoleonic tradition. It turned to promoting democracy and national self-determination, thus newly adopting the revolutionary testament of which Napoleon had claimed to be the executor at Saint Helena.

It was to fight against these very principles that the Holy Alliance had been established in the first place.

There is only one international Right: that of divine right, of the principle of authority from on high. By virtue of this principle, not merely the king but also every father and legitimate superior represents God, provided he keeps the commandments. Likewise, there is only one international Left: that of popular will, of the principle of authority from below – of authority stemming from those who should obey. But if those below do not obey, then there can be no order, not even in a small shop or humble family, not to mention in a state. For how could one both command in principle and obey in practice? Take the Bolshevik 'Soviets': in theory, the colonels and officers only give orders according to the will of those who should obey them in their regiments, namely the representatives of the soldiers gathered in the assembly, or 'Soviet'. This is what happens when the principle of 'national will' is logically applied on all levels, instead of being illogically confined to any individual one. This is a principle opposite to that of 'divine right', by virtue of which colonels will give orders in the name of the king, who in turn will rule in God's name.

The most crucial difference between these two principles rests on a point of the utmost importance: the fact that the government of divine right is neither arbitrary nor absolute, since it is guided and limited by the laws of Christian morality.

Nor could things be any different. All we need is a little logic to understand that a ‘visible lieutenant of God’ – whether he is a king, father, or leader – cannot act against the precise instructions given by his invisible captain, God or Christ, without undermining his own authority.

So-called national will – which is to say the will of the majority: a plebeian, ignorant, inconsistent, and incoherent will – has no one it must be accountable towards. It remains legitimate, legal, and supreme whatever it may do, whatever tribulations it imposes, and whatever crimes, impieties, extravagances, and abominations it commits. This will does not take the place of the king, but of He who makes all kings rule – God.

People do not realise that this path remains legally open as soon as *the principle of national will has replaced that of divine right*.

All European nations now find themselves on this path. This is the reason why they are so reluctant to fight Bolshevism, which is merely preceding them along it. For ultimately, Bolshevism stems from the same ideological principle: the alleged will of the masses of farmers and workers – alleged, that is, because the masses actually play no part in determining the public will.

It is the Anonymous, Imperceptible, and Invulnerable that does so in their stead, here and there. The Anonymous can only be grasped and perceived when it takes the form of the ‘people’s commissar’ – invariably a Jew, as one would expect. In other cases, however, it makes sure to conceal itself more prudently. It is the will of the Anonymous which replaces that of kings or even God.

But while all European nations now find themselves on this path, things were not so in 1830. At the time, France alone abandoned the body of nations destined to serve as a bulwark against the revolution. France walked out just like that, without banging any doors, and joined the other side of the barricade. Many Frenchmen were very proud of this – indeed, many still are! But how long will they continue to feel that way? Only the future will tell.

¹ Nicholas II (1868-1918) was the last Tsar of Russia, executed by the Bolsheviks.—Ed.

² Charles I (1625-1649) was the King of England, Ireland, and Scotland until his execution during the English Civil War, when the revolutionary forces of Oliver Cromwell insisted on a constitutional monarchy for England.—Ed.

³ This passage is missing in Evola’s edition.—Ed.

⁴ Latin: ‘peace with you’.—Ed.

⁵ Evola’s version: ‘One of the exterior signs of this original sin was the absence of the Pope, who – at least for Catholic nations – might have served as a rallying symbol of higher unity. More generally, a Leader was missing who, as a representative of pure spiritual authority in the fullness of its universality and transcendence, might have imposed his own right over all and risen like a common banner, without any of the great men down here feeling humiliated or

belittled, given the transcendence and supra-political quality of his very function. If this supreme and intangible point of reference is wanting, and this pure spiritual authority is silent, what is left is simply the voice of people singing *Rule Britannia*, *La France d'abord* or *Deutschland über Alles* – so loudly as to make their neighbours inaudible.’—Ed.

[6](#) Evola adds, ‘over all particular interests’.—Ed.

[7](#) Evola has, ‘Protestantism, liberalism, and democracy’.—Ed.

[8](#) This clause stated that the other powers would come to the aid of any member state in the event of an uprising against the monarchy there. Although the Alliance did intervene to crush a number of rebellions in its early years, by 1825 rising antagonisms between the various powers caused it to lapse.—Ed.

[9](#) Instead of ‘us’, Evola has ‘most of Europe’.—Ed.

[10](#) In the July Revolution of 1830, the monarch of France, Charles X, was overthrown by his opposition, and a constitutional monarchy was established to replace him. The new government took France out of the Holy Alliance. The monarchy itself was finally disbanded altogether in 1870.—Ed.

[11](#) The *fleurs-de-lys*, a stylised lily that was often used in French heraldry, was closely identified with the French monarchy.—Ed.

1848: The Beginning of the World Revolution¹

With the French revolution of 1830, the united front of counter-revolution was broken. France became a breeding ground for the kind of revolutionary ideas which ultimately led to the 1848 revolution, as people waited for the day in which the country would have taken a stand as the official champion of nationalisms² and political equality. The causes of the 1848 revolution are so futile and imperceptible that it is best to ignore them and simply note that the revolution broke out because it was destined to.

Ultimately, what is it that the populace of Paris wanted?

It would be difficult to answer this question other than with the old refrain: 'It did not know what it wanted, but wanted it very badly.' Apparently, it wanted universal happiness on Earth. But then who doesn't?

The specific variant of this idea in 1848 was the happiness of others as well as one's own, meaning nationalism for those 'groaning under foreign yoke' and democracy for oneself – since the French already had nationalism.³

The words 'yoke', 'groaning', and 'foreign' were all treated as synonyms. Likewise, the word 'happiness' was regarded as synonymous with democracy, republic, and nationalism.

How can one be so naïve as to even imagine that the common sense of the people, which is so adverse to abstraction by nature, drew this cloudy ideology from out of its bosom?

The people is the same everywhere. At times it seems to show extreme generosity without understanding a thing, while at other times it behaves ferociously for no apparent reason; sensitive to the point of silliness at times, even when there is no reason to be moved, at other times it remains impassive or even acts cynically when it ought to react or even become enraged so as not to be shamed. The people is what certain elements would like it to be. Such elements crown the people, as they know full well that sovereignty will always rest in their own hands.

This is the root of all infatuation with democracy, as was the case in Paris in 1848. The French people then wanted a republic. Soon after, it wanted the empire again, and war in the name of nationalism. Such was the plan of the international conspiracy.

It was argued at the time that France was not a nation like the rest: that its own patriotism was too small for its big heart and that the country had to embrace all nationalisms on Earth – without actually ascertaining whether these were real or merely figments of the imagination. France owed this to itself, for it had inherited the mission of the French Revolution; and an honour of this sort justified all sacrifices.

The happiness of men – people argued – does not consist of good health, well-being, or security. What a disgracefully materialist view this was for men who, in the name of evolutionism, claimed to be nothing but the offspring of apes! Nor – they continued – does happiness consist in the joys of the heart and spirit, this being mere sentimentalism unworthy of strong minds. Happiness for them consisted of two things: first of all, in

having politicians elected by universal suffrage; and secondly, in having politicians and ministers who all speak the same language. They need not share the same ethnic background, for they may be pure-blooded Semites, without this posing the slightest inconvenience. In this respect, the nationalist dogma was most generous: indeed, it considered it a sign of bad taste to even regard its policy as a form of accommodation.

The great revolutions of 1848 signalled the beginning of the political, social, and economic rise of the Jewish people. Throughout Europe, the Jews became what they had already been in the aftermath of the French Revolution: citizens of the countries where they had set up their gold Bedouin tents, citizens on the same footing as actual nationals – Germans in Germany, Prussians in Prussia, Austrians in Austria, Hungarians in Hungary, and Italians in Italy. They did not become such all of a sudden, but only gradually, as one revolution was followed by another and the new ideas became the statute of European countries.

The alleged disenfranchisement of peoples and men was nothing but the disenfranchisement of the Jews. The alleged spring of the peoples was nothing but the spring of the Jews. So much so, in fact, that such words only have meaning when used in reference to them.

All the anarchic developments of later democracies enabled the Jews to acquire greater influence and power. All the armaments imposed by the exacerbation of nationalism were a source of revenue for them. The taxes that ruined nations and men enriched the Jews, who were their ultimate recipients via the state. The Jews became the universal creditors. Tax hikes merely served to pay off some of the ever-mounting debts, while automatically increasing the wealth, power, and influence of Israel. Clearly, this went to the detriment of the entire human race, which fell directly or indirectly in debt to the Jews without realising it.

The wars and revolutions that continued spreading after 1848, which became an increasing burden on European countries, were but the finest of all financial operations for the Israelite gold peddlers.

The Jews may have no industries, forests, castles, or factories, but they own the stocks, sponsorships, and letters of credit for them. Those who offend the Jews' envious gazes by showing off their own riches are in fact nothing but the Jews' tax-payers, one way or the other. At the same time, these individuals serve as lightning rods attracting blasts of popular rage upon themselves and their tangible assets, thereby diverting this rage from the Jew, who remains undetectable and free from responsibility.

When the gap between the wealth of businesses and the misery of the masses will grow too conspicuous or shocking, people will explain – by resorting to scientific arguments – that the problem is a widespread economic crisis, and not simply the transfer of cash into Jewish pockets.

This process unfolded relatively slowly in the first half of the nineteenth century, but since 1848 everything has been moving along with giant steps in this direction – uninterrupted progress, indeed.

The simultaneous revolutions of 1848 were exceptional events in both economic and political terms: Jewish businessmen never made a better investment.

If in certain respects men came to enjoy a greater level of comfort after these revolutions, this was due to the industrial application of science, which has nothing to do with capitalist practices or democratic methods.⁴

The juridical disenfranchisement of the Jews and their acquisition of equal civil rights went to the detriment of their new fellow citizens. Something similar may be found in the *Arabian Nights*, which tells of a fool who opened a bottle containing an evil genie. When the genie was released from the pressure of the bottle, it grew to such a size that it ended up occupying the entire world and ruling over humanity.

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, all professions, careers, and fields of action – with the exception of certain honorific offices of no social importance – were opened up to the Jews, who rushed to occupy them *en masse*. They fiercely competed with the Christian flock and gradually took over all the best posts.

Russia alone remained closed to them. The outrageous case of Russia thus became the favourite subject matter of all Jewish-made European literature and thought. There is less talk of Russia nowadays – when the state of the country is enough to make one's hair stand on end – than there was between 1848 and 1914. This in itself should make us think and realise that, according to modern parlance, a state is liberal, tolerant, and enlightened when it honours the Jew, even if it oppresses all its other citizens and is headed by a new Nero. A state, on the contrary, is regarded as despotic, oppressive, and backward, and elicits feelings of outrage, as soon as it seeks to defend itself against the Jew, even if all its other citizens have no reason to complain.

Israel was never to forgive Russia. As soon as it had attained its goals in western and central Europe, it directed its efforts against the one enemy still standing.

If the year 1848 was the equinox of the Jew, it was followed by countless April showers, with great temperature variations. Still, it took about twenty years for relations in Europe to conform to the new order.

Leaving aside the case of France, where the monarchy of the Orléans was brought down, this first historical attempt at a pan-European revolution initially seemed to have failed, since the old order was re-established.

The overall plan, however, had been well prepared: no conservative state was to deal with its neighbour's revolution, for each had a revolution of its own to deal with. Russia alone was free, but had its eyes fixed on Constantinople, where the 'sick man' was growing sicker and sicker. The Tsar focused all his diplomatic efforts on the attempt to ensure his succession and thus become the executor of Peter the Great's will. Britain held Russia in check. While neither side wished to wage war, the situation remained tense.

This tension was exploited by the parties of subversion, which were hoping to avert the possibility that Nicholas might deal with the revolutions in central Europe.

The Tsar never intervened in this area, not even in Prussia, where the ruler – his brother-in-law – was facing a difficult situation. Still less did the Tsar consider intervening in Italy, which was far away.

While in his heart he was utterly foreign to liberalism, Nicholas I did not possess Metternich's genius, nor his overall view of the historical chain of causes and effects. A greater soldier than statesman, and a ruler so authoritarian as to ignore all advice, the Tsar only saw what was before his eyes and never considered the possibility that the fire consuming Europe might envelop his own empire.

Nicholas I, the man before whom everyone from the White Sea to the Black, and from the Carpathian Mountains to the Pacific Ocean, trembled, believed his empire to be made of iron. He refused to admit – or even consider the possibility – that the Judaising liberals of the West he so deeply despised had already started digging his descendants' graves.

He behaved like our contemporaries do and like Bismarck did (who nonetheless is considered to have been a great statesman). But the behaviour of Nicholas I is more excusable, since he lacked the same level of experience.

The Tsar was certainly capable of crushing the revolution in 1848, for he was still sure of the unfailing loyalty of his troops. However, he committed the terrible mistake of not doing so, and the price paid for this was the very existence of his dynasty and empire. The revolution of 1848 was the egg from which the revolution of 1917 was born: for historical events are always interconnected. Regrettably, the only people aware of this are the Jews, and herein lies their great superiority.

In the life of individuals, families, and nations, there are certain supreme moments in which the future rests in one's hands.

History might have taken a different course, had Nicholas I – whose empire had not yet been affected by the surrounding putrefaction – resolutely stood up as the representative of absolute authority in 1848, just as Napoleon III was to do a short time later for the principles of the French Revolution. Short-sighted people would have accused the Tsar of engaging in a useless war. From a contingent point of view, it would no doubt have been useless for Russia, but from the point of view of the philosophy of history – as may be judged today – it would have been a war of salvation both for his own country and for Christian humanity.

Only Nicholas I could have intervened and crushed the infernal conspiracy. What he did, however, was merely stifle one of its local symptoms: the revolution in Hungary.

A Russian army led by General Paskevitch got the better of it. The insurrection capitulated and the holy crown of Saint Stephen was returned to its legitimate holder, the Emperor of Austria.⁵

This act put the government of Vienna back in power, when for a moment it had been thrown into confusion by the occurrence of simultaneous revolts across its domain. The movement was temporarily quelled, but the impulse had been given by then and would never come to a halt.

Politically, Metternich had no voice. An old man disheartened at witnessing the triumph of what he hated and feared the most in his last days, this great European – the last statesmen to have envisaged Europe as an orderly and united whole – had in a way been buried by the ruins of his own edifice, the Holy Alliance. Only the memory of it survived. Its hour had come and the only man capable of fully grasping the events of the century had nothing to look forward to but death.⁶

The old emperor Franz had died. After the short reign of the weak Ferdinand, Franz Joseph – whom our generation has come to know as the patriarch of Europe – ascended his ancestors' throne at the age of eighteen. He hadn't had the time to acquire much experience, for he had been caught in the midst of events arising out of democratic chaos that were even less intelligible to the men of his day than they are to us.

This young man, who had been raised according to the traditional principles of the Hapsburg household, was most disconcerted by the first encounter he made with the phenomenon of democracy on the threshold of adulthood. The impression it created must have been like that of an upside-down house painted by some extravagant artist trying to be original and shocking by inverting all established values. Franz Joseph's reaction may easily be imagined, especially because democracy at the time was still something new that found its only precedent in the French Revolution, a frightful nightmare which still haunted people's imaginations.

People no more realised at the time than they do today that this was an attack mounted by a minority as small as the ruling elite, and seeking to replace it. The so-called People was regarded as an actual entity which plotters and adventurers who were in the pay of capitalist anonymity claimed to be representing.

The new Chancellor of the Empire, Charles Philip, Prince of Schwarzenberg, was less inspired than his brilliant predecessor and took the dangerous path of concessions and compromises. A similar approach will never satisfy an enemy who is insatiable by definition: it will merely show one's fear of him, and thus make him all the more demanding and arrogant. One cannot claim to know what impertinence is until one has witnessed democratic arrogance and heard the unrestrained words of the blithering maniacs who claim to embody the mute and indifferent people.

This regime based on half-measures lasted several years. Finally, a parliamentary constitution was introduced.

The Austrian state started down a slippery slope. The Jews were assigned full civic rights. All paths, except those within the imperial court, were opened to them. From this moment onwards, the Jews anonymously began playing a conspicuous and dire role by hiding – as they are wont to do – behind the fetish of the 'people'.

The party of the French Revolution – which should not be confused with France as a country – thus celebrated a new victory. It did so in Vienna, the 'Kaiserstadt' which was regarded as the sanctuary of feudalism and which had been the cradle of the Holy Alliance.

In Austria, however, despite political changes, the economic and social structure remained imbued with the feudal spirit. The great noblemen remained economically independent of capitalism and continued to hold far greater prestige in the eyes of the masses than the bureaucrats and politicians. Besides, on both sides of the Leitha, it was the heads of great families of impeccable lineage who made up the Upper Chambers, which were known as the Lords' Chambers. Things continued this way until the Great War, much to the indignation of all 'generous and enlightened souls'.

Austria and Hungary, not unlike Prussia and the rest of Germany, showed themselves more reluctant to embrace democracy than France had been, and Russia was destined to be in the future. No Louis XIV or Richelieu, no Ivan the Terrible or Peter the Great, had sapped the lifeblood of patriarchal feudalism and domesticated the landed aristocracy. Gradually, almost everywhere except in Austria, this nobility had been drawn towards the royal courts, thus losing touch with the countryside it had once ruled over. In France and Russia this aristocracy was replaced to a far greater degree than in Austria or Germany by paid officials with no roots in the country and ready to serve the highest bidder.

The victory of subversion, while striking, was only partial. Planning to proceed with order, as usual, subversion was satisfied with what it had accomplished and left the rest up to its ally: time.

Things would have been much easier if republican and parliamentary regimes had already been flourishing in Europe in that age. It would have been enough, then, with the help of the press and some propaganda, to fabricate the desired public opinion and instil it in the sovereign people, which at that point could have been exploited to demolish the state.⁷ Demagogues devoted to the cause would have occupied ministerial seats. By financial means, they would have nourished certain dispositions, giving the impression they were simple and spontaneous ones. This is how international capitalism manages to have all the wars it desires and prevent those it does not want.

In order to implement this process, however, two things are required: first of all, complete freedom of the press, whereby no authority has the right to muzzle the press, not even when the salvation of the nation is at stake; and secondly, a republican democratic regime, in which the weak men in power have only a casual relation with their ministerial portfolio. The only permanent and hereditary ties these politicians have are with their own portfolios, or rather wallets, which is why they will say: 'After me, the deluge – as long as I can take enough "dough" on board Noah's Ark for my family and me.'⁸

A similar point of view is more of an exception in the case of kings, and especially absolute monarchs, for the simple reason that the state represents their personal fortune, power, wealth and glory, as well as their descendants' heritage. It is particularly rare among the landed aristocracy of the old sort, whose traditions are not nomadic like the Ark of the Covenant of the Old Testament. The fortune of these nobles consists of a sum of elements drawn from the national territory: it is not mobile and is not based on credit, which is to say on debts that make it dependent on creditors. The above point of view, however, is quite logical and normal for scheming politicians with no links to the soil or

history: men risen out of God knows where, only to disappear with their pockets full after having carried out the tasks allotted to them by God knows whom.

To behave dishonestly towards his own country, a nobleman – not to mention a king – must be dishonest to the point of selflessness and stupidity, something rare indeed.

To behave honestly, a ‘Tartempion’⁹ of democracy brought into power by an anonymous clique that collected him from a barn – if not from a dunghill – must be honest to the point of selflessness and self-sacrificing heroism.

This is also an infrequent case: men like Cincinnatus¹⁰ are the exception. Besides, even when they are to be found, it is not they who are brought to power and given any credit.

This is why political regimes ruled by dishonest men of the above sort are so warmly praised by the men of ‘progress’ – whose alleged progress is merely the powerful leverage they exert to the detriment of the blind masses.

But up until 1848, this golden age of democracy had yet to dawn.

¹ Evola adds, ‘Israel Enters into Action’.—Ed.

² Evola has ‘plebeian nationalisms’.—Ed.

³ Evola has ‘Jacobin nationalism’.—Ed.

⁴ The previous two paragraphs are not included in Evola’s edition.—Ed.

⁵ The 1848 revolution in Hungary expanded to become a war for liberation from the Hapsburgs. Russia intervened at Franz Joseph’s request, and invaded Transylvania in April 1849, although the Russian forces were soundly defeated by a Hungarian army under the command of the Polish-born General Józef Bem. The Russians sent a larger force in during the summer and were victorious the second time.—Ed.

⁶ Evola omitted the last sentence from his edition.—Ed.

⁷ The original French has ‘another’ in place of ‘the state’.—Ed.

⁸ In French this is a pun, since *portefeuille* means both political portfolio as well as wallet. In Italian, *portafogli* can only mean wallet, causing Evola to use the word for ‘offices’ (*cariche*) the first time it occurs.—Ed.

⁹ In French, Tartempion serves the same function as ‘John Doe’ in English, to designate an anonymous male person.—Ed.

¹⁰ Lucius Cincinnatus (519-430 BC) was a Roman consul who was elected dictator of Rome in 458 during time of war. He was successful, and became a hero to the Romans.—Ed.

Napoleon III: An Ally of World Subversion

In the historical period we are focusing on, subversion had the tremendous luck of finding a powerful ally who could exercise the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of other countries. He did so in a way opposite to the way Metternich had intended it, namely in the name of a new principle of international solidarity: mutual solidarity among nationalist and democratic states bent on freeing one another from the yoke of alleged traditional tyrannies.

This ally and selfless champion of democratic solidarity based on the ‘immortal principles’ was Napoleon III, who emerged in France thanks to the 1848 revolution. Yet before undertaking any new tasks, subversion more prudently sought to prevent the possibility of there being any reversal of fortune. Up until 1848, it had dared to ignore the wild card represented by the Tsar of all Russia. This monarch, who had hardly been enlightened by the torch that Weishaupt had passed on to Nubius, and Nubius was destined to pass on to Lenin,¹ had threatened to ‘spill the beans’: the sauce the Jew was preparing in order to poison all those who stood in his way.

Luckily for the Jew, this autocrat who continued to treat God’s Chosen People as rabble had only intervened in Hungary. While it had been possible to remedy this damage, the partisans of liberty on the march were never to forget the lesson they had learned.

Before having France intervene in Italy² in any way, it was necessary to avert the risk of any Russian intervention to reinforce Austrian defences. In other words, it was necessary to deliver a blow against the Russian Emperor alone, in order to immobilise and disable him. Then another blow would have been delivered against the emperor of Austria, who by then would have been completely isolated. The aim was to have only the revolutions occur simultaneously, while fostering divisions within the opposite front. It was a fine political strategy.

We shall not focus on all the various incidents of the Parisian revolution of 1848. Suffice it to know where it led to, after all the incoherent declamations that followed it: first, it brought a President of the Republic, namely Prince Louis Napoleon Bonaparte. Then, through a plebiscite, Napoleon III became emperor – clearly, Emperor of the French, not of France; and by the will of the nation, not by grace of God.

It was Napoleon III’s ambition to complete his uncle’s work. But in order to complete any kind of work, one must first understand of what it consists. Now, ‘to understand is to equal’: the work of Napoleon the Great could only have been completed by Napoleon the Great, not by Napoleon the Lesser.

More than simply the work of Napoleon, *The Memorial of Saint Helena* is a product of the man’s disenchantment – which can easily be imagined, considering how he must have felt after having been abandoned by all the princes and great men of the world who had once been at his feet. Having been betrayed and even left by his own wife, an emperor’s daughter, Napoleon naturally turned back to his origins: the gospel of resentment preached

by the French Revolution. How different things had been on the day when Napoleon had placed the imperial crown on his own head with the momentous words: ‘God gave it to me, woe to him who touches it.’

Why had he not said: ‘The people gave it to me, and I shall keep it until the day it wants it back’?

What was the reason for the presence of the Pope at the consecration ceremony? Did the will of the people require it? This was very much in the tradition of Charlemagne and the Holy Roman Emperors, only with an added touch of pride, for while the latter had gone to Rome, Napoleon had personally summoned Rome. Still, his ceremony was hardly in the tradition of Robespierre.

Why had Napoleon married not just a blue-blooded princess, but the double grandniece of Marie Antoinette – a representative of the purest Catholic, feudal, aristocratic, and medieval tradition, the very opposite of that of the Revolution?

Why had he appointed arch-chamberlains and arch-seneschals in place of the chamberlains and seneschals of the *ancien régime*? What was the reason for all this royal pomp, which showed none of the republican simplicity enjoyed by Washington or Lincoln?³

If Napoleon hadn’t fallen, he would have left a new feudal system of fiefs loyal to the crown, with generals’ sons as the new neighbours of the old country noblemen.

But what about the principle of indivisible nationalities? Was it to be found in France (which extended beyond its ethnic boundaries), in the Confederation of the Rhine, in the Kingdom of Westphalia, in that of Naples, or in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw?

The truth is that it hadn’t taken Napoleon long to throw his republican cloak out the window and don a mantle dotted with bees. It was only when he was forced to remove the latter that, now a lonely and abandoned man filled with bitterness, Napoleon addressed posterity from the rocks of Saint Helena as an obedient son of the Revolution. Up until that moment it was not the ‘great achievements of the human spirit’ that the great conqueror had sought.

Napoleon has sought to present himself as an heir of Charlemagne, not of the French Revolution. With his ambition growing with victory after victory, he had yearned for the honour of being Emperor of the West and not simply Emperor of the French – too modest a title for him, and one that, in any case, would no longer have fitted him. For Napoleon, nationalism never mattered.⁴

Napoleon certainly paid a great service to the revolutionary cause in Europe. But he did so unconsciously, without really intending to, only because almost all his officers and soldiers were old revolutionaries who carried the dust of the Revolution on their uniforms and boots, leaving traces of it in the capitals they marched through. The loyal subjects of emperors and kings saw their lords and princes being humiliated by the Great Upstart and his band of upstarts, as a consequence of which the old rulers lost much of their prestige.

It was no revolutionary, democratic, and nationalist dream which the new Caesar cherished for his son, who was bestowed the medieval – and in a way imperially international – title of King of Rome. This title alone is enough to reveal the real nature of Napoleon's thought, his *Memorial* being but the sour grapes of his resentment and bitterness.⁵ The title of King of Rome implied that its holder was a Roman emperor – a French Roman emperor, just as in the past there had been German Holy Roman Emperors; an emperor, nonetheless, who would have had the Pope as his chaplain and kings as his great vassals (who in turn would have had princes as their own vassals). This would have been a new feudal system: a pyramid with a summit – what had been missing to make the Middle Ages complete.

Such a grand view of history was too much for the limited intelligence of someone like Napoleon III. Ultimately he was nothing but a petty conspirator in the pay of the anonymous conspiracy that had brought him to power.

Incapable of grasping the real plans of Napoleon at work behind the events of the First Empire, his heir merely gave a literal interpretation to the manuscript which Napoleon had dictated to him by his own resentment and disenchantment at Saint Helena.

The parties of subversion made sure to interpret the manuscript for Napoleon III. They had already claimed the great name of Napoleon I for themselves in the aftermath of the events of 1815, along with the desire for revenge felt by the French. There was actually no reason for feeling vengeful, as the historical territory of France had not been mutilated. Only the French Revolution had been defeated with the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The subversive parties, however, put their subtle minds to work in an attempt to link the revolutionary idea to that of France, thereby confounding mediocre souls.

One of these mediocre souls bore the name of Napoleon and the surname of Bonaparte. The forces of subversion were very clever at exploiting this man by making a most particular – and indeed historically unprecedented – emperor of him. Napoleon III's mission was to fight kings and emperors (his new colleagues), to weaken the prestige of the monarchy in Europe, to disintegrate all empires, and to make the Revolution triumph everywhere, with all the implications this would have carried.

As a monarch, Napoleon III had a particularly lustrous court, teeming with title-holders and gold-spangled dignitaries. He conferred hereditary noble titles that included all the privileges of the old, traditional ones.⁶ As a matter of principle, he fought with fanatical zeal – to the point of making this the very purpose of his reign – against the principle underlying the privileges by virtue of which he ruled, and could hope to pass his throne on to his descendants.

This is a paradox that has hardly been seriously considered. Otherwise, people would soon have realised that something unusual was going on.

Precisely because they have seriously considered this matter, certain writers have reached the conclusion that Napoleon III was simply an agent of the occult circles that dominated society in his day. These circles brought him to the throne and kept him in power by

means of invisible strings, the nature of which is unknown to us, but which established a genuine form of servitude from which the emperor could not break free.

This may all sound a little far-fetched. But while it is a rather bold judgement, it is not unjustified.

It is certainly hard to understand how an emperor might have enthusiastically promoted democracy worldwide – the one thing that most went against his own *raison d'être* – and done so almost purely for the sake of art, so to speak, when such a policy damaged the interests of his own dynasty and country.

Speaking from his throne in the middle of the Atlantic, Napoleon I had proclaimed himself to be the 'Messiah of the Revolution'. Napoleon III was a man for all tasks: a tool to demolish walls. He owed his crown to the Revolution, which would take it back as soon as he had played his part. This part, for which Napoleon III had been raised out of nothing, he certainly played very well: for, as we shall see, he was ready to listen to the prompts which were whispered in his ear.

The first wall that needed to be demolished was Nicholas I. This unscathed champion of reaction – the only man who had successfully intervened in the past and who might have done so again in the future – hanged over the forces of subversion like a sword of Damocles.

The question was whether Napoleon III was strong enough on his own to bring down this formidable athlete, who was then at the peak of his power.

As if it had just fallen from the sky, in 1853 Napoleon found the ally he needed to pave the way for democracy and avert the danger that threatened it. Britain did not usually meddle in continental affairs and was interested in only one: that of the Ottoman Empire, Constantinople, and the Dardanelles. Its latent rival here was Russia.⁷

Unlike the countries of continental Europe, Britain had not witnessed any explicit revolutions. Instead, it had undergone a long phase of evolution, as imperceptible from the outside as it was profound on the inside. British institutions had apparently remained unchanged. The Crown was still there – indeed, its prestige was even on the increase – as were the Privy Chamber, the House of Commons, and the House of Lords. Still, these no longer retained their original significance. Everything had been democratically transformed, while remaining unchanged on the surface.

Let us also bear in mind that Britain was swarming with Masonic lodges. It is true that their mental, intellectual, moral, or even mundane and social level was far more elevated than that of continental lodges. But still, one should not forget that while Masonic lodges are often perfectly respectable places in themselves, they are particularly prone to becoming the passive recipients of progressive suggestions. Certain cells will thus become saturated with these influences, without most members of the lodge – including its honorary leaders, those adorning its façade and attracting outsiders – ever knowing about their role or presence.

In the age we are now discussing, a radical Liberal minister was in power in Britain. It

has actually been found that he was under the control of the radical wing of his party. Its head, Lord Palmerston, was Prime Minister, which is to say that he was the political leader of the United Kingdom. This was the same party as that which is now presided over by Lloyd George – himself a radical, i.e. more than just a Liberal. At the time, this party brought together pure liberals and radicals. Yet as the wheel of history has travelled quite a long way since Lord Palmerston's day, because of the distance that separates us from him, he now strikes us as being less of a subversive than Lloyd George.

Lord Palmerston and his radical circle naturally sympathised with the European revolutionary movement of 1848 and could not bear Metternich's policies, Nicholas I's attitude, and the Moscovite spirit of those years more generally.

Their aversion for Tsarism, which had little regard for the Chosen People and their ideals, was only Platonic at first. Things changed, however, as soon as a pretext was found that could bring British interests into play. This pretext – something rather insignificant in itself – would not have been enough for a conservative government, which would easily have found a way to come to an arrangement without sacrificing any of the country's interests. On the other hand, it was quite enough for Lord Palmerston to launch an offensive against the Russian Empire: for he was heeding the call of his blood. Lord Palmerston found an unexpected ally in Napoleon III – unexpected, that is, because the Turkish question may have been a good enough reason for Britain to attack, but certainly not France.

There may have been few grounds for serious conflict between France and Russia, but many could be found for conflict between Russian autocracy and the French Revolution. What more could be asked for?

¹ Evola adds this footnote: 'Jean Adam Weishaupt, born in Bavaria in 1748, was the founder of the so-called "Order of the Illuminati", a secret association of great historical importance, as it clearly illustrates the transformation of aristocratic and spiritual initiatory organisations into political, revolutionary, and subversive groups. "Nubius" was the pseudonym used by a mysterious figure who exercised considerable influence over early nineteenth-century secret societies, starting with the Italian Carbonari. Besides, it is likely that the name Weishaupt – meaning "White leader" – was itself a pseudonym.'

² Evola removes 'in Italy'.—Ed.

³ Evola omits this paragraph from his edition.—Ed.

⁴ Evola omits all but the first sentence of this paragraph.—Ed.

⁵ The previous sentence is omitted in Evola's edition.—Ed.

⁶ Evola omits the first two sentences of this paragraph.—Ed.

⁷ De Poncins is referring to the conditions which led to the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1853.—Ed.

The First Wars for Democracy: The Crimean War¹

The war of 1853, known as the Crimean War, marked an important historical turning point for two reasons. First of all, because it signalled the final cancellation of the pact of the Holy Alliance and the closing – at the hands of its signatories – of the beneficial period of international peace it had brought. Secondly, because the war coincided not merely with the cancellation of the Holy Alliance, but with the very negation of the principle on which it was founded and its replacement with an opposite one through a complete reversal of values. The Crimean War was an event and a symptom with no historical antecedent: it was a war for democracy, and ultimately nothing other than that. For the first time in history, two monarchies acted as the mercenary champions of a sweeping revolution that transcended the apparently national boundaries of the French Revolution.

Strictly speaking, the wars of the French Revolution had not been democratic ones. They had been defensive wars waged by France, which happened to be in the thralls of revolution at the time. The Napoleonic Wars had been fuelled by the all-consuming ambition of a great conqueror who thirsted after glory and power. The war of 1853, by contrast, was the first openly and genuinely democratic war in history. As we know all too well, it was not the last.

For the first time, young men from good families² killed one another, not in the name of their countries, princes, or any inborn feeling, but so that scum on both sides, instigated by the tumultuous Jew, could tread on their corpses.

It took what is mockingly referred to as ‘freedom’ to make such bitter irony possible, with its repression of people’s genuine personalities. People would once have given their lives for what they loved. Now that they are ‘free’, they are forced to have themselves killed, if needs be, for the devil himself or the interests of Jewish capitalism – which amounts to much the same thing. If they refuse to do so, they will be accused of being traitors to their country and possibly shot, as if one’s fatherland, Freemasonry, democracy, and the Jew were all one and the same thing.

The spokesmen of democracy and the so-called freethinkers cherish few illusions concerning the real meaning of the war of 1853. They see it not as a conflict among many others in history, one motivated by some issue with the Turks, but rather as the clash of two worlds and two basic dogmas: ‘that of the barbarian Christianity of the East and that of the young social faith of the civilised West’, to quote Michelet’s³ own words.

We should hasten to add that according to that way of thinking, Christianity is barbarous in Naples, Munich, or even Saint Peter’s Cathedral. Lodges, stock exchanges, and banks were to be the future temples of the ‘civilised’ West. Nicholas I was a ‘tyrant’ and ‘vampire’, as Metternich had been. There are some people whom one cannot disturb without being labelled a vampire, while there are others whom one is free to massacre by the thousands in the name of freedom without thereby ceasing to be a noble and generous person.

According to Michelet himself, this ‘was a religious war’ – what an accurate expression! – which called for ‘the death of hundreds of thousands of men’. It was thus necessary for Christians – for most of these men were not freethinkers, financiers, or Jews – to have themselves killed in order to destroy Christianity and pave the way for Bolshevism in the East and the ubiquitous spread of capitalism in the West.

The Crimean War – the work of capitalism, democracy, and their artificial product, modern nationalism⁴ – inaugurated this new method of warfare, which was destined to find its triumph in the World War.

Russia was unprepared for this conflict. How could it have not been? The Tsar and his ministers were men of the *ancien régime* whose political approach was based on the lessons history had taught them; they were not apocalyptic visionaries of the future, after Michelet’s fashion.

Things we have grown accustomed to by now, such as the ‘selfless’ wars waged by countries – especially monarchies! – for democracy or the profit of international capitalism⁵ were unintelligible to the followers of ‘barbarian Christianity’. What they saw was that in 1853 there was no good reason to trouble the lives of peoples, and that the reasons invoked, which fell outside the spectrum of ordinary causes for conflict, were an unprecedented novelty that utterly escaped their understanding.

No one in Russia was expecting any clash to occur in Crimea. Troops thus had to be moved across the whole of European Russia – a slow and difficult operation in an age when the country had few railways and all of its roads were either incomplete or in a state of disrepair.

In short, the army of Moscow, whose reputation following the events of 1813 was rather overinflated, were defeated, and the Tsar did not even make it to the battlefield, for he fell ill along the journey and died. According to the official version, he died of flu; according to the most common opinion, this proud and uncompromising man poisoned himself because he could not bear the thought of having been humiliated by democracy. Others still say he was poisoned.

With the death of Nicholas I, a living embodiment of Tsarism disappeared, and of all that by which democracy was most horrified. Yet, Nicholas I lived on in the hearts of his own people, who admired him as a true Tsar and lord. Adored by his soldiers, Nicholas I had been generous with those loyal to him but merciless in the fight against revolt, whose real significance in nineteenth century history he had grasped. Once, when the rumble of revolt had reached the windows of the Winter Palace, Nicholas I had stepped out on the balcony and shouted: ‘On your knees!’ The people had knelt before him: such was the authority which his bearing and voice commanded.

Nicholas I’s successor, Alexander II, half-heartedly professed a vague sort of liberalism. To the extent to which this is possible for an autocrat, he was well regarded by democrats, who only tolerate weak and irresolute monarchs. It was thus in the reign of Alexander II that the decay of the Empire began. It was destined to never end. All other obstacles

having been removed, subversion was now to direct all its efforts against Russia.

The Congress of Paris was Napoleon III's triumph. People saw it as an act of revenge against the Congress of Vienna and for the French defeat at Waterloo. One would be hard put to find out just how and why this was considered to be the case, unless we are to reduce this whole triumph and revenge to the simple fact that the Congress was held in Paris. France was destined to receive much the same degree of satisfaction in 1919, in the aftermath of a bigger war for democracy.

This, then, is what France gained. Britain hardly fared any better. The rest went to democracy. It was democracy which really triumphed, for Nicholas I had never posed any real danger to France – only a serious threat to the Revolution.

[1](#) Evola entitles this chapter, 'The First Wars for the Occult Front: The Crimean War'.—Ed.

[2](#) Evola has, 'sons of the same family'.—Ed.

[3](#) Jules Michelet (1798-1874) was a French historian and man of letters. He was very much an anti-clericalist and opposed to the pre-Revolutionary order of France.—Ed.

[4](#) Evola has, 'the subversive and anti-traditional nationalism of modern times'.—Ed.

[5](#) Evola omits, 'or the profit of international capitalism'.—Ed.

After Bringing Russia Down, the Revolution Directs Its Efforts against Austria

After having temporarily brought Russia down, all efforts were directed against Austria. The revolution made no mistakes about this country. Hatred, like love, is driven by an unflinching instinct when it comes to what is intrinsically one's opposite.

Austria was the most hated of all countries. It was the most visible embodiment of Catholicism, the *ancien régime*, the concept of personal property (as opposed to the social one of capitalism), the heritage of the Holy Roman Empire, and the ideal of a hierarchical ordering of Christendom under a single sceptre – in other words, an embodiment of all that was considered to be most barbarous. In short, Austria stood for the very opposite of the ideals of the Revolution: capitalism, democracy, and nationalism,¹ all three of which were utterly contrary to the Austrian and medieval worldview.

Now, Austria in the first half of the nineteenth century was a country of the *ancien régime*. The reason for this lay not simply in the fact that it was a political monarchy. Capitalism might, in theory, have contented itself with turning Austria into a monarchy ruled by bankers and financial traders. The country, however, consisted of a federation of self-sufficient economic monarchies governed by a sovereign who was a big landowner free of debts – in other words, an independent ruler. These monarchies were self-sufficient in that they made up for one another as concerns basic goods.

Trade, moneylending, and agiotage were to be found almost exclusively in the big cities – which were certainly not as big as those of today – yet only constituted a secondary feature of the economy. This was instead based – for individuals as much as for the state – on production, consumption, and exchange. The economic rulers of the country were the landowners, who were often industrialists as well, and produced most of the necessary foodstuff with the help of their farmers. There were no complaints, poverty, or strikes, first because this ruling class was patriarchal and its members – from father to son – were thus visible and personally accountable; and secondly, because these landowners had no fixed-term creditors ready to hold a knife to their throats. They were free from debts, while paying all of their taxes, for the state was relatively undemanding at the time, not being indebted as today's states are.

This is not to say that the Jew played no role, but simply that he did not take the lion's share – one big enough for the Lion of Judah.

In economic as well as political and social terms, Austria set the tone for the whole German Confederation, which was comprised of states which were all rather similar in this respect. They consisted of federations of big patriarchal landowners and industrialists under the paternal leadership of princes, archdukes, and kings – who were landowners and producers themselves. The latter received a just amount of taxes not for the enrichment of usurers, but for the upkeep of famous schools and universities, the police, the law courts, roads, and their small armies.

If Austria – albeit stripped of its Italian provinces – had taken the upper hand in Germany, this would have meant the establishment of a reactionary and anti-capitalist bloc based on feudal property ownership (or, rather, an updated version of it). This bloc would have cut Russia and the Balkan peninsula off from the Western democracies: it might thus have prevented the destructive infiltration of the ideas spawned by the French Revolution. The Catholic element, moreover, would have been predominant.

Austria had to be destroyed.

It was because of this goal that such great importance was assigned to the problem of national irredentism, which had previously been utterly non-existent.² We should not forget that in the first half of the nineteenth century, Austria was even more of a patchwork of different races and languages than at the beginning of the twentieth. It not only ruled – without granting any constitutions or autonomy – over Bohemia, part of Poland, Hungary, and Croatia; in other words, over a Magyar land and three Slavic ones with different languages; but it also controlled the whole of northern Italy: the Veneto, Lombardy, and Tuscany.

It was thus chiefly in pursuit of the above goal that the ingenious Jews – never to be caught off-guard – staked everything on nationalism, which they started fostering. The terrain chosen for their attack was Italy.

Italy was no doubt the most vulnerable area of the Hapsburg empire, especially because the peoples of the north of the peninsula were the heirs to democratic and republican traditions – which were instead prominently lacking in the central European regions.

Italian cities had been, for the most part, republican if not democratic. They had always fought against the German emperors. Traces of this remained in the local political temperament. They alone in Europe had professed a sort of patriotism or particularism that was less dynastic than civic, being reminiscent of the spirit of the ancient Mediterranean cities.

There were thus good reasons to expect the new ideas sparked by Napoleon and the French Revolution to be better received in Italy than elsewhere. Italy was the most vulnerable region of the Empire whose dissolution was so eagerly sought; at the same time, it was the most desirable victim according to the overall plan of subversion.

It was not so much by means of democracy and the ‘immortal principles’ as through nationalism that Austria had to be isolated as far as possible, so as to prevent her companions in misfortune from coming to her aid: for she alone would never have been capable of getting herself out of trouble. After demolishing Austria, there would have been plenty of time to think about what yet remained to be done about the other states.

Napoleon III fulfilled his task by declaring war against the Emperor of Austria, with no apparent grounds or provocation, for not even a vague reason was to be found that might somehow have concerned the future of France. Napoleon III simply declared war, as he had done with the Emperor of Russia, in order to complete the revolutionary work of 1848. The true and undeclared reason was the following one: the Catholic unity of the

Hapsburg state, which lay above all national and ethnic differences, was a relic of the Holy Roman Empire, a more limited expression and model of what the Holy Alliance was originally meant to be, but in practice never was. How could the enforcer of the lofty plans of the great Revolution not contribute to the disintegration of this hated vestige of the medieval order, which was considered so offensive in the age of progress?

A second democratic war was thus waged in the name of nationalism.

Austria was defeated and withdrew from Italy forever.³ It lost much of its power and prestige within the German Confederation, where Protestant Prussia now gained predominance.⁴

Two other ideals were weakened as a result of this war: the Catholic ideal of Christian political universalism, which yielded to the Protestant idea of nationalist separatisms; and the conservative and feudal ideal – as traditionally embodied by Austria – which yielded to democratic ‘progress’.

The King of Italy became yet another sovereign ruling ‘by the will of the nation’. In fact, he ruled by the will of subversive rather than purely national elements. Hence, the King found himself in an extremely difficult position: for as the heir to a Catholic dynasty of illustrious princes, he represented the conservative ideal; but at the same time, he embodied the very opposite ideal, as the involuntary enemy of the Pope – the source of all legitimacy – and the product of Masonic lodges and other secret societies.

Napoleon III himself faced much the same difficulties: for as the head of a Catholic country, he was forced to take the religious feelings of his subjects into account. He could not be a real ally of the new Italy of Mazzini and Garibaldi against Austria, and was even forced to stand in its way at the gates of Rome. His army, which had crucially contributed to the Italian victory and unification, was destined to prevent the Italians from gaining access to their new capital. Ultimately, in unifying Italy Napoleon III went against his own interest, something which he ought to have foreseen: for ‘a woman will easily forget what has been done for her, but will never forget what has not been done for her’. This proverb equally applies to nations. Napoleon III alienated the international front of the Right only to be abandoned by the international front of the Left. The latter, a habitual priest-basher, was now after the highest priest.

From this moment onwards, Napoleon III grew increasingly isolated. Seeing that he could follow her no further, the revolution searched for a different tool and found it in Prussia, in the person of Bismarck.

¹ Evola has, ‘collectivist nationalism’.—Ed.

² In Evola’s version, this paragraph, as well as the following five paragraphs, are substituted by a very different text, which is appended at the end of this chapter.—Ed.

³ In Evola’s version, for this paragraph he substitutes the following: ‘The real purpose of this war was not to favour genuine Italian patriotism, of the sort that strikes no compromise with the underground forces of the Revolution and Freemasonry; rather, it was to weaken the power and prestige of Austria within the German Confederation, where Protestant Prussia now gained predominance.’—Ed.

4 Concerning the backstage political events surrounding the Italian Risorgimento, it will be useful to refer to the documents included in Cretineau-Joly's *L'Église romaine et la Revolution* (Paris, 1859, vol. II). These clearly illustrate the role played by certain concealed Jews and Freemasons, who openly expressed contempt among themselves for the ideas of the Italian patriots. The latter they regarded as merely 'a means for turmoil worth holding on to'. Mazzini was considered a ridiculous and romantic conspirator who could never be introduced to the 'unknown superiors' of the Carbonari. Armed threats were even made against him, lest he should ever meddle in their business. The Carbonari were pursuing far greater aims. Against Rome they felt 'a healthy, cold-blooded, well-pondered, and most profound hatred that is worth more than all the fireworks and declamations of the politicians'. Their goal was to strike the very heart of traditional spiritual authority, with full awareness that this would have caused 'the fall of thrones and dynasties'. It would also be interesting to explore the role played by Britain and its Masonic leaders not only in France, but also in Italy – that is to say, with respect to the Italian secret societies operating for the revolutionary international under the guise of nationalist and patriotic groups. The aforementioned work contains some references to this. (Julius Evola)

EVOLA'S VERSION:

Austria, therefore, had to be destroyed.

We should not forget that in the first half of the nineteenth century, Austria was even more of a patchwork of different races and languages than at the beginning of the twentieth. It not only ruled – without granting any constitutions or autonomy – over Bohemia, part of Poland, Hungary, and Croatia; in other words a Magyar land and three Slavic ones with different languages; but it also controlled the whole of northern Italy: the Veneto, Lombardy, and Tuscany. The chosen tactic consisted of laying particular stress upon the previously non-existent issue of national irredentism, while closely linking the idea of nationalism to the liberal-democratic, anti-traditional, and anti-hierarchical one.

The chosen terrain for the first phase of the attack was Italy. Events unfolded as follows. In Italy, two traditions and heritages coexisted. The first one, the oldest and most genuine, was the Roman, Catholic, and aristocratic tradition. It found expression in Dante's Ghibelline⁵ and feudal Italy: that of the distinctly Italian princes who – starting from the Savoy and Monferrato families – had never hesitated to take up arms in defence of the rights of the Emperor and nobility at the time of the insurrection of the Italian city-states. The second tradition was the democratic one of these city-states, which was particularly strong in northern Italy. As a consequence, this region was one of the most vulnerable areas of the Hapsburg empire. What may rightly be described as the shadiest side of the Italian Risorgimento – which betrays the influence of the secret forces of world subversion – consists in the fact that the idea of Italian unification came to be exclusively associated with the second of these traditions. The ideas spread by Napoleon and the French Revolution became tools in the hands of Masonic lodges and the Carbonari. The greatest effort was spent in trying to make Italians forget about the first of the aforementioned traditions; in other words of their Roman, imperial, and aristocratic heritage. The stake here was two-fold: on the one hand, the aim was to open a crack in the empire that was to be demolished; on the other, it was to turn Italy into one of the most desirable victims according to the overall plan of subversion.

Napoleon III...

⁵ Ghibelline is a thirteenth century term which was originally coined to name the supporters of the imperial power of the Hohenstaufen throne against Papal authority. They were in conflict with the Guelphs, who favoured the rule of the Pope.—Ed.

Bismarck and the Transformation of Central Europe

Prussia had endowed itself with a less liberal constitution than the Austrian one. It too was a monarchy in which vestiges of feudalism survived and big landowners acted as small kings, having few links with the banks and stock exchanges. Yet the overall mindset of Prussia was no less open to new ideas, if for no other reason but the fact that it was a Protestant country and one in which – as in all other countries of the Reformation – Freemasonry flourished.

While both Austria and Prussia were monarchies ruled ‘by grace of God’, they differed considerably.

Already before the French Revolution, Frederick II – a friend of Voltaire’s and a generous patron of freethinkers – had stated that ‘the king is but the first servant of the state’. This had merely been a prince’s opinion, with no immediate practical consequences for his reign. Yet it is difficult to imagine this sentence coming from Hapsburg lips, or those of the man who claimed such things as ‘I am the state’, ‘I failed to wait’, and ‘the greatest person in my kingdom is whoever I might be speaking to, the moment I condescend to do so’. Likewise, it would have never passed the lips of Nicholas I or Franz Joseph.

This momentous sentence is part of the Masonic repertoire. It clearly illustrates the imperceptible spread of the ‘new ideas’ through cells whose affiliations remained utterly unknown. Berlin was overflowing with lodges. Some of them, such as the Royal Lodge of Prussia, were aristocratic ones in which – interestingly – Jews were not admitted. The latter were nonetheless represented by other cells imbued with their spirit.

The Royal Lodge of Prussia, like the British ‘Great Lodge’, was a salon attended by pure-blooded princes and the most prominent members of society, who would be subtly influenced by forms of propaganda carefully measured so as not to alarm them.

‘The prince, the first servant of the state’: apparently, there is nothing wrong with this claim. Did Christ himself not say much the same thing? ‘The Son of Man has not come to be served but to serve.’ Did Christ not wash the feet of the Apostles? But it was the popes and emperors who imitated this gesture of Christ, not the kings of Prussia, as it applied to living men and not abstractions such as the ideas of nation, society, and the state.

If princes are servants of the state – an elusive concept – rather than its lords, then they are no longer the servants of Christ the King or God, for the state itself becomes God. The capitalist and fiscal state truly is the reign of Mammon.

What we are approaching here is the establishment of a state that seeks to replace God by situating itself above all, in such a way as to identify itself with enslaving capitalism, hate-fuelled nationalism, and finally democracy (which refuses to serve God, serving the priests and people of Mammon alone).

At the dusk of ancient history, the Roman Emperor Constantine the Great had already sought to use Christianity for his own purposes. The Roman Empire passed away, but

Christianity endured, for what is greater and everlasting cannot serve what is lesser and transient. This causal value relation cannot be inverted. What Constantine had sought to accomplish with the great, positive force-idea of history,¹ Bismarck sought to accomplish with its great negative force-idea, Judaism, in the hope that this age-old current might be put to work 'for the King of Prussia'.

British statesmen of our day have acted in much the same manner, possibly in the belief that by reviving the Kingdom of Judea under the Union Jack they would be delivering a master stroke.

In all three cases, those who were hoping to seize were seized themselves. Nor could things have been any different. For neither Christianity nor Judaism (its antithesis) can be seized by the petty and contingent self-interest of any political regime or nation: for they represent the two leading force-ideas of history, not mere historical incidents.

Everything else converges towards these two currents and cannot seize either of them in the pursuit of personal or national goals.

The word 'Israel' means 'he who fights with God', he who is as strong as God. It was bestowed as a title on the patriarch Jacob, the common father of the Jewish race, following the Biblical dream in which he had seen himself caught in an endless fight against the Most High.

Has Bismarck – not to mention Lloyd George – ever dreamt anything as grand? It is rather unlikely, because everything suggests that these men were nothing but petty opportunists.

As strong as God!...

But let us not rush ahead of things. What we wish to show for the time being is that Bismarck was the first in Europe to rely on capitalism, which is nothing but a front for Jewry. Bismarck tried to 'take the bull by the horns' by turning a feudal state into a capitalist one. The state, which had hitherto been only a means to improve citizens' lives, became a goal in itself: a deity to be worshipped. Religion – Protestantism, in this case – simply became an accessory, as did the whole feudal structure, for the state was now a materialist one. It was also strongly nationalistic, as it sought to claim the nationalist outlook of 1848 for the exclusive profit of monarchical Prussia by stripping it of its democratic overtones. It was apparently successful at first.

Much discussion has been made about the political transformation of Germany under Bismarck's drive. There has been far less talk about the economic and social transformation of the country, which was more subtle but much more important.

No economic and social transformation as radical and rapid has ever taken place under the rule of one man. The city of Berlin alone witnessed its population increase tenfold. The same occurred in Hamburg and many other cities, particularly in the coal basin of the Rhineland.

The whole of Germany followed Prussia's example, even to the point of surpassing it.

The gentle balance between consumption and production was suddenly replaced by the circulation of goods and capital.

At the time of Bismarck's death, Germany was one of the countries with the most intense capitalist life. It was ahead of France and Britain in this respect, and almost on a par with the United States. When Bismarck had first come to power in Prussia, it had merely been a loose federation of feudal and agrarian states. Under the impulse of this Prussian squire, the idyllic motherland of *Hermann and Dorothea*² became a country of great financial wealth and proletarian misery.

Germany came to be known as a flourishing country that was growing richer and richer. In all good faith and with no exceptions, Germans seemed to be very proud of this. They never wondered why they themselves or those close to them were not growing any wealthier, when the country – their country – was meant to be taking such giant steps forward in terms of economic progress. They never wondered why the need had suddenly arisen to expand abroad or – if this was not possible – to emigrate en masse to the Americas or other places.

These questions were answered by simply invoking overpopulation. There was no doubt some truth to the issue of sudden overpopulation, but what was its cause? The problem had emerged in just a few decades, when for centuries no such development had ever threatened Germany's existence. Was it the various applications of modern science that were making men more prolific? The excess population might have gradually flowed towards Russia, whose government at the time did not hinder as much as favour such movements. Nor would Germany have really lost part of its inhabitants, for it would merely have waited for Russia to turn – as one might have expected – into an area of German penetration. By colonising empty Russian space, these emigrants would have acted as colonisers and, in a way, the pioneers of German influence. The empire of the Tsars was already sprawling with German colonies at the time – flourishing colonies that extended as far as the Volga.

The wretchedness of the German masses was in fact due not so much to overpopulation – which was merely invoked as a pretext – as to the sudden and extreme intensification of production. This was geared not towards consumption, which it far surpassed, but only towards trafficking, commerce, and agiotage, all for the benefit of loan sharks. As the latter financed shipping ventures and industries, they aimed to increase these businesses in order to have more to finance. Hence, they did their best to either directly or indirectly discourage the colonisation of Russia, as they had little to gain from it.

As for the state, it sank deeper and deeper into debt as it grew in military strength. It became more and more indebted towards these people, to whom it was forced to pass on most of the revenue it acquired in the form of taxes from its citizens. The latter, in turn, were forced to come up with artificial means to meet their ever-expanding needs: they plunged into the whirlpool of business, so that the state might be able to pay off its creditors' interests. Germany automatically dragged its allies and potential enemies into this vicious circle. The whole of Europe thus became a field open to capitalism, through which the Jew obtained the money he needed to finance future wars and revolutions.

Bismarck is the man who bestowed the crown of unified Germany upon Wilhelm I. Yet – and this was something far more serious – he was also one of the men who contributed the most to crowning Mammon as King of the Earth, at a time in which Marx and Lassalle, followed by Liebknecht and Bebel,³ were carefully observing this march of progress as it swept across the centre of Europe.

Bismarck certainly wasn't a democrat in the most obvious and ordinary sense of the term. By birth he belonged to a class which was particularly loyal towards the Prussian monarchy, that of the small landed gentry of Prussia. He was therefore a fervent royalist. But his royalism was of a strictly Prussian sort and only became German when Prussia itself turned into Germany; it was never European and historic, as Metternich's royalism had been.

Unlike Metternich, Bismarck did not see the presence of two international and historic fronts engaged in a struggle that had been going on for generations. He did not realise that Europe was about to become a single body whose various organs would increasingly react against one another.

All he saw was the ready profits monarchical Prussia could make by becoming a tool of ubiquitous capitalism, even to the detriment of the monarchical ideal. Bismarck was a great Prussian but a small European.

He knew that the monarchy was a point of strength and wanted it for his own country; but for the same reason he also wanted liberalism for the potential enemies or rivals of Germany, as this would have been a point of weakness and inferiority for them. All countries, in fact, represented potential enemies, as Germany was 'above all'.

Bismarck humiliated and weakened Austria, this citadel of the feudal nobility.

He fought against Catholicism and the Holy See, which is to say against the very principle behind divine right. He called this fight *Kulturkampf*, the fight for civilisation! Is this not the language of the men of 'progress' at home in Masonic lodges?

Bismarck contributed to the republicanisation and democratisation of France, in order to humiliate and demean this great country.

As for his own country, Bismarck turned feudalism, which had been its very social frame, into nothing but mere pretence. He replaced it with state bureaucracy, which is what Richelieu⁴ had done in France, forgetting that a mere turnover of people would have been enough to turn the system into state democracy or socialism.

Bismarck, in other words, fell under the spell of imperialist capitalism.

The reason for this is the fact that, blinded by his nationalist pride, he trusted Prussia to be exceptionally immune to certain influences.

Bismarck drove his own country – and in doing so all others too – down the road of militarisation, to the point that universal conscription, which is to say armed masses, became the rule throughout Europe. Bismarck was only naively seeking to increase the

military power of Germany *vis à vis* its neighbours. What he failed to realise was that these neighbours would have followed Germany, and hence that the balance of power was destined to remain substantially the same. The balance which did change, in Germany as elsewhere, was that which concerned the possibility of class war. If there had been no excuses for any European statesman worthy of his name to ignore this threat in the latter half of the nineteenth century, there were even less in the final quarter of the century.

In much the same way, the Romans in the age of decadence had taught the barbarians who made up their legions the science of war, only to let them return to their homes and prepare to invade, pillage, and conquer the Empire.

The arms race, which grew enormous, forced the state to adopt a broad tax policy with the sole aim of paying off the interests from its loans. This policy led to more and more debts, the sum of which could no longer be recouped because it had been swallowed up by expenditures of no benefit to anyone except ubiquitous international Jewry. Ever-new expenditures were made, so that the private wealth of individuals – who were becoming increasingly indebted to the Jews through the state – soon dwindled: once solid and tangible, it now vanished into the coffins of the anonymous creditor,⁵ in the form of easily transferable gold and notes.⁶

Bismarck's overall policy might have been excusable or even normal a few centuries earlier, for kingdoms back then had no internal enemies. Or even when they did, these were not permanent enemies, but only contingent ones: each acted for his own self-interest, and there was no international front with national branches following a general strategic plan under a common inspiration.

Emperors then were free to quarrel with popes; kings with one another and their great vassals; and prelates with princes: for there was no formidable and omnipresent common enemy plotting everyone's ruin. A similar enemy, however, was already in existence in Bismarck's day and asked for nothing better than to switch allies at the right moment, so as to gradually destroy them all by driving one against the other until it remained the only winner on the battlefield, without actually having to run any risks in person.

A similar policy was simply suicidal after 1848, or even the French Revolution. But such was the policy of a man who had no doubt been a sincere conservative and royalist – someone reactionary and absolutist at heart – and which history would have us describe as a genius.

Either Bismarck was nothing but a false reactionary, a conscious tool of subversion who behaved like Judas towards the *ancien régime*, in which case he really did give proof of genius (but this scenario is frankly impossible to assume); or his alleged genius merely consisted of being the most unlikely fool of the century. In this respect, Bismarck far outdid Richelieu. In demolishing feudalism, the latter stripped the Kingdom of France down to the bone, so to speak, in order to bring about the rise of a king who could claim 'I am the state'. Precisely because of this claim, the state was all the more easily guillotined later in the person of its King. Still, Richelieu had not experienced almost a century of revolutionary strategies.

Bismarck proved all the more foolish because he possessed undeniable intelligence and shrewdness. These virtues, however, remained enclosed within the narrow boundaries set by the contingent ambitions of the Hohenzollern and the self-serving interests of Germany. Within these boundaries, Germany was regarded as being not simply ‘*über alles*’, meaning above everything – which would have been understandable from a German perspective – but beyond all: sheltered, that is, from the currents that made all parts interdependent, and thus situated outside of universal history.⁷

If Bismarck had been a genuinely great man – or even just an egoistically but intelligently great patriot – and if he had possessed the sharp foresight of a genius, he would have realised that a future for his overcrowded and congested fatherland was to be found in Russia. With its fertile and uncultivated fields, Russia would have been capable of feeding twenty Germanies for a whole century. Its vast territory concealed unimaginable riches and all the raw materials one might have wished for. The future of Germany was not to be sought for in over-industrialisation, which was destined to provide only temporary relief, and which actually worsened the country’s congestion in the long run and made socialism an increasingly likely scenario.⁸

The penetration of Russia might have taken place pacifically, for the country needed the kind of capacity to organise which was possessed by its neighbour, just as Germany needed the materials to be found on Russian soil. The two monarchical countries – with their related dynasties, which were bound by traditional ties of friendship – had every reason to get along with one another. A mutual alliance between them would have represented a formidable barrier or even force of attack against the democratic tide.

Wilhelm II not only worsened Bismarck’s mistakes, but even failed to follow him where he had been more inspired.

A characteristic of real political geniuses is their highly developed foresight: a sort of double vision. These men are capable of discerning what the Gospel calls ‘the signs of the times’, in other words what is essential and permanent, which they are careful not to confuse with what is only accessory, contingent, and accidental.

What was essential and permanent in the nineteenth century was the implacable antagonism not between two nations, but between two superimposed worlds: the upper world, which continued to lie under the influence of traditional Christianity, and the lower world, which was either consciously or unconsciously under the occult hold of Freemasonry and imperialist, militant Judaism. The latter concealed itself by taking the two-fold form of capitalism, and was opposed to personal ownership, and democracy – bourgeois at first and later socialist – which opposed legitimate authority.

The lower world was internationally united in thought and deed: ‘No enemy on the Left’. The upper world was divided by nationalism: *France d’abord*, *Deutschland über alles*, ‘Rule Britannia’. Hence the manifest inferiority of the latter of these worlds. Given such conditions, things could have gone no differently.

Like all of his contemporaries, bar none, Bismarck found it easier to act as an

opportunist; in other words, not to go against the historical current created by the forces of subversion but to follow it, seeking to exploit this current in order to fulfil his contingent ambitions and those of his country. As Bismarck was without a doubt the most skilled, crafty, and resourceful diplomat of his age, he managed to outdo all his colleagues as far as opportunism went, and achieved brilliant success, while unconsciously playing the game of international subversion. Clearly, the latter had no intention of losing Bismarck, as it had lost Metternich and Nicholas I, who had stubbornly gone against its current. On the contrary, it fully supported Bismarck, and this is the reason why his name has lived on as that of a winner, as has that of the later ruler Edward VII.

Metternich and Nicholas I have instead gone down in history as losers.

The greatest of all the sons of men, Christ, He whom even unbelievers regard as more than just a genius, was also defeated. More than anyone else Christ went against the current created by the ancestors of modern subversion; and it is for this reason that his Church, which is two thousand years old, enjoys the unique privilege of eternal youth.

Bismarck thus paid a greater service to the revolutionary cause than Napoleon III. Bismarck's work was only made possible by the weakening of Austria, which had been brought about by the 1848 movement first and then Napoleon III.

To the very end, Napoleon III remained loyal to the Revolution. Not satisfied with having unified Italy to the detriment of Austria, he did nothing to prevent Germany from unifying, again to the detriment of the same country.

It did not take great political acumen to foresee that a unified Germany under the leadership of a militarised Prussia would have constituted a far greater threat to France from the east than a pacific Germany divided into small autonomous states – each concerned with its age-old particular interests – under the vague suzerainty of a remote Austria comprised of a heterogeneous population.

Confident of Russian neutrality, Germany had no serious rivals in Europe except for Napoleon III. The latter stood isolated and could not rely on Russia, which he had humiliated in Crimea merely for the benefit of democracy; nor could he count on Italy, for this country he had unified in the name of nationalism could not forgive him for defending Rome despite this ideal. Napoleon III could rely even less on the idolatrous democracy that was now leaving him for Bismarck, the man destined to lend a new impulse to the ever-advancing march of 'progress'.

Napoleon III's turn had come, then. Again, a pretext was easily found. If it hadn't been the famous Ems telegram,⁹ it would have been something else. It is difficult to understand why certain historians like to waste so much time discussing such minor details.

The decision was taken to go to war. The German army was ready, but the French one was not. The European chessboard favoured Prussia as the power that had given a new impulse to international Jewish capitalism.

A German army of half a million well-armed and disciplined soldiers – the greatest military force Europe had seen since Napoleon I's campaign of 1812 – entered French

territory.

The main French army, led by Napoleon III himself, was surrounded and forced to surrender. The Emperor was made a prisoner of war. The two other French armies, led by Napoleon III's generals, met much the same fate. The King of Prussia, accompanied by all the German princes and sovereigns, laid siege upon Paris.

The hybrid monarchy which had sacrificed the country's interests to those of the Revolution fell victim to the very Revolution it had once cherished.

Napoleon III was a strange monarch, of a sort that is hardly to be found in contemporary history – even among usurpers and parvenus, for while the latter usually try to conceal their origins, it was as if Napoleon III felt proud of his own, and only held the throne in order to demolish all monarchies – ultimately, including his own. The Second Empire approached the form of a secular republic, to the point of almost coinciding with it. For all its deceiving pomp, it was the regime of democracy and freethinking.

¹ In French, *idée-force* refers to an idea which becomes a driving force of history.—Ed.

² An epic poem by Goethe which describes German refugees during the French occupation of parts of the Rhineland in 1792, during the French Revolution.—Ed.

³ Karl Liebknecht (1871-1919) and August Bebel (1840-1913) were the founders and leaders of the Social Democratic Party in Germany; Liebknecht later founded the Communist Party of Germany.—Ed.

⁴ Cardinal Richelieu (1585-1642) was a clergyman who became the chief advisor to King Louis XIII in 1624. Seeking to centralise political power in the King, he weakened the powers of the nobility and had their fortresses destroyed, in order to make rebellions against the crown more unlikely.—Ed.

⁵ Evola adds, 'and the Jew'.—Ed.

⁶ It will be worth quoting the following words which Metternich spoke in 1849 and which once again show how prophetic his vision was: 'In Germany, the Jews play a prominent role and are class revolutionaries. Jewish writers, philosophers, poets, orators, and bankers carry the weight of their ancient infamy within their minds and hearts. They will become a real plague for Germany... Still, they are probably destined to meet an ominous fate' (quoted by I. Within, *The Trail of the Serpent*, 1936, p. 93). (Julius Evola)

⁷ Evola omits this last sentence.—Ed.

⁸ One must acknowledge, then, that Bismarck set certain limits to this policy of all-out industrialisation, for which his successor, Wilhelm II, is to be held more responsible. (de Poncins)

⁹ On 13 July 1870, the French ambassador met with King Wilhelm of Prussia in Ems to deliver a demand from his government that he would never allow a Hohenzollern to become a candidate for the then-open throne of Spain, which would pose a strategic threat to France. The Kaiser remained noncommittal. Bismarck, after having received a report of the conversation, edited the report to make the meeting appear much more confrontational than it had actually been, and then released it in a telegram to the media. Per Bismarck's designs, this telegram angered the French and led them to declare war on Prussia.—Ed.

The Commune and the Eternal Hatred¹

The death of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte was hardly a great loss for France. But who was to be his successor?

The infernal machine fuelled by international gold which continued to operate in the dark underground of nineteenth-century European thought had visibly governed France for two decades, leading the country to unsheathe its sword beyond its borders. Nor did the machine come to a halt under the subsequent 'enlightened' regime, which reeked so strongly of the 'French Revolution'.

A new version of the machine was about to be launched: a considerably perfected one, to match the 'progress' which the 'immortal principles' had made – like wine stored in a canteen – over the past eighty years.

Was France not to continue bearing the torch it had carried in 1789? Is it not the case even today that many Frenchmen are still proud to be the first to implement Israel's plans?

And yet, the torch of 1871 could not be the same as that of 1789. The 'immortal principles' developed in Year 1, 2, and 3 of the Jacobin age² had turned into commonplace statements in European thought. An unprecedented innovation is what was needed, a new Parisian trend. It was found in the proletarian revolution, something Europe had never witnessed before.

The French Revolution had been the first revolution of the bourgeois and middle class – what is historically known as the Third Estate.

The Commune of Paris was the first revolution of the proletarian class, which until that moment had remain largely behind the scenes. It was the first historical embodiment of the dictatorship of the proletariat – a short-lived and quickly suppressed attempt to express this unprecedented form of subversion.

As the advent of the Fourth Estate, the Commune represents a step forward from what had come before it. Hence, it marks a date in the evolution of the spirit of revolt. All the pontiffs of contemporary subversion, from its socialist and Communist phase, are unanimous in stating so. The greatest among them, Marx and Lenin, have ostentatiously rejected all links with bourgeois, republican, and democratic revolutions such as those of 1789 and 1848, regarding them as simply a means and starting points rather than as goals in themselves. By contrast, they all claim to be the direct heirs to the Paris Commune, even when they criticise its technical failures. All, without exception, have bowed before it as if it were a sort of leader, devoting countless speeches, booklets, and books to it. The Commune provided a foretaste of the Bolshevik revolution. Marx, Lenin, Trotsky, Kautsky, Lawrof, and many others have discussed this point in their polemical tracts.

It would be a great mistake to suppose that the Paris Commune was a spontaneous movement – a mistake people make with all revolutions.

Again and again we find men – hundreds of thousands of them – who are so naive as to

believe that things can emerge spontaneously out of nothing without anyone's intervention. It is easy to realise what a philosophical absurdity and challenge to common sense this is. This is especially true in an allegedly scientific age, in which people should know that even those processes which were previously believed to be automatic and regulated by the abstract laws of nature – such as bodily decay, illness, old age, and so-called natural death – are in fact determined by concrete living agents, namely bacilli and toxins, which operate toward those ends. Without these agents there would be no decay, fever, decrepitude, or death: while invisible to our eyes, they are nonetheless real.

The same applies to society (i.e., humanity situated in space) and history (i.e., humanity situated in time).

Bacilli and toxins in human form remain unseen by generations of men. Historians ignore them, or more often feign to ignore them. Still, the existence of these agents is no mystery to the bacteriologists of society and history. It is they who cause fevers, decrepitude, decay, paralyses, convulsions, ageing, collapse, and death.

Their victims believe that the process affecting them is unfolding independently, by virtue of ineluctable laws intrinsic to the very nature of things – which is why they never react. After all, only a fool would react against the ineluctable nature of things...

The Commune of 1871 was no more spontaneous than the events of 1789, 1793, 1848, 1905, and 1917, or the disorders in China, India, Sudan, Syria, Turkey, Morocco, and Afghanistan. Even less spontaneous are all the strikes taking place in our age. It is nonetheless true that – as with animal organisms – in order for bacilli and toxins to accomplish their deadly work, the affected body must first have been weakened and damaged by exposure to weather and fatigue. Healthy organisms possessing all their strength usually manage to defend themselves and counteract baleful influences.

It is for this reason that social infections usually follow economic or political calamities, which is not to say that they are caused by them. No direct causal link exists between the military disasters of 1870 and the Commune.

One could understand the rabble wanting to lynch some of those responsible for the defeat. This too could only have occurred through pervasive insinuations on the part of those who had an interest in doing so. But the Commune of 1871 was no more anti-Bonapartist than it was anti-Orléanist or even anti-Gambettist. It was directed against all that was seen to embody the social order, whether good or bad. It was practically against everything.

One may retort that the people had been told that the social order itself was responsible for all ills. But this is precisely what we are arguing. A similar idea did not emerge spontaneously: it required a long preparation and sophisticated planning of the most detailed and careful sort.

Only a superficial observer without the slightest clue about the way in which revolutions are fashioned could believe that these were improvised symptoms. Men have always been men, and the masses have always been masses: the maturity they had allegedly reached

after just a few decades was but a huge bluff. There have always been defeats and setbacks, but only from the latter half of the nineteenth century have these invariably been followed by phenomena such as the Commune, which have gone to the exclusive profit of the Jews and the subversive elements of society.

There can be no doubt as to the fact that the First International, which was created and headed by Marx, the founder of modern socialism, acted as the driving force behind the Paris Commune. It made use of the Blanquist party³ like a lever: the party's leader was dead, but its traditions lived on, and did not need to be revived in the suburbs of the French capital.

The same process is at work nowadays in England, where the Third International is operating through the radical factions of the British trade unions, which it is gradually bolshevising.

The white-maned lion – as Marx is called by some of his disciples – could not make it to Paris himself, but still closely observed all that was taking place in the city. It was easy for him to do so, as he was regularly corresponding with all the major Communards, and especially Kügelmann,⁴ who appears to have acted as his spokesman in Paris.

The First International had already been around for a few years. It had already held several congresses, chiefly in Switzerland, under the presidency of the Judeo-socialist messiah in person. These congresses were the Council of Nicea of socialism, which by then had acquired unity and left its catacombs under the guidance of its master. Its gospel and creed were to be found in the *Communist Manifesto*, published in 1847. This booklet, which was made accessible by the working masses and signed by Marx and Engels, ended with the famous rallying cry: 'Workers of the world, unite!'

If we were to go by its appearance, this booklet was making a break with what had been regarded as the revolutionary essence until then, namely the monopoly of radical ideas which – according to the nineteenth-century way of thinking – was held by the French Revolution. These ideas had crystallised in the twin form of liberal democracy, connected to the Feuillants and moderate Girondins, and radical democracy, connected to the radical Girondins and Jacobins.

The ideas issued from the French Revolution proclaimed individual equality and the non-existence of classes. In practice, both things were automatically denied.

Less hypocritically, the *Communist Manifesto* rejected all this sanctimonious liberalism, which was ultimately nothing but a convention adopted to mislead fools. The *Manifesto* instead openly proclaimed something that was already in people's minds but which no one had dared state until then. It proclaimed inequality and the dictatorship of one class above the rest. There was no need for this new ruling class to make up the majority, for this was not the case with the proletariat in regions comprised of small rural estates. It was enough for this class to be the poorest and less enlightened one – something the text does not openly state, of course. In other words, this new class coincided with the one which could most easily be indoctrinated and led wherever one pleased; and this, clearly, not only

because its weak intelligence made it more prone to suggestion, but because it had everything to gain and nothing to lose.

Only an apparently unbridgeable gap separates the *Communist Manifesto* from the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen*.⁵ If any gap is to be found at all, in fact, it is only in countries where the working class is still in the minority. This class, however, is becoming the most numerous everywhere, including in rural regions, where capitalism – another ally of the Jew – is striving to turn all estates, both large or small, into nothing but pieces of paper. People who were formerly small landholders are becoming city workers, whose work will be idly exploited by the former large landholders through the intermediation of Judaised banks and stock exchanges. Meanwhile, democracy is accelerating this process through its inheritance taxes and parcelling of the land, which is being divided into plots so small as to be of no practical economic value.

The *Communist Manifesto*, therefore, has simply accelerated a process which the leaders of subversion felt was unfolding too slowly.

This process began the day individual egalitarianism was proclaimed: it dates back to the French Revolution. Apparently, and to superficial observers – which is to say, to most men – Marx was burning what he professed to adore, namely the ‘immortal principle’ of equality among men and classes. This equality indirectly yet unequivocally serves as the basis for majority rule, on which all democratic legality rests. For this reason, modern democracy – the heir to the first revolution – is accusing the prince of the second revolution of wishing to re-establish the reign of privilege: an upside-down *ancien régime*.

There is another point on which people like to argue, namely that a chasm exists between the second revolutionary programme, which was espoused by Marx in his *Communist Manifesto*, and the first programme, that of the ‘immortal principles’ of the French Revolution, which still made the men of 1848 swoon. This arose because of the principle of nationalism, which the French Revolution and the revolutions of 1848 appear to have upheld, whereas the *Manifesto* treats it as a thing of the past.

Actually, the French Revolution only used the nationalist sentiment as a way of repelling foreign invasion, just as a man under attack might have grasped the first stick he found to defend himself against an aggressor – but he might have picked up a stone instead, if this had served him just as well. The Revolution later found that it could employ French nationalism as a valuable tool for its aggressive proselytism, and so continued to make use of it. Still, the so-called French Revolution initially aimed to become an international one.

To pursue this aim, it organised genuine congresses in Paris attracting subversive elements from all countries, just as the Russian Revolution is doing today. The latter, no doubt, will not hesitate to brandish the nationalist standard the day the Western powers will finally decide to attack it, especially if they were to invade Russia. After all, is it not the case that the current Chinese revolution – which we know was spawned by the Russian one – is already raising this standard to acquire legitimacy in the eyes of the stupid Europeans?

Nationalism offered too great an opportunity for the revolutionary movements of 1848. We have already frequently referred to the huge service which nationalism⁶ paid to the cause of subversion by dividing the Christian front, thereby preventing it from standing united against the common enemy. The groups that followed the path of the French Revolution would have been ill-inspired and indeed ungrateful if they had sought to reject this ally – an ally that is made all the more precious by the fact that it is unaware of being such, and which in practice may prove the most important ally of all.

Let us open our window and stare at what is going on in the street: what we shall see is the world Revolution, very strategically split into two armies, each pursuing a different goal. The first openly draws upon the French Revolution and that of 1848, brazenly claiming to be a barrier against the other army. Its mission is to spread among the Christian nations so as to rouse their nationalistic antagonisms to a frenzy. At the same time, in the name of democracy, it seeks to exacerbate old forms of animosity among different groups and individuals within single countries. These feelings have not yet been exhausted by the French Revolution, whose work of equalisation and levelling awaits completion.

The mission of the second army of subversion – the one rallying under the banner of the *Communist Manifesto* – is to join all the militant forces of subversion into a single, homogeneous, and compact bloc centred around a Jewish core. These forces will provide the assault battalions for shattering the opposite front, which will have been split horizontally by nationalism and vertically by democracy in all of its various forms.

All these things hang together and are part of one and the same conspiracy, whose authors see nationalism as Gambetta⁷ saw clericalism: as something worth exporting if Jews can benefit from it. This is everywhere the case: in Europe, as well as in other parts of the world.

Nationalism is thus being exported along with the Rights of Man and worthless Communist trash, which is why it has become popular again today.⁸

In a way, the Paris Commune signalled the entrance of the second of these revolutionary waves onto the historical stage. It was later destined to manifest itself more acutely with Bolshevism and proletarian terrorism. Until the Commune, however, it hadn't yet left the world of intellectual speculation. It was only in 1871 that this new avatar of the spirit of revolt came to life. Its adherents, far from bowing before the 'immortal principles' as all previous rebels had done, regarded them as retrograde and outdated ideas.

There was no divide separating the two revolutionary currents which had sprung from the same Jewish source; rather, the two fitted together. The Commune was their point of intersection. In a way, it stemmed from both currents, representing a sort of intermediate species between the two. It was this lack of a unified character that ultimately caused the final defeat of the Commune and prevented the rise of Bolshevism in a corner of Europe fifty years before the fated date.

It is particularly interesting to study the Paris Commune because it shows the two

revolutionary currents – that of ‘89 and that of the *Manifesto* – facing and hampering each other, to the point of thwarting the enterprise of those who had made the mistake of seeking to reconcile them.

Two human types are to be found among the leaders of the Commune. On the one hand, we have proletarians directly inspired by the First International: the spiritual forefathers of contemporary Bolsheviks (for it was the First International which spawned the Third). These people contemptuously turned their backs on the ‘glorious day’ of the French Revolution, which they already regarded as an outdated model; all they had in mind was the ‘great evening’ to come.

Then we have the petty bourgeois and shopkeepers of the capital, who harboured ideas like those of Monsieur Homais⁹ and were rather similar to the radicals or radical socialists of today. These people were republicans driven primarily by anti-clericalism; often they were also quite nationalist and sported the revolutionary cockade of the ‘immortal principles’. They only half agreed with the revolutionary tradition of ‘89 and ‘48 and still had scruples based on the idea of democratic legality, which is to say the principle whereby sovereignty rests with the majority. They appear not to have realised that they had already departed from this principle, insofar as the Commune was not a French but only a Parisian affair: from the point of view of democratic legality, as conceived by its leading theoreticians, a city – be it even a capital or the City of Light itself – has no right to determine the fate of an entire nation. This is particularly the case when it has received no mandate from the latter and is acting behind its back – for at a certain point all communication between Paris and the rest of France was cut off.

Driven by a force beyond their control, the Communards could not act lawfully towards France from the point of view of an alleged legality based on the number of votes. One is led to wonder, therefore, why so many of them were so keen not to transgress this holy principle of democracy with regard to the city of Paris.

Concern for the ‘immortal principles’ was such that at a given moment, the Communards missed the chance to crush Thiers’ government,¹⁰ installed at the gates of Paris, at Versailles, because elections first had to be held to ask for democracy’s permission.

This way of acting was indeed worthy of faint-hearted merchants accustomed to their routine. Marx and Lenin remarked that the Communards had been like revolutionary stones petrified by the principles of the French Revolution – just as others had been petrified by the prejudices of the *ancien régime*.

The French Revolution was the Communards’ *ancien régime*. Saturated by its spirit down to their very marrow, they completely lacked flexibility and boldness. The immortal principles of 1789 and 1848 held them back through curious feelings of human respect, timorousness, and scruple.

True revolutionaries do not act in this manner. They do not wait for power to be bestowed on them: they simply take it. They care nothing about the alleged popular will, which they treat just as their fathers treated divine right – the holy principle of their day.

This is how the Bolsheviks acted, having learned from the experience of the Commune, from which they openly admit to having benefited.

It would be difficult to single out any leader of the Commune. In fact, there were none. From start to finish, there was only a Central Committee – a sort of ‘Soviet of the National Guard’ – which squabbled with the Commune, instead of leading it by the nose. This is what the Bolsheviks did half a century later with all those who resisted them, on the Left as well as on the Right.

Under these conditions, a revolution – and particularly one with such radical ideas – could never be expected to triumph. Marx realized this, much to his distress. His advice went unheeded and his agents were overwhelmed by the Tower of Babel of the democrats from the new ‘*ancien régime*’.

From another point of view, however, the Paris Commune was indeed ‘all the rage’ in its day. After all, it embodied the first historical attempt to establish a government of the workers, for the workers. But while workers made up the majority, they had not yet been sufficiently moulded by the First International. The Commune coincided with a phase of transition between the fierce, romantic ideology of 1848 and the merciless, utilitarian, and materialist cynicism that was destined to gain the upper hand in the future. Jewish influence was strong, yet perhaps caught off-guard by the speed at which events unfolded. Consequently, Jewry failed to take control of the situation, as it later did at Petrograd in 1917.

The dictatorship of the proletariat had been established, but there were no Jewish dictators to exercise it. This may explain the weakness and ultimate failure of the Commune, despite the atrocities it unsystematically committed.

A revolution, however radical it may be, is destined to be scattered if there are no Jews to direct it by channelling its various movements toward their anti-Christian imperialism.

Christians – even if they are only former Christians like the Communards – will commit unnecessary crimes, while failing to commit others which would be required. The Commune may have executed an archbishop and a few generals, and knocked down the Vendôme Column, but it had scruples which a Jewish government would simply have ignored. It committed murders for which it then apologised with lofty statements about the grand aims of the Conventions, instead of shunning public opinion and forging ahead. For this is how the Jew, a born revolutionary, would have acted.

The Commune nonetheless may be seen to have adopted certain methods which later made the fortune of Bolshevism. It would take hostages and thus terrorise its enemies, who trembled and feared for their close ones.

It is this method of taking hostages and leading hundreds of them to painful deaths in retaliation for every attack against a high-ranking Bolshevik that enabled the great leaders of the Russian Revolution to preserve their own lives.

French readers, who might have heard stories about the 1871 Commune from their parents and relatives, will be surprised to learn that one of the most serious reproaches

brought against the Communards by leaders of the Russian Revolution such as Lenin and Trotsky is the charge of having been too soft with those under them and with their enemies. This in itself gives a good enough idea of how terrible the year 1917 and the ten years¹¹ thereafter must have been in Russia.

The Commune is only one generation away from us. There is therefore no need to discuss the alleged softness of its methods, as its history is known well enough and almost still living in people's memory.

One of the distinguishing features of the Commune was its sectarian character, which it demonstrated in its approach to Christianity. Its spiritual roots unequivocally bear the mark of Jewry: it is easy to see how the unreasonable and especially deep hatred harboured against Catholic priests was not a natural feeling inherent to the soul of the proletariat in an age in which the Church had long ceased being a source of domination or persecution, and in which individuals were quite free to ignore it.

The Second Empire is so close to us that there is no need to explain that it was not an age of religious intolerance or great ecclesiastical influences, capable of weighing peoples down in any way. On the contrary, it was an age of largely unprecedented indifference toward religious matters. There were few practising Catholics and even they could hardly have put any pressure on their fellow citizens, even if they had wished to do so. Fortune's favour was to be sought in the growing number of temples of Mammon, not in any Catholic church.

How could people envy the wealth of the clergy, when there was nothing to even suggest its existence?

It was the bankers who had all the nice carriages, luxury hotels, stables filled with race horses, and bejewelled babes the sight of which might have roused bad – albeit all too human – feelings of greed, envy, and spite in the hearts of the working classes. But nothing, absolutely nothing, in the figure of clergymen – who were often the sons of workers themselves – could have reasonably engendered such feelings.

Should we demolish all mosques and kill all mullahs for the simple reason that we do not believe in Muhammad? Such thoughts have never sprung to the mind of even the most malicious, vicious, and depraved among us – why should they?

Are the Communards' feelings of hatred, then, to be interpreted as forms of sadism, sexual perversion, or mental depravity connected to known pathological conditions? Well, no.

The striking thing is that certain events came to pass in a century of almost complete religious indifference. People were entirely captivated by the idea of mechanisation and were hardly concerned with theological, liturgical, and dogmatic issues.

This is a subject which our contemporaries would do well to explore. Let them simply consider for a moment what the possible origin may have been of this intense hatred which Parisian workers felt in 1871 for priests, who were neither their bosses nor their superiors.

Priests had few ties with them. By choosing to be an unbeliever, a worker could relegate priests to the margins of his life, preventing them from influencing his future in any way. Nor was there anything particularly enviable in priests' spirit or lifestyle, which were certainly less enviable than those of the middle classes. Workers, especially ones who were unbelievers, ought to have seen priests simply as passers-by they might have come across in the street now and then – men with no rights over their lives and no hold over their fates.

From what mysterious depth, then, might this hatred have surged? The answer is already contained in the question itself. This mysterious depth was most certainly not to be found in the souls of shopkeepers or workers. Rather, it was a mental suggestion induced from the outside. Its roots lay in the radical and socialist intellectual milieus, and in Masonic lodges.

Yet this answer does not solve the problem, which remains open, but only eschews the question.

When examining these subjects, it is easy to overlook an important psychological fact: in order to hate a given faith, it is not enough merely not to adhere to it; rather, one must have an opposite faith, which is the negation of the former.

It is also easy to overlook another psychological fact, one that is perhaps even more important for the purposes of the present discussion: to hate a religious faith, it is necessary to hold a different religious one. Possession of a faith that is political, social, patriotic, or of any other sort could only indirectly explain this kind of hatred in age of religious intolerance – an age in which religion is so closely intertwined with politics and social or international affairs that it actually influences them.

If there is any century which might be criticised in all respects except from this point of view, it is certainly the nineteenth, particularly in its latter half. The reason for the profound and Satanic feelings of horror inspired by Christianity, and especially the Roman Catholic Church, is not to be found in the political, economic, or social faith held by Freemasons, radicals, and socialists, but rather in their anti-Christian religious faith exclusively.

This relentless loathing spread to the working classes and petty bourgeoisie through a thousand underground channels that were skilfully arranged for this purpose. This religious faith held by the subversive milieus in command of the situation was not – as many of our contemporaries naively imagine – merely accessory to politics and economics. It was and still is the essential feature of world subversion: it is politics, economics, and ethics – depending on expediency – that are accessory to it.

This apocalyptic¹² evil *par excellence* continues to foster the revolt of the angel who no longer wished to serve among men. It prolongs the sin of Eden, for men have been made to believe that through disobedience they will become God-like and will be able to govern themselves without taking account of authority.

A striking example of this is provided by contemporary Russia. In the economic field, we

are witnessing an extension and exacerbation of the worst forms of capitalistic serfdom and medieval abuse: the common people in this country have fallen into misery while the rich have been ruined completely, all for the profit of the Jews and their close servants. In the political sphere we have an upside-down aristocratic oligarchy, Jewish by three-quarters, which rules the people with an iron fist. This religious faith and everything connected to it stands at the very opposite of the Christian ideal, as an antithesis might stand to a thesis.

The pro-socialist elements across the world are in favour of the state of affairs we have just described, which they actually ought to resolutely condemn if they were to follow the purely profane principles they claim to embrace. All those professing to be radicals, or simply liberals, find it difficult to conceal their discreet, yet profound, sympathy for this historical outrage. Finally, capitalists in both hemispheres are secretly allied with Bolshevism, for without capitalist support, the latter would be long dead – or, rather, would never have arisen in the first place – given its anti-capitalist tirades, which are intended to be exported and spread among the poor (who are being misled by their own misery). It was through the work and arms of the poor – if not their brains – that the Paris Commune of 1871 was set up.

It is easy to see that this link is no profane or secular faith.

It is something less evident, yet infinitely more enduring and profound.

This mysterious link is a religious faith, one as deeply rooted in the souls of its followers as early Christianity was. This faith has its profiteers, but also – and one must acknowledge it – a fair number of selfless apostles who have undergone persecution and shed their blood for it.

We are here faced, then, with a metapsychical¹³ mystery that is quite unfathomable even to the developed mind of ordinary man. For how can certain individuals choose to give their lives out of a selfless love for evil with no hope for their immortal souls and no material concern for their children or loved ones, whom in many cases they will cold-bloodedly sacrifice, feeling they are accomplishing some sinister duty in doing it?

These are undeniable facts which are unequivocally proven by the history of all countries in all ages, including our own. If we were to seek an explanation for it, we would not find it through human logic alone, as there is only one science which can provide it. And this science – our agnostic readers will forgive us – is Christian theology.

Within it we find two types of superhuman and absolute selflessness: that of the being who, while omnipotent, cannot increase his own exaltation, namely God; and that of the being who cannot further aggravate his degradation, namely Satan. The supreme good and the supreme evil thus represent the two perfect types of selflessness.

As everything in the world originates from either one or the other of these principles, the selflessness of certain men with respect to evil is as understandable as the selflessness of others with respect to good. To pursue evil merely for profit, self-interest, and the satisfaction of the flesh is only a weakness of the flesh. With a few exceptions, we all fall

into this category. But while this applies to the masses, it does not apply to their genuine spiritual leaders, who do not guide the sweeping historical offensive of evil for profit, weakness of the flesh, or self-interest. Rather, they do so out of love: specifically for that negative love which is the hatred of all that stems from God.

A Satanic current parallel to the Christian one flows through history. It does so just as selflessly, waging its perpetual battle against Christianity.

This mysterious and deep hatred is essentially different and superior to the various other forms of hatred we find in history. The latter are often fierce and shameful, but always driven by strictly human motives such as envy, pride, rancour, and vengeance. They never possess the sort of permanent character that leads one to constantly focus on the same object for no apparent reason – for Christ himself stated: ‘They hate me for no reason.’ Precisely because they concern specific things – tangible causes commensurate to given effects – normal forms of hatred do not possess the frightening character of a stream of primitive fury that inevitably brings demonic possession to mind. As Christ put it: ‘This is your time – the time when darkness rules.’

Hatred of this sort lies beyond all reason and is quite imponderable. It corresponds to a mysterious crisis affecting not the body, but the soul.

* * *

After the Commune, the revolutionary flame made its way back underground, where it lay dormant for forty years, with only sudden and violent blazes here and there.

In 1789, the fire had ravaged France.

In 1848, it had extended to Europe.

In 1914, the whole world was set ablaze by the Great War – the prelude to social upheavals of which Bolshevism is but the first concrete manifestation.

¹ Evola entitles this chapter, ‘The Commune: The Metaphysics of Revolutionary Hatred’.—Ed.

² The revolutionary government proclaimed a new calendar in 1793, although it had fallen out of use by 1805.—Ed.

³ The Blanquists, who adhered to the principles of Louis Auguste Blanqui (1805-1881), held that socialism should be introduced by a small, secretive elite seizing power at the top of a society, rather than relying on the masses to instigate a revolution, as Marx held.—Ed.

⁴ Louis Kügelmann (1828-1902) was a German gynecologist and a Social Democrat who was a friend of both Marx and Engels.—Ed.

⁵ The *Declaration*, passed by the French Assembly in 1789, was the fundamental statement of the principles of the French Revolution.—Ed.

⁶ Evola has, ‘democratic nationalism’.—Ed.

⁷ Léon Gambetta (1838-1882) was an assemblyman who came to prominence following the suppression of the Commune. He assisted in the creation of the new Constitution in 1875, pursuing a course of moderation between radicals and conservatives which he termed ‘opportunism’.—Ed.

[8](#) For this paragraph, Evola substitutes, ‘Only very recently was nationalism to shed its democratic overtones and follow a different course, in some cases resolutely converging against those dark forces which had so often exploited it in the previous phase. Elsewhere, however, and especially among coloured races, Moscow continues to play by the old rules: it uses nationalist ideology as a way of making these peoples rise up against the hegemony of the European powers and join the international red front.’—Ed.

[9](#) Monsieur Homais is a character in Flaubert’s novel *Madame Bovary*, a shopkeeper who adheres to the ideas of Voltaire and other republican and scientific ideas.—Ed.

[10](#) Adolphe Thiers (1797-1877) was a politician and historian, and a former Prime Minister, who became head of the provisional government following the collapse of the Second Empire in 1871, and he ultimately crushed the Commune.—Ed.

[11](#) Evola just has, ‘following ones’.—Ed.

[12](#) Evola has ‘metaphysical’ instead.—Ed.

[13](#) Metapsychology refers to aspects of psychology which cannot necessarily be understood through empirical science.—Ed.

1914-1918: The Great War¹

When the order of general mobilisation was sounded from the Pyrenees to the borders of China, the impression among all peoples was one of astonishment more than consternation. It was difficult for them to realise just what was happening.

For most men, war meant one or more big battles with breaks of a few days or weeks in between. Then, except in certain areas whose borders might have been shifted a few dozen – or, more rarely, a few hundred – kilometres backwards or forward, things would soon have got back to normal.

Given the power of modern weapons, which had been rendered particularly deadly through applied physics and chemistry, people certainly feared that the number of people killed or wounded would be much higher than ever before.

A war of this sort, based on universal conscription, could never be a *lance war*,² such as those waged in ages in which the elites alone had the right to bear arms. As much as this claim will upset the partisans of democracy, it is indeed the case that brutality is most common among the lower strata of the human race. Modern warfare has simply confirmed what plebeian revolts and revolutions – in which such elements were at work – had already long since proven.

One of the great merits of Christianity consists precisely in having turned the profession of arms into a ‘noble art’ reserved for the best and regarded as a privilege – an art entailing specific duties known as the code of honour.

By contrast, modern war, which is a conflict among nations and not simply among armies, seeks to destroy the economic output of the enemy along with his military power. It therefore treats devastation as a strategic duty. This in itself makes modern warfare and its methods necessarily immoral, as becomes most painfully evident when war is waged in enemy territory.

What people were hoping, however, was that the evil aspects of modern warfare might ultimately turn out to be a good thing by shortening the conflict.

People generally believed that the war which had broken out in August would last two or three months, ending in early winter at the very latest.

We ourselves were the first to think along these lines.

We believed that Russia would soon be put out of action, whereas things would be more uncertain in the West – although Germany seemed to hold some advantage. To avoid losing countless lives to preserve the integrity of Russia, Western powers would have then negotiated with Germany. The latter had few reasons to make any claims in the west, and a hundred times as much to gain from the east.

In such a way, a peace advantageous for both sides would have been signed, without any real winners or losers except Russia. The country would have been partitioned – at least to

some extent – into areas of influence assigned to each of the warring parties. The sovereignty of the Tsar would have been safeguarded, just as that of the Sultan in Bosnia, Crete, and Macedonia.

A similar outcome would have meant putting an end to the congestion of civilised peoples for quite some time, which was the only natural cause of the War in reality – if not the only cause at work, as we naively believed at the time.

Leaving aside what was taking place behind the curtains and what only initiates could know, the first stages in the Great War appeared to fully confirm the above predictions.

Only a few weeks later, most of the German army was stopped in its impetuous drive toward Paris and forced to take up a fixed position during the memorable days of the Marne. It was not defeated, though, and still less quashed.

At the same time, most of the Russian army, including its best troops, were literally crushed by a small contingent of German forces in the great Battle of Tannenberg.

This moment signalled the end of the War, in the sense that its final outcome could already be foretold. The outcome of the War simply lay in the Battle of the Marne to the west and Tannenberg to the east. These two battles carried the four years of useless butchery that followed in themselves, just as seeds may be said to contain potential trees.

Those who had imagined that the War would last no more than two or three months had not really been mistaken after all, as in any other century or age the conflict would indeed have ended with these two battles. The first battle froze the Germans where they ought not to have gone in the first place – where it made no sense for them to go, for it meant simply increasing everyone's congestion, starting with their own.

This first battle contained a clear warning for the Germans, a warning written in blood: that they were to follow a different path and were not bound to pass through Paris.

The second battle instead opened up the gates of Russian Asia to the Germans: the place where they ought to have gone. A German advance into this vast territory would have meant the beginning of the de-congestion of civilised peoples, since there was plenty of land there, not only for the Germans but for all those wise enough to follow their example. People in this endless expanse would never have bothered one another and would have found no reason to plot their mutual destruction.

Those who had imagined that the War would last no more than two months were ultimately proven wrong. In all good faith, they had believed that the War served a purpose which actually meant something to the parties involved. In doing so, they had ignored a powerful player whose aspirations and interests lay beyond what was good and profitable for each of the warring parties – which is to say, everyone else.

If Europe had been comprised of absolute monarchies and governments and had not been forced to take account of occult contingencies and influences that went against the actual interests of its peoples; if faceless capitalism hadn't been in control of all drives behind personal and collective life, making things take a direction opposite to the one they ought

to have taken – then the War would certainly have lasted no more than two or three months. The solution adopted to bring the conflict to a prompt end, to everyone's advantage, would probably have been similar to that which we have just outlined.

The prompt and advantageous settlement of a frightening cataclysm that threatened to extend even further – turning from a European conflict into a global one – was a compelling option for all reasonable and honest men. What we call logic, evidence, and truth are things of great intrinsic power that risked spilling out of oppressed hearts and minds like an avalanche.

This prospect posed a huge danger:³ something had to be done before it was too late. Judaised propaganda, which fashions public opinion by influencing the multitudes, put everything to work toward this supreme battle.

Thus another war was waged, parallel to the tangible one and without which the latter would have lasted a shorter period in months than it lasted in years. This campaign of subversion was concealed under national garbs and passed off as something respectable.

The people's way of thinking was the battlefield in which it wreaked such frightful havoc – albeit in a less evident way than the war waged in the other sphere.

The history of this war has yet to be written. On the day on which it will be, humanity will be shocked. This will not be the humanity of today, however, in which traces of the bewitchment which was worked still survive. What we are talking about are future generations.

If judged from the point of view of the logical requirements of international politics, as taught by past history, the events which followed 1914 will appear as a muddle of contradictions.

These events become understandable, and indeed quite clear, by contrast in the light of the fact that the Great War was merely a front for the advancing revolution.

Everyone knows that the War was an unprecedented tragedy. Detailed statistics give us the number of people killed and mutilated, of the cities destroyed, fields devastated, and historical monuments irreparably damaged.

Many authors from all the warring nations have discussed this subject. We shall not waste our time repeating what is universally known.

We must instead focus on a different kind of damage: one hardly ever discussed, yet incomparably more serious for its historical consequences than all the wounds inflicted, which time and forgetfulness are bound to heal.

First of all, in all countries and regimes, the World War has favoured the rise of subversive ideals based on Jewish values. These ideals had merely begun to take shape with the most serious revolutions of the past. With the War they were instead realised in practice, and came to affect men's lives and mores. They were often imposed against people's will and despite all resistance, for the simple reason that without them, the War would not have continued.

Rousseau is the author of a famous postulate that inspired two centuries of subversion and is itself rooted in the Jewish notion of polity: 'Liberty consists in the total alienation of each associate, together with all his rights, to the whole community.' This is the idolatrous ideal of men who have forgotten they were created by God and for God, their Creator, believing they merely exist thanks to and for the polity.⁴

The World War brought these principles out of sociological workshops and directly applied them to the everyday life of all men.

In practice, private property ceased to exist: it was only tolerated to the extent that its owners were seen as tax-paying servants of the state and collaborated to attain the triumph of ideas of which they may have personally disapproved.

After people had been forced to send their children to get killed in order to 'make democracy comfortable' – without having ever been asked whether they themselves felt comfortable – their horses, cattle, carts, and household goods were seized. They were ordered to plant potatoes in their fields and rationing was imposed upon them, even if they were producers themselves. Sometimes people's houses were seized, leaving them just enough space to live in. All this was politely referred to as 'requisitioning'.

Private accounts were examined, as was the way owners managed their property. Industrialists had their factories militarised and workers were mobilised by the state. Individuals, with everything they had or embodied, came to be regarded as the property of the state: like things, war materiel, and robots whose only feelings, thoughts, and desires were to be those of their leaders.

People were expected to jump in with all guns blazing for the war and to treat it as if it were a personal quarrel. Depending on their country of birth, they were to consider the Germans, English, or French as their personal enemies.

If someone close to them was murdered or crippled, they were expected not to complain but to consider themselves lucky if the papers said they had died for democracy.

Those men whose fathers had been dispossessed, humiliated, shot, or guillotined by democracy were expected to welcome the idea of offering up their own possessions and lives upon the altar of democracy. These were men who were about to be openly treated as second-class citizens, and who because of their interests, temperaments, and inborn sentiments could only endure the yoke of democracy with profound horror.⁵

If we examine the meaning of the aforementioned postulate by Rousseau, we shall soon realise that it contains the seeds not only of all democracy, but also of all forms of socialism and Communism, as the latter are simply the logical outcome of the former.

This unlikely and disconcerting utopia became incorporated into real life through the exceptional requirements imposed by a war with no historical precedents.

Slowly and gradually, what had been a mere emergency measure came to permeate what is second nature to men as social creatures: their customs and habits.

After all, socialisation was never officially or juridically imposed, in the sense that the

big owners, be they landowners or industrialists, continued to be known as such. They continued to be paid the same respect as before and to play an important role, yet this was only with national production in mind: strictly speaking, they exercised the function of public functionaries under state control. They were not owners in the genuine and literal sense of the term, for they could no longer claim to be masters – after God – over their ancestral possessions, on the sole condition of respecting laws which no normal and civilised being would seek to transgress.

Nobody seemed to realise that this situation *de facto* represented the accomplishment of the socialist plan. For the only truly essential condition for this plan – all else being but accessory demagogy – is state control over all production, or rather all sources of value, which the state will then distribute.

This is the state capitalism Lenin has described and defined in many of his works as the penultimate stage: the anteroom to his paradise.

The transition from this state of affairs – which the most famous Bolshevik writers, starting from Marx and Lenin, regard as a preliminary and necessary stage – to that which is openly advocated by the apostle of the new order does not require any social revolution: a simple palace revolution, or rather cabinet revolution, is enough.

Without any great upheavals, the capitalism of the bourgeois state will then be replaced by what Lenin calls the capitalism of the proletarian state – that which Soviet Russia acknowledges to be its current regime. After all, we are here quoting Lenin almost to the letter.

As for the placid masses, which subversives scorn far more than the old aristocracies ever did, their role is now simply to shout ‘The King is dead, long live the King!’, while embarking on a pilgrimage to visit the tomb of this or that Lenin – just as they would have done with saints’ tombs only a few years ago.

For the uninitiated, the new monarch will be the people: farmers and workers expressing their will through councils directly appointed by them (*soviety* in Russian, *Soviets* in English).

For the half-initiated – such as Lenin himself, to judge from his confessions – the new monarch will be the Communist Party: the chosen guardian of the poor until the day in which they will have come of age.

But for the initiated – and Lenin’s confessions do not extend that far – the monarch is simply Jewish Mammonism, concealed under the label of ‘Communist Party’.

The above argument, except for the last point, is simply based on the teachings of the greatest Bolsheviks.

By adopting socialism, which had previously been regarded as an unworkable chimera, the princes and landed gentry who controlled Germany and Austria practically up until the armistice paved the way for subversion – the landmark event in the aftermath of the War – even more so than the democratic and Judaised leaders of republican France, liberal

Britain, and pro-Masonic Italy. If they went further in this direction than their adversaries, this was not intentional, but simply because the geographic configuration of their countries, in the face of the blockade imposed upon them, required a greater concentration of all sources of value and means of production in the hands of the state. This called for tighter control over private property as well as people, which is to say for a form of social constraint reminiscent of the socialist ideal – the dreadful constraint which Rousseau regarded as the ultimate expression of freedom.

The leaders of the two great reactionary monarchies, who for the most part were members of the landed gentry themselves, were not simply madmen unaware of what they were doing. While they may have overestimated the traditional virtues of their people and their immunity against the virus of subversion – although the future has proven that they had not been completely mistaken in this respect – they were quite conscious of the deadly risks they were running. Still, they could hardly have acted otherwise, for they found themselves caught between the devil and the deep blue sea.

The devil was the frightening spectre of the possibility that the outlook of the working classes might gradually take a subversive direction, opening up a range of revolutionary scenarios. The deep blue sea was the fear of an immediate revolution sparked by the inevitable trigger of all social unrest: hunger.

The only way to avert this scenario – or at any rate to contain its consequences – was to drive production to its limits, or even beyond them through new inventions and applications.

The old leaders thus chose the less immediate and imminent of these two scenarios. They found themselves in the tragic situation of someone rolling down a slope toward a chasm, knowing full well they will fall into it but unable to stop, and with no other hope but the chance of being saved by some fortunate event at the last moment. This event could only have been a decisive victory, but on the western front a similar prospect had become rather unlikely after the Battle of the Marne.

Those who argue that the great conflagration was caused by a clash of economic interests are not far off the mark. Still, they are quite mistaken if they believe that this clash was fatal in itself.

The cause of the War was the desire to change the inner structure of society in general and to help world subversion take a great leap forward.

This momentous intention is where all threads of modern history converge. We should never lose sight of it, if we are to avoid losing ourselves in the inextricable tangle of events.

The War was a new offensive of the Revolution. It had been planned through decades of convoluted diplomacy in the intentional pursuit of the very opposite of what common sense dictated.⁶

The Revolution was not at all concerned about giving Alsace and Lorraine to France, or Trentino to Italy, or with pleasing Britain by assigning it a few more Negroes. The

changing of borders in no way aided its cause. The Revolution left these trifles to the blind patriots who had gone through such pains to prepare its triumphal banquet. The chief concern of the Revolution, after four years of unprecedented slaughter, was to bring down the last bastions threatening democratic progress, as President Wilson later stated.

Besides, as soon as it was no longer necessary to take account of the feelings of the Tsar, an unwilling victim to his own inconceivable folly, things such as these were quite openly declared. This outburst followed quite naturally, as certain people became free to express the secret that filled their hearts, and which they had been forced to conceal for so long with the greatest effort.

After the imperial guest was told to ‘go get hanged elsewhere’⁷ – which might not be literally what happened, but is not far from the truth – he was replaced by an American fellow who was aware of the real meaning of events. Things were thus kept within the family. Why continue to hold back the stream of democratic outpourings that had hardly been contained until then?

The time had come to unceremoniously give oneself over to sheer joy, without the slightest concern for the thousands of honest men who continued to suffer and die for democracy, a regime they despised and which was about to treat them – in all countries – as the only real losers of the War.⁸

Thanks to the thorough work which had been carried out by the social termites of democracy, only anonymous property and anonymous authority were acknowledged in the economic and political spheres. Likewise, heroism and merit were only recognised under the veil of democratic anonymity and impersonality. Tangible proof of this transformation in the people’s way of thinking through the gradual yet unrelenting instillation of Jewish values was soon to be found in the monuments erected to the ‘Unknown Soldier’. This figure came to be praised not only more than the great leaders who had brought victory, but also and above all by the more modest heroes who had sprung from the people.

Based on sheer statistical probability, it is most likely that this ‘Unknown Soldier’ – whether French, British, Italian, or Polish – was a man of the people. It is equally probable that this fact will be implicitly known and that this new cult will come to be seen as a popular one by the masses. The ‘Unknown Soldier’ will therefore ingeniously be turned into a sort of anonymous champion whose impersonal and popular character will somehow counterbalance the personal prestige enjoyed by ‘known’ leaders and heroes. The latter are guilty of embodying a striking example of inegalitarianism, and hence of officially disproving the democratic theory according to which each person is simply an expression of the collective.⁹

It must be acknowledged that democracy gave proof of possessing the laudable virtue of frankness in the last eighteen months of the War, for it no longer concealed the fact that it was simply pursuing its goals through the onslaught.

The aims of the World War were quite clear in the minds of the anonymous milieus who wished to turn it into a ‘total’ conflict, namely: the destruction of the feudal Hapsburg

empire and its replacement with a hive of radical and economically unviable republics bound to be at the mercy of the Jew, and the Jewish corrosion of the medieval Asian empire of the Tsars and its transformation into a great hotbed for the Jewish world revolution of the future.

To this we can add the creation of a fervently democratic Polish republic, bound to find itself – on account of the absurd arrangement of its borders – forever caught in a state of latent conflict with Germany. It was feared that the latter might experience a counter-revolutionary awakening and expand to the east, an area which was by now sacred to the forces of subversion.^{[10](#)}

Clearly, the democratic Republic of Poland was bound to soon play the tragic and disgraceful role of a western buffer for the Judeo-Satanic orgy of Moscow. Any attempt to spoil this plan was strictly prohibited, as the very centre of universal decomposition was to be established through it.

To all this we should add the democratic turn in people's way of thinking, the result of the inversion of all the traditional values of the human person. It was necessary to make Europe into a suitable broth of nutrients for the microbes which were spreading at the same time in Russia.

The capitalist or socialist turn in people's way of thinking – through the forced introduction of state control and collective forms of economy in those countries which had until then resisted them the most – was no secondary matter, since it contributed to the development of democracy and the preparing of that broth we have just mentioned.

We should also take account of the striking rise of indebtedness, which exclusively benefitted international Jewry, and its ubiquitous lending of money to up-and-coming democratic regimes, both great and small. Nations thus began indirectly financing the very cause of their misfortunes.

The ultimate aim of the War – the goal *par excellence*, the summation and crowning of all others – consisted of fostering physical, material, and moral exhaustion and lassitude among both winners and losers, confounding their ideas and values, in such a way that no state would ever intervene after the War against the spread of the infection whose centre was Moscow. Nothing was to prevent this deadly disease from travelling freely, far and wide across the entire world.

With this, we believe to have illustrated all the essential aspects of the plans developed by the aforementioned milieus. After having deliberately made war unavoidable, these milieus chose to wage it to the very end, until the fruits of subversion were ripe enough to be picked.

After three years of conflict and unspeakable suffering, this stage was finally reached.

The various cells of the front of subversion had done a good job at spreading their influence through speeches and writings among overexcited minds in all the most vulnerable areas. The clan of international subversion rejoiced at the long-awaited triumph that had been the real object of the War. Still, it was not too ostentatious in its rejoicing for

Russia, where there was still a chance that Tsarism might unexpectedly rise from its death bed, as certain attitudes of its last political representatives appeared to suggest. But as soon as this last scruple vanished, the truth which had been concealed for so long finally shone forth.

President Wilson became its herald. He gave almost immediate expression to a new state of mind which was far from having emerged spontaneously – for nothing ever does.

It was like a forest fire long smouldering in the soil, consuming all roots, and then suddenly lighting ablaze and enveloping the very summits of the trees – which were already partially dried up, yet still green.

From that moment onwards, the War could be said to have already accomplished most of the goals which constituted its actual *raison d'être* in the minds of those who had planned it.

By that stage, democracy had gained a sure foothold in Europe. To the west it was flanked by the even more developed American democracy. To the east it found the Judeo-Muscovite model of democracy, which was anxious to beat all records of 'progress'. In its wake stood all 'young' democratic states, which were expressions of democracy rather than nationalism: for one and the same process was at work behind the creation of Poland, Bohemia, Croatia, Lithuania, and all the various other countries which were destined to spring from a peace that completed the subversive work of the War.

Democracy could now speak openly, for it no longer needed to conceal itself. It no longer hesitated to fully reveal the hideous and shocking truth to the world: that if rivers of blood had been spilled and continued to be spilled (the year was 1917), this was not in vain, since the democratic front was already the potential master of the battlefield. After all, if the real aim of the War was democracy, had it not been met?

The so-called war among nations was simply a long-awaited and planned conflict based on a complicated series of secret manoeuvres and intrigues. It was a battle between Revolution and Counter-Revolution.

This is the only real meaning of the War.

Democracy had never found itself in such a good position. It had never been given the chance to perform so brilliantly before the attentive eyes of the five continents.

Still, when the time came to pass from theory to practice and show peoples that the idea of a republic is not only a fine thing under an empire, what happened was an unprecedented fiasco.

When put to the test, democracy proved its incapacity and frightening harmfulness.

¹ Evola entitles this chapter, '1914-1918: The Two Faces of the Great War'.—Ed.

² The Lace Wars refers to a series of wars which took place in Europe from the late seventeenth to the mid-eighteenth century between the various monarchies. One of the prizes was the town of Mecheline, on the border between Belgium and Holland, which produced a highly well-regarded type of lace.—Ed.

3 Evola adds, ‘for the occult front of world subversion’.—Ed.

4 For this sentence, Evola substitutes, ‘This, of course, would be a community that has been stripped of all sacredness and become purely materialistic: one that finds its *raison d’être* in itself and opposes its collectivism – as irrational as it is omnipotent – to all laws from on high, as well as all traditional forms of human dignity and freedom.’—Ed.

5 For the previous six paragraphs, including this one, Evola substitutes, ‘By yielding to these principles, human life necessarily acquired a “total” character; and this, in turn, necessarily became a general rule which continued to be in force even once the emergency state of war that had led to its advent had passed.’—Ed.

6 We would like here to recommend de Poncins’ book, *Société des Nations, Super État Maçonique* (Paris, 1936), which gives readers an account of a congress held by international Freemasonry in Paris in the summer of 1917. In this congress the true intention behind the World War – which was then in full swing – was openly declared. What is more, the future peace treaties were anticipated, along with the League of Nations, explicitly revealing the subversive function they were to serve for the benefit of the secret forces of the Revolution. (Evola)

7 This is a French expression, which means roughly, ‘go to Hell’.—Ed.

8 As concerns Italy, it might be worth quoting the following passage from M. Rygier’s work *La Franc-Maçonnerie italienne devant la guerre et le fascisme* (Paris, 1929, p. 42): ‘Upon Italy’s entry into the war, the Great Orient sent a message to the Italian people, which had proven its loyalty. The draft of a text examined by the masonic authorities in charge emphasised the role played by the Great Orient in the interventionist campaign and the success this had met. These sentences, however, were removed from the final version of the text and replaced by a more conventional statement ... that the war just declared fulfilled the expectations and prophecies of the martyrs and prophets of the Risorgimento, whose teachings and conduct masonic lodges had always recommended to their members as a source of inspiration. If the Great Orient acted in this manner it was – as is attested in trials – out of concern for the sacred union: in order to make Catholics and especially the indifferent masses aware of the fact that the country’s soldiers were fighting and dying for a cause promoted by Freemasonry.’ (Evola)

9 Evola ends the sentence with, ‘a faceless part of the collective body’.—Ed.

10 Evola ends the sentence with ‘the Judeo-Bolshevik orgy’. He also omits the following paragraph.—Ed.

1919: The Peace Treaties – The Disruption of Europe and the League of Nations

The aim of the famous and pitiful Paris Conference was to legalise and consolidate the new conquests through a Jewish peace. These were not the conquests made by France, Britain, or Italy, which were but accessory factors; they rather consisted of revolutionary and democratic progress, which represented the essential aspect of it.

Many international congresses had already been held in the past: the Congress of Vienna in 1815, that of Paris in 1855, and Berlin in 1878, not to mention minor ones or those of previous centuries. The world, however, had never witnessed anything comparable to the Paris Conference of 1919.

It was presented not as a conference in which people would ‘confer’, discuss things, and negotiate, but as a sort of criminal court of history that would judge the whole world in the light of democracy.

Various regimes and historical outlooks were to be brought before this court as guilty parties or defendants. Individuals and peoples – the former filled with anxiety, the latter with hope – awaited the outcome of this great conference, as if it were the Final Judgement. Everything was to take place according to the Holy Scriptures, except for the following inversion: the good and righteous, the sheep and lambs, were to be found on the Left; the evil ones, or ‘goats’, on the Right, whence they would be plunged into Gehenna, amid tears and the grinding of teeth.

As there were no longer any warmongering princes or ambitious nobles to oppress the humble and disinherited, from that memorable moment onwards justice was expected to rule on Earth. In a perfected Eden blooming with ‘immortal principles’, with the fruits of the French Revolution and the *Communist Manifesto* as the only ones not forbidden, a new golden age would have dawned.

The Conference was a one-sided affair. In all its hearings, it acted as a court retiring to deliberate. The defendants, in other words the opposing party, were only allowed to stand before it to hear its verdict.

Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey were the ‘criminals’. After finally repenting of their sins against Jews and democracy, these states – much like medieval penitents – hopelessly awaited in the ‘darkness outside’ for the ‘Maundy Thursday’ on which they would have been admitted into the church of democracy.

On the other hand, states regarded as allies, such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, and even certain countries that had been part of the Entente,¹ like Romania and Serbia, found themselves in an uncertain situation. They were not members of the court and in a sense were not even members of the Conference, since they were the parties for which the latter was expected to grant justice. They awaited this justice passively, with no right to plead their cases except when explicitly invited to do so. They were like believers standing by the door, forbidden to enter the church.

The Paris Conference differs from previous congresses in many other respects as well. There were no longer any great men here – kings with their ministers, courtiers, and followers, which is to say privileged clans – to determine the fate of ‘unfortunate’ peoples by exchanging, partitioning, and distributing them ‘like cattle’, as would have been the case in ages of ‘obscurantism’ and ‘barbarism’. This time, progress seemed to mean that the various peoples themselves, free at last, could determine their own fate.

These peoples – over a hundred million Americans, a hundred and fifty million Europeans, and an even greater number of Asians, not to mention all the Africans and Australians – were therefore expected to speak through the voices of Wilson, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau in the halls of the Quai d’Orsay. The Paris Conference purported to be a free discussion among free and equal peoples.

In practice, it was what the British and Americans referred to as the ‘big three’ that ultimately made up the supreme court which was called to judge all the nations and individuals of the world.² This court was intended to pass judgement according to democratic justice, which is to say according to a new code completely independent from outdated things such as natural law, the Decalogue, and Roman law.

The new code was envisaged as an expression of ‘human progress’ beyond all that had come before in the history of civilisation. Hence, there could be no criteria above this new code, which could only be interpreted by the three great judges. If anyone else, even the Pope, had dared claim the same degree of infallibility as them, the whole world would no doubt have broken out in a cry of indignation. The claim to infallibility made by Lloyd George, Wilson, and Clemenceau was instead regarded as something quite legitimate on account of the fact that these three gentlemen allegedly acted not as individuals, but as ‘peoples’.

The Jewish or Judaised press – whose mission it is to influence public opinion and make people stoically bear the most absurd burdens – fed the incoherent masses this lie, which was quite readily swallowed.

The ‘big three’ were the only judges and interpreters of a new moral law whose canons did not even exist in writing, but which allegedly promoted the higher interests of democracy.

Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Wilson were thus invited to play a historically unprecedented role. The parliaments of the three fiercely parliamentary democracies which these gentlemen represented suddenly fell silent, as if ordered to do so: their spokesmen alone were allowed to slice Europe and part of Asia up like a pie.

All these men were concerned with was to please the Jew, who was about to ‘take the world by stride’! At any rate, everything took place as if this were their only concern at this fateful hour of history.

The work accomplished by the Paris Conference may be summed up as follows: first of all, it led to the creation of the largest possible number of sovereign nations, in other words the largest possible number of mutually conflicting interests – which could

nonetheless still have been reconciled to some degree; then, as if to rule out this chance of salvation, the Conference limited these nations, so that their interests, and in many cases vital needs, would indeed become mutually irreconcilable; finally, it established the League of Nations, a Platonic assembly lacking any power and incapable of imposing any sanctions – an assembly that meets no clear corporate interest and is entrusted with theoretically reconciling what is in practice irreconcilable for the longest possible time by simply playing on people's fear of things becoming even worse.

The chaos we presently have in Europe is not due, as is often claimed, to the evil nature or collective maliciousness of this or that political or ethnic group. Nor is it due, as people make a show of believing, to the rancour and hatred engendered by the War: for rancour of this sort is always a temporary thing and tends to wane after some time. The present state of Europe is simply the logical consequence of the situation and relations determined by the Paris Conference.

Consider how Hungary was dismembered for the benefit of Czechoslovakia and Romania, as had previously been done with Poland for the benefit of Russia, Prussia, and Austria before its third and last partition. Or again, consider the place of Hungary *vis-à-vis* the new tiny Austria, whose capital alone used to boast over a million and a half inhabitants. Neither country is self-sufficient and can import or export any goods unless Germany, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia grant them permission to pass through their territory.

On the other hand, Czechoslovakia itself, while pampered and helped in every possible way, and treated by Judeo-Masonic democracy as its love child, nonetheless finds itself in a position where it cannot breathe and cannot get in touch with the rest of the world except through the silver tunnel of the Elbe, a German river.

Germany, in turn, with its growing population and countless industries, is split in half by Poland and surrounded on all sides.

Poland, restored to the frontiers it had after its first partitioning, can only access the sea through an artificial corridor.

Italy, with its overflowing population, is cramped in its peninsula, with no other prospect of meeting its physical need for expansion than war.³

Wherever we may cast our gaze – provided we look at things with a scientific mind and eye, so as to discover their underlying causes – we shall soon realise that what we have is the compulsory war of all against all, potentially if not in act.

While privileged nations may not be engaging with one another in such drastic terms yet, they still find themselves in the equally difficult situation of being demanding creditors and debtors forced to bleed themselves dry by imposing new taxes in what is nothing but a form of socialisation.

This is the state of Europe in the aftermath of the War: a continent divided and organised in such a way as to make each country unbearable to all the rest. To complete this picture, however, we should add the socialism of the Muscovite East and the capitalism of the

American West, each of which is manipulated in its own way by the Jew, with both seeking to infiltrate themselves into all places in order to gain control of everything.

We must have the courage to admit that in the Europe crafted by the ingenious hand of the Paris Conference, more than ever before in history, the only common interest of all nations, both old and new, is war. If, despite this, we still have peace – a restless, burdensome, and armed peace, but peace nonetheless – it is only because the common interest of all nations finds a temporary counterbalance in their common fear. This fear, however, is progressively waning as the previous war becomes a thing of the past and new generations are born which never experienced it. By contrast, this interest and indeed vital need for war will be a constant thing for all nations for as long as the order established by the Paris Conference will endure.

All this is mathematically, or rather geometrically, certain. To realise it, it is enough to take a careful look at the map without losing sight of the most important thing: the fact that economic frontiers have been reduced to a corollary of political frontiers, as if the two were mutually inseparable.

Ultimately, none of the nations of Europe is satisfied with these treaties, yet they are all obsessed with the idea that any change would only worsen their situation. This idea is deeply set in all minds and prevents people from seeing things as they really are.

People tell themselves over and over that a complete revision of the treaties would only lead to a new war, or who knows what other catastrophe. They thus fail to realise that it is precisely these treaties which, sooner or later, will inevitably bring about a new cataclysm.

The work of the Paris Conference is as absurd as it is brilliant: it is absurd from the point of view of the interests of the overwhelming majority of men, but brilliant in every tiny respect for a certain category of individuals.

The overwhelming majority of men in France and Poland, including educated men, believe Germany to be the one plotting. According to the Germans, it is France and Britain that are doing the plotting – or even Italy, especially now that it has taken an openly anti-revolutionary stance.⁴

Moscow is simply brought up in relation to Communism: no mention is ever made of the backstage connections which Moscow has to all those around the world who have no enemies on the Left.

Once evidence of plotting has been found, it is always one's partner and neighbour who are accused, rarely the Soviet state and never the international Jew. This merely aggravates already existing disagreements and paves the way for future plotting that will again benefit the – supposedly non-existent – Jew⁵ and the Soviet state itself, which is always acquitted of any possible charge of involvement.

At the time of the French Revolution, people used to say that Freemasonry was a British institution in the service of Britain – which was only true to the extent that Britain indeed favoured the Revolution. In recent times, people in France have written that Freemasonry is a German institution in the service of Germany, which again is only true to the extent

that the Weimar Republic collaborated with the Israelite state to the east. The Germans, on the other hand, would have us believe that Freemasonry is an essentially French institution.

Similar considerations are being made concerning capitalism: the French claim that it is in the service of Germany; the Germans swear that it serves Britain; and almost everyone agrees that it serves the United States.

Largely the same assertions are being circulated about socialism: thus people will point out, for instance, that Marx and Lassalle, while Jewish, were nonetheless born in Germany.

Still, no one except 'conspiracy crackpots' apparently dare write that these countries are in fact the victims of Freemasonry, socialism, and capitalism, by which they are all being manipulated to various degrees.

Under these conditions, it is clear that the League of Nations can in no way represent a rallying point for European interests. At most, it might serve as a junction for all the plots and counter-plots, manoeuvres and counter-manoevres being made by large, medium, and small world powers. These countries ignore what might bring them together and are only aware of that which divides them. The European powers find themselves in this state of discord not through any fault of their own, but because a condition of irreparable and inevitable mutual division, animosity, and antagonism has been created by the immutable treaties of the Paris Conference.

It is claimed that the League of Nations is the embodiment of peace. But if that is so, it is only because the treaties of which it is the depository – and which it cannot change in the slightest, for indeed it can only comment upon them, just as the Church may authoritatively comment upon the Holy Scriptures – are being presented to us as the very essence of peace, whereas in fact they are nothing but seeds of future war.

The role of the League of Nations is that of a mystic body for perpetuating the spirit imposed by the acts of Versailles, Saint-Germain, Trianon, and Sèvres – 'final' acts that, to use a common expression, form the new Great Charter of humanity.

The Paris Conference adopted the language of Catholic logic while inverting its terms. Effects it always treated as causes and vice-versa. It always treated what is accidental as permanent, while dismissing things permanent as being merely accidental.

What is essential it treated as being accessory, and what is accessory as being essential. In order to show how the Conference focused its attention on only the most accidental and accessory issues, we need to take but one case into consideration.

Austria-Hungary was treated as the permanent and central evil. The Hapsburg empire, seen as the root of all ills, was struck off the map of Europe and erased from history.

Germany was regarded as a more accidental and accessory ill to be done away with: as one less important than Austria-Hungary, although more important than Russia. The latter was seen as a perfectly accidental, accessory, and indeed negligible problem – so much so

that it was dismissed.

Exactly the opposite is true. The real and deadly peril comes from Moscow, which poses a threat not unlike that of the plague in the Middle Ages: attempting to come to terms with it is sheer folly. As effects are inseparable from their causes, the peril and infection of Moscow cannot be suppressed by simply suppressing the outcome of the Judeo-Russian revolution.

The German peril was certainly real. Still, it was not essential, for – unlike the peril of Jewish Bolshevism – it did not stem from the essence of the German nation. The German peril was simply due to accidental factors, of which economic congestion was the most important. By solving this problem, the peril itself would have been averted.

By contrast, there was no such thing as an Austrian or Hapsburg threat. In order to make everyone happy, except of course a few ambitious rebels, it would have been enough to restore the ancient empire on a federal basis, as suggested by Archduke Franz Ferdinand, after assigning Galicia to Poland and the Italian provinces to Italy.

This example reveals something of crucial importance.

The work of the Paris Conference was not carried out carelessly by people acting on instinct who simply aimed to smooth things and get out of a difficult situation in whatever way they could. This was not – as superficial critics like to say – the work of men ignorant of geography and history.

On the contrary, the work of the Paris Conference was carefully planned down to the slightest detail. It strikes us as being imbued with historical universalism, yet it has in fact reversed all values for the benefit of the one current in history that represents the antithesis of the Catholic thesis.

The Hapsburg empire was completely suppressed because it was the one most in line with the Catholic thesis and most opposed to the Jewish antithesis.

Well into the twentieth century, the Hapsburg empire constituted an expression of the historically Catholic Pentecost that opposed the Tower of Babel of languages and races. It represented the unity in diversity of the Middle Ages, a reduced form of what the Holy Empire had sought to be during the Crusades – one still surviving in an age poisoned by the Reformation and the Revolution, with its nationalism, capitalism, and socialistic democracy.

In other words, the Hapsburg empire embodied what was most hateful to – and less compatible with – the products of Judaism and Freemasonry in shaping contemporary history.

The German empire, sprung from the Reformation and brought to completion by Frederick the Great's freethinking, a secular and civic empire, and hence a statist one, elicited far less hatred. Indeed, it ceased attracting any hatred at all the moment it did away with its princes and its vestiges of feudalism, which still endured despite capitalism and statism, and chose to recognise Luther, Kant, Hegel, and the Jew Marx as its only

forebears. When it then found an ingenious, if not brilliant, way of ensuring that it would become the ally, technical advisor, and organiser of the new Jewish state by force, the German empire even became something desirable and useful.⁶

Bound hand and foot to Jewry in the guise of Communism, hated Russia has become a sacred and untouchable country. When it is Russia that touches others, one cannot react, since it makes everything it lays its hands on inviolable.

In order to correctly evaluate the work of the Paris Conference, it must be gazed at from the Vatican Hill, the towers of the Kremlin, or the skyscrapers of Broadway – the only truly fixed places in the world. The work of the Conference will then strike us as a perfect construction lacking neither a sense of universality nor that of history. It is the work of architects who are perfectly aware of what they are building, and who act under inspiration from the Great Architect of the Universe, the highest figure in Masonic lodges.

This huge edifice is crowned by the League of Nations.

The genius who has presided over this global disruption is he whom Christ calls a ‘liar from the beginning’.

In completing the war for the creation of the new Babel known as the League of Nations and the various bodies which sprung from it, the work of the Paris Conference serves as a prologue for the world conspiracy of the twentieth century and as a bloody epilogue for that of the nineteenth century. Where one ends, the other starts.

Now it is time for us to cast our gaze on Bolshevism.

¹ In the First World War, the Triple Entente was an alliance consisting primarily of the British Empire, the French Third Republic, the United States, and the Russian Empire.—Ed.

² In theory, there was also a fourth actor: the Italian Prime Minister. Everyone knew, however, that his opinion mattered little. This is no doubt the reason why he ostentatiously left the Conference at a given moment, only to make his way back later. (Poncins) (Evola presents the note as follows: ‘To tell the truth, there was also a fourth actor: the Italian Prime Minister. But although Italy, at first neutral, had then sided with the Allies and thus made a crucial contribution to the outcome of the World War, the country’s voice was largely ignored in Paris. The Italian spokesman was actually forced to leave the conference at a given moment. Italy was later to become one of the first nations to embrace revisionism and stand up against the peace treaties.’—Ed.)

³ Evola has this paragraph as follows: ‘Despite being one of the winners of the conflict, Italy, with its overflowing population, was cramped in its peninsula and faced the prospect of having to wage war in Europe in order to meet its physical need for expansion. This prospect was indeed about to come true at the time of the conquest of Ethiopia, which took place despite the opposition of the League of Nations.’—Ed.

⁴ Evola omits the last part of the sentence, concerning Italy.—Ed.

⁵ Instead of ‘Jew’, Evola has ‘the occult front’.—Ed.

⁶ Evola rewrites this sentence as, ‘When it found an ingenious, if not brilliant, way of ensuring that the Jew would control all its vital cells (for such was Germany’s perspective in the immediate aftermath of the War and before National Socialism), Germany even became worthy of love, or at any rate desirable.’—Ed.

The Birth Pangs of Bolshevism: The Rise of Capitalism in Russia

The Russian Revolution of 1917 marked the penultimate stage in the plan to implement the ideas of the international Left. As such, it played a crucial role in the history of Subversion.

It is worth tracing the origins of this Revolution to find out how and why it spread in Russia. In order to do so, we must briefly examine the period of Russian history leading to the explosion of 1917.

Our readers will thereby come to know facts that the mainstream press has said nothing about, but which acquire particular significance now that we are hanging over the chasm that has opened up before our feet.

Two critical moments sealed the fate of the Russian dynasty and empire.

The first was when Alexander II chose to emancipate the serfs under such conditions that only emigration toward the east would have enabled emancipation to work.

The second moment was when Alexander III set out to industrialise his empire and thereby created two new social classes, the proletariat and the capitalists, which suddenly found themselves operating in terms of a collective economy.

With Alexander II's act, property belonging to farmers was separated from that of their old lords. This act assigned rural communes¹ enough hectares of land to support one generation. Its effects only became visible thirty years later, with the new generation, when Alexander III – following the alliance between Russia and France – was required to industrialise his country with the help of French capital in preparation for war.

This represented a novelty in the history of the Romanov empire that entailed many risks for the old system. Events unfolded without people actually realising that a substantial, and indeed crucial, change was taking place.

Following the pact between France and Russia, a flood of liquid capital swept into the empire of the Tsars.

This was all quite natural and to be expected, since economics responds to laws of its own that are as inescapable as those of physics.

From a physical perspective, Russia represented an empty space with no capital. Capital tends to behave as bodies do: it dreads emptiness. The Russia of those years may be compared to a large, hermetically sealed room whose air is rarefied and whose walls are covered by the condensed atmosphere of its surroundings.

This monetary atmosphere was nowhere as condensed as in France, the foremost country in terms of savings. Its inhabitants, both rich and poor, saved far more money than they

spent, and so their chief concern was to find new investments for their ever-increasing funds.

The sort of investments that used to be known in France as ‘heads of family’ would pay six or seven percent. The safest investment of all, which was apparently guaranteed by all the alleged resources of the Empire, were government stocks, which would pay four percent.

These were highly appealing rates, compared to those which people were used to. Middle-class Frenchmen swooned at the prospect of doubling their revenues without the slightest risk. The apparent solidness of the giant which had outdone Napoleon’s genius filled the French with blind confidence: for they did not know that it was standing on clay feet.

The small savers, however, whose ignorance of geography is well known, felt an instinctual mistrust towards anything beyond their country’s borders.

It was necessary for their government to announce that their fears were unfounded, and that by making this investment they would be killing two birds with one stone. Aside from doubling their revenues, French savers would be paying an acknowledged service to their own country: thanks to the formidable support which the Russian giant would give France in the case of war with Germany under these conditions, these people would be ensuring the safety of their homeland and hence their own.

With the famous ‘steamroller’ on one’s side, things would no longer happen as they had in 1870. Hesitation was not an option: all purses and penny banks between the Pyrenees and the Vosges, between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, were emptied in a bout of indescribable enthusiasm.

A capitalist wind of unusual force thus started blowing from the west to the east.

Wind of this sort usually brings rain, but in this case it was a shower of gold that France rained upon Russia – a country which was as dry as a desert in this respect.

Naturally, the Russians were delighted to receive this downpour. The delight was shared by landowners as much as the bourgeoisie. It was the former, in particular, who rejoiced, because life in the countryside did not cost more than it used to, and it was time for things to change there. Landowners started selling their produce for more, so that without acquiring any new property they miraculously became richer, as if in a fairy tale.

We have personally met a Russian landowner who received five hundred thousand roubles for the felling of his trees. When he had first inherited his property, which included more than just the forest, it had been evaluated at fifty thousand roubles and its annual yield was no more than one point five percent of this sum. With the half a million roubles this owner obtained, he purchased some papers that returned six percent. The house, fields, pastures, and vegetable garden – what he needs to support himself in the countryside – he kept; and what is more, in fifty years or so his heirs will have a newly-planted forest.²

Previously, very few men in Russia had grown rich in this way, by operating conjuring tricks with scribbles on paper. People who did so used to be contemptuously called ‘birds of the sky’ – an allusion to the birds that, according to the Gospel, our good Lord feeds without them ever having to sow, gather, or store anything. This shows just how much aversion Russian landowners used to have for capitalist methods.

This new manner of acting and living seemed magnificent. It was Russia’s honeymoon for the holy matrimony it had contracted with Capitalism – behind which the Jew was hiding in wait of his prey. To celebrate the marriage in style, sumptuous banquets were held, filled with champagne and vodka. People genuinely believed to have found the secret formula for changing water into wine, as Christ had done at Cana. No one – not even the Tsar and his advisors (except a few perhaps, whom we shall mention later) – realised that something crucial had changed. People failed to see that a real revolution was taking place, one without which the revolution of 1917 would never have been possible.

The good old times in which each man was the master of his house and God alone the master of all were dead and gone.

The state became the one responsible for pumping blood through the arteries of the country in the form of money – which had suddenly become something indispensable. Russia thus ceased to be a chequerboard of autonomous units and individual liberties. The state took the form of a single economic and social body. Once in debt, it was forced to gain effective control over the country, not in order to increase its output of those resources directly and genuinely necessary for life, but to produce the constituent elements of capital and credit, without which it now seemed quite impossible to manufacture anything.

The Tsarist regime had not expressly wished any of these changes, which flew in the face of its tradition and patriarchal heritage. Yet, the new state of affairs followed as an inevitable consequence of the hasty industrialisation of the country, pursued on the basis of political considerations about the possibility of future war. The only starting point for this industrialisation was the foreign credit which had been explicitly given for such purpose. Given these conditions, the new industry lacked any natural support in the form of land capable of feeding its workers and of furnishing them with what they needed without resorting to endless transactions. Consequently, both employers and employees lacked any immediate means for subsistence.

Things could not have been any different for an industry based on credit, whose workers, managers, and direct or indirect backers no longer lived off the land. In the countryside, by contrast, where people continued to support themselves through farming, as in the past, employers and employees could have continued collaborating – as their fathers had done – without the intermediation of money. Yet psychological factors came into play: people were no longer satisfied with the old way of doing things.

By now, human relations had turned into relations between creditors and debtors. Brass, silver, gold, and paper bills came between men as soon as these were divided into two categories. In the books of so-called double-entry accounting, figures split even

individuals into two, making them creditors and debtors at one and the same time. The damage done was irreparable.

[1](#) Evola adds, ‘the so-called *mir*’.—Ed.

[2](#) Evola omits this entire paragraph.—Ed.

Stolypin's Economic Reform

Just before the War, a providential man appeared who might yet have fixed the situation.

Nicholas II, who never accomplished a thing, had finally found a man up to the task: Stolypin. Had this man not been killed, he would have saved Russia – and with it, perhaps, the world – from the subtle plague of the soul.

The tale of these events is still clouded by passions and distorted by shameless propaganda. But the day will come in which justice will be given to Stolypin by assigning him a rightful place among the great builders of empires.

We shall focus for a moment on this great witness to the 'twilight of the gods' whom a Jew's bullet prevented from implementing a plan more fruitful than that of Peter the Great and Catherine the Great. These two sovereigns had built a vast empire which was ultimately nothing but a giant standing on clay feet. To judge from the political, economic, and social work Stolypin carried out in the short period between June 1906 and September 1911, fifteen or twenty years of external peace would have sufficed for this providential man to build a great nation and people in place of all the chaos and incoherence he had found.

Stolypin hailed from an old noble family belonging to the great landed aristocracy. Ever since he was a child, he had been steeped in feudal tradition. His blood thus led him to gaze back at a past that was dear to him.

Stolypin's mind, on the other hand, was open to the future: hence, he was the very opposite of those reactionaries – in the literal sense of the term – who, with their narrow minds, instinctively react against all that is new and blindly cling to outdated forms without knowing how to separate the wheat from the chaff.¹

This feudal gentleman, the son of a great chamberlain of the court, spent his whole life fighting both against the people of his own class, who saw him as a dangerous innovator and man of progress (which he indeed was, in the literal sense of the term), and of course against the champions of alleged democratic progress, who rightly regarded him as the worst enemy they had ever beheld and the most serious threat to their evil plans.

While of pure Russian stock, the Stolypin family owned some land in the province of Kovno. It was there that the future man of state began his political career.

Stolypin managed to bring stability to a milieu in which misery, resentment, and mutual mistrust – caused by the Revolution of 1905 – left no room for any corporate² spirit of social collaboration.

Within a few years of efforts, Stolypin did such a great job at easing relations among classes and races that he came to the attention of Nicholas II, who was very worried by the agrarian question. The Tsar appointed Stolypin governor of the province of Grodno, which borders Kovno and is home to an ethnically mixed population of Poles, White Rusyns, Jews, and Russians.

As the new governor, Stolypin was not much of a bureaucrat. He instead made brilliant use of his skills as a man of social action, focusing in particular on an in-depth study of the agrarian problem, which he regarded as the Gordian knot of the Tsarist empire.

The political situation had taken a very dangerous turn. The Revolution of 1905 had broken out, and peasant revolts were ravaging the Volga regions. Stolypin was forced to quit his peaceful work in Grodno and take command of the province of Saratov, which lay at the very centre of the uprising.

His was a place of honour and combat – a test of fire both in the literal and metaphorical sense.

Stolypin gave proof of qualities that immediately made him stand out among those serving the threatened regime.

To shed light on the problem, he did not turn to the books and pamphlets written by those undercover villains who claim to be voicing the grievances of the people. Rather, he personally made enquiries among the people themselves – those folk he had been in regular contact with ever since his childhood and which he regarded not as some sort of myth, but as a body comprised of living individuals. Everywhere Stolypin received the same response from the mouth of the people – which alone was authorised to speak in its own name.

Let us here quote the daughter of the future reformer, who reported one of the replies she once happened to overhear:

‘They said it was true that pillaging and ransacking wasn’t going to solve a thing. When my father asked them why they were then behaving in such a way, one of them answered, with approval from all his fellows: “What I would like is a piece of blue paper with the imperial coat of arms assigning me and my family full ownership over a small plot of land. I could pay for it over time: thank God, people work in my family. But what is the point of working at the moment? You love your land, try to farm it the best you can, better than all others, and then they come and take it away from you – after you have put your heart and soul into it; they give it to someone else, and the following year the commune sends you to work somewhere else. What I am telling Your Excellency is true and many of my mates agree: why bother? Life is already dull as it is, Your Excellency!”’

Alexandra Stolypin adds:

‘My father was very sorry to hear all this. “Poor Russia, a country of wood and thatch,” he would often say. In his mind he would picture the thriving farms of nearby Germany: in what were tiny plots of land compared to our vast plains, serene and tenacious men amassed produce and wealth generation after generation. Turning his gaze toward the Urals, in his mind he would then traverse the long prisoners’ route across the Asian Russian empire: all of nature’s treasures lay buried there in virgin soil, immersed in their ancient slumber...’

We have quoted this lengthy passage because it sums up the whole story of the origins of

the Russian cataclysm, a subject to which many books in all languages have been devoted.

It is fair to say that everyone in Russia had heard this voice, but that only one man chose to listen to it. And this is why he was such a great man. For the same reason, this Christian and loyal servant of the throne, this autocrat by birth and feudal gentleman by persuasion and temperament, may be said to have been the only real democrat – him, and not Witte, Bakunin, Miliukov, Chernov, Kerensky, Lenin, Trotsky, or any of all the other anonymous sympathisers of democracy, be they Russian, Western, or American.

By then, the path Stolypin was to follow until his death had been traced. Knowing that sins against the spirit of evil are never pardoned in this world, he chose to sacrifice his own life to his vocation of tirelessly working for the happiness of the Russian people.

This great landowner never lost sight of the fact that Russia – and more generally what is referred to as one's fatherland (literally, 'the land of one's fathers') – ought not turn into a branch of international business and a consortium for smooth financial transactions; but, on the contrary, that it ought to represent one's heritage and land, a great land to be put to good use for the benefit of its inhabitants.

In line with what is written in the Gospel, when Stolypin was required to put his skills and faith to the test in a small arena, he did not hesitate to do so.

Time was working in his favour and his day – destined to be a short one – was rapidly approaching. As soon as the dissolution of the Duma was announced, Goremykin – a man of another age who was not ready to face such events – resigned. His successor was bound to be the only man who had chosen a different path: Stolypin.

The new head of the government enjoyed the trust of his sovereign, and justifiably so. Both ultimately shared the same ideas, but the Tsar, a fearful and hesitant man, did not know how to go about implementing them. Stolypin was practically invested with quasi-dictatorial powers.

Fate was offering him the chance to fulfil his life's dream. Few men have such fortune in this world. Stolypin felt that he would pay for this great opportunity with his own life. This foreboding, or rather well-founded certainty, was always at the back of his mind. He even told his family about it: for he was quite conscious of what Enemy he was challenging, and indeed certain that this Enemy would not hesitate to kill him in order to prevent him from spoiling their Satanic plan.

For this reason, Stolypin tried not to waste a single minute. Postponing the creation of a new electoral law, he went straight for his goal.

The most urgent task was to sever the Gordian knot that tied Russia to those causes which were driving it toward the abyss – not to discuss how one might go about untying it. These causes were simple ones, as are all first, primal causes.

The chief cause of disorder in Russia was ferment and exasperation among the people. No revolution in history has ever had any other initial motive behind it. Even in the case of revolutions classified as religious, denominational factors are usually only what sparks

the flames – not the fuel without which no blazing fire would be possible.

The primary cause of the people's exasperation was their misery. They were caught in a deadlock because they were expected to live off what they sowed and reaped, and yet no longer had any land on which to sow or reap after a decree had disenfranchised the serfs. The situation was growing increasingly worse from one generation to the next.

The primary cause of the exasperation and ferment among the people was therefore quite clear and perfectly natural. If anything was certain and evident, it was the fact that there were no other causes. Sure, professors, lawyers, and journalists in Paris and London – or even Saint Petersburg and Moscow – were told that what tantalised the Russian people was the desire to have democratic institutions. But country gentlemen such as Stolypin – or even men far less sagacious than him – could hardly buy these tales.

Once the problem has been posed in these terms, it remains to be ascertained whether this initial cause – this deadlock of the masses – might have been done away with for good without first having to grant constitutions, convene parliaments, and hand over the press to Jewish capitalists. Had it been possible to do without such restrictions, the primary cause – the exasperation of the masses – would have been automatically suppressed. It is clear that this cause could indeed have been easily removed, at least for one century. Russia would have found itself in a most fortunate and privileged position.

Homeland and colony at one and the same time (the colony being but an extension of the homeland), Russia had enough resources not only to feed several times its own population, but also to provide its inhabitants with all they needed to become small landowners. The only requirement would have been for it to gradually extend eastwards in a planned fashion.

To attain this magnificent goal, there would have been no need to rob anyone; in fact, alongside small properties there would have been plenty of scope for the creation of new medium- and large-scale domains. Would there have been the need – as had once been claimed elsewhere, in different circumstances – ‘for money, more money, always money’?

Well, not really: Russia was still a newcomer to the capitalist system, and most of its inhabitants were still doing happily without any currency. Besides, even supposing this had been the problem, with all the money Witte³ had managed to borrow, there would have been plenty of funds to colonise and manage a portion of the Asian Russian empire of a large enough size to avert the threat of agrarian congestion for quite some time. Indeed, capital would never have been invested in a more useful and advantageous manner – with costs soon to be amortised and the prospect of countless benefits in the future.

Without the hindrance of a democratic constitution, without any hostile and treacherous collaboration from frenzied parliaments, and without having to allow Jews and social turmoil maniacs to dishearten the people through the so-called free press, the Tsarist government had everything it needed, in a material sense, to completely eradicate the only decisive causes of the approaching cataclysm.

The Tsar could thus have suppressed the very *raison d'être* of all future revolutions once

and for all. Had he done so, we can confidently claim that neither the War nor the Bolshevik Revolution would have taken place.

Stolypin's merit does not lie so much in having understood all this: for many others, especially among the landowners, reasoned along much the same lines. Stolypin, however, was the only one in half a century to have drawn the logical conclusions by immediately taking action.

After a mere four months since Stolypin had come to power, a new agrarian law was passed by imperial decree, establishing private property for farmers. This memorable event bears the date of 9 November 1906.

Alexander II's mistake was thus at least partly rectified. Farmers were now given the right – and indeed the opportunity – to break free from servitude under the commune, which had replaced that they had known under the landowners.

The farmers' agrarian bank – a special institution that was already in existence, but until then had simply been operating as a sort of tool for Russifying foreign regions – purchased lands at a low cost. Adding these properties to those already belonging to the state, the bank put them to public use, enabling each farmer to buy a plot on credit after announcing that he was freely leaving the commune. Each farmer would only pay the bank what money he had, as the imperial treasury would make up the difference.

Almost immediately, half a million heads of family came into possession of almost four million hectares.

This was in practice when serfdom was finally abolished. Yet, because it did not mark any 'progress' towards collective socialist economy, but rather was a 'regression' toward individualism and private economy, this event did not have the same literary and theatrical resonance as Alexander II's reform. Enthusiastically welcomed by the people, it was hardly appreciated by their alleged friends, advocates, and spokesmen – who treated the people as some sort of myth. It was also given a disconcertingly lukewarm reception by liberals and their press. As for the foreign press, it merely looked on in almost complete silence.

In the eyes of this press, Stolypin was a reactionary obscurantist and tyrant – why, it couldn't quite tell. Certainly, had Stolypin given over all land to be managed by an anonymous Jewish company in the name of the people – according to Communist or socialist practice – he would have been described in very different terms.

Confident in what he had done, Stolypin continued along his path, ignoring all the barking dogs. In just a few years – and we have witnessed this with our own eyes – European Russia, as if under the protection of a good fairy, became filled with a growing number of small, wealthy, and happy farms.

This was only the beginning. In setting out to transform one-sixth of the world, Stolypin had a far greater plan in mind. To buy property at a fair price and then sell it under more advantageous conditions, in such a way as to cover the inevitable deficit of the treasury which was created by the taxpayers, was clearly a plan geared toward social solidarity.

Ultimately, it meant artificially supporting the unemployed at the expense of the state, through taxes. Yet Stolypin's plan would not have brought only financial losses, for it was based on the hope – almost the certainty – of making up for these losses in the future.

This strategy, of course, would not have increased the wealth of the nation. While on the whole this would have remained largely the same, there would have been a decrease from the point of view of the country's yield. Manorial estates, which were cultivated and managed in a more intelligent way, were more productive: their parcelling – even if only partial and carried out in a perfectly honest spirit – could hardly be expected to contribute to the country's exports; in fact, it had the exact opposite effect. Still, good business – if we may use this expression which capitalism has distorted – consists of man's triumph over matter and energy, not over his neighbours.

In a country in which the farmers' agricultural methods were outdated, the transfer of lands which had already been exploited and cultivated from one person to another – or rather several others – was bad, in general economic terms. But Stolypin's approach was only an expedient aimed at curbing the immediate effects of subversion, in such a way as to buy some time and secure at least what little peace was necessary for him to carry out his ambitious plan.

Stolypin's major idea, which was of far broader import, was to put what we might call the virgin lands of the eastern and Asiatic part of the empire to good use. To attain this goal, he first needed to pave the way for it, chiefly by improving the existing means of communication. Otherwise, he would have acted like those overly hasty imitators of the West, who end up with a fruit that is already rotten before having even reached maturity, as the story goes.⁴

These problems, therefore, had to be solved through careful planning.

Stolypin was first of all concerned with agriculture, which provides the essentials for life and averts the danger of hunger – the prelude to all revolutions. After this came transport and communication routes, which enable agricultural regions to supply those with little Sun, while at the same time enabling the latter – which may be rich in other resources – to furnish the former with the materials they need to increase their agricultural yield. Finally, there is mining and what little industry is needed to meet the fundamental needs of man and the land without having to call upon help from the outside. The main purpose of this industry was not to export any goods or nourish the banks through commerce, but to provide agricultural implements, so that the whole economy would take the form of a closed circuit, so to speak.

Only once this ground floor – the foundations of Stolypin's economic plan – would have proven solid enough to support a superstructure would the upper floor have been constructed, in the form of large industry. Such industry, however, would not have been wildly expanded according to offers of credit, but only developed in accordance with the availability of raw materials – envisaged as the starting point – as well as the demand for finished products.

Indeed, industry must follow the extraction of raw materials in agriculture and mining –

never precede it. To act otherwise is to put the cart before the horse. Our generation, more than any other, knows all too well what a system of this kind leads to.

The criterion of harmony also applies to economics. An ideal national economy – or private economy, for that matter – is one that leaves nothing undone which can be accomplished without external aid.

Stolypin realised that only under these conditions could a perfect economic model be developed, one shielded from the vicissitude of external events and financial plotting. This is not to say that finance would necessarily have been excluded from this economic model. The latter would have made use of it to the extent to which it was convenient, without depending upon finance or being at its mercy: for an economy that is not sustained by finance is like a person hanging from a rope in the claws of the Jew.

For the most part, we owe the Trans-Siberian Railway to Mr Witte. This railway – the longest one on Earth – is an imposing work that honours the person who conceived it and oversaw its construction. Still, it is curious to note to what extent it bears the stamp of a man as steeped in capitalist ideas as Witte. The Trans-Siberian does not run across the wealthiest portions of the Asian Russian empire, those which would be the most suited for internal immigration and most likely to become local production centres. The main purpose of this formidable railway – its genuine *raison d'être* – rather appears to be that of providing the shortest possible route to connect the densely populated regions of western Russia – and via them, Europe – to China and the Pacific Ocean, in such a way as to open up a window on another sea for the descendants of Peter the Great.

With its boundless riches still waiting to be explored and exploited, and stretching for thousands of kilometres, Siberia had merely been regarded in this framework as an obstacle to be overcome – the main concern being transport, commerce, and financial interests.

The apparently similar work that Stolypin had in mind – but which an untimely death prevented him from fully accomplishing – was actually of a completely different sort. The Southern Trans-Siberian ran across the most fertile regions, those most suited for internal colonisation. While shorter than the other railway, it was still the second-longest one in Europe.

The creation of the first Trans-Siberian had been met with enthusiasm by the European press because it had shortened the distance between the headquarters of the financial institutions in Paris, London, and Berlin and their Peking or Shanghai branches. This same press, by contrast, hardly ever mentioned the colossal project of the second railway. The reason for this is that the creation of the Southern Trans-Siberian was only of genuine importance to the Russian people. The latter, however, was presented as being mercilessly exploited by its greatest benefactor, while its impersonal name was used to conceal the aspirations of Israel, in whose way stood the Tsar.

A quick look at statistics will help make things clearer.

In 1895, after three hundred years of Russian rule, Siberia – which covers a far wider

surface than the whole of Europe – was inhabited by 4,000,000 people, some of whom were descended from deported political prisoners or ordinary criminals. Between 1895 and 1907, in other words from the opening of the first Trans-Siberian to Stolypin's rise to power, this population increased by 1,500,000. In the three following years, under Stolypin's administration, it increased by almost 2,000,000, despite the fact that the new railway had not yet been completed.

Had this reasonable pace been kept up, by 1922 the population of Siberia would have increased by 10,000,000. Indeed, thanks to the new railway and to the fact that the Russians would have stirred from their age-old apathy under a government which devoted all its energy to this task, it is likely that this figure would soon have multiplied by a factor of three or four.

According to the estimates we were given by people close to the former Prime Minister, the Russian emigrant population in Siberia and Turkestan during the years 1920-30 ought to have reached a figure between 30 and 40,000,000. These would not have been thirty or forty million teeth-gritting, barefooted proletarians fighting for a miserable wage, but thirty or forty million small landowners: well-off, prosperous men who would have had more land and natural resources than most French farmers. Thirty or forty million men leading happy lives, confident of their future, satisfied with their lot and enjoying the highest possible degree of economic independence would have constituted a formidable barrier against any sort of revolution: in no country in the world is such a powerful conservative and reactionary force to be found today.

The only unquestionable benefit brought by the French Revolution was the improvement of the economic conditions of the peasant class. God knows how often this refrain is used and abused today to excuse the abominations of the Revolution. At the cost of what blatant robberies and glaring injustices was this improvement achieved?

Without harming a soul or ever departing from the most scrupulous morality and legality, Stolypin took a path which would have led directly to a far more considerable outcome.

[1](#) Evola omits the following five paragraphs from his edition.—Ed.

[2](#) Corporate, in the sense of a type of society in which citizens are organised into groups based on the function they perform for the body of the entire society itself, such as agriculture, the military, or administration.—Ed.

[3](#) Sergei Witte (1849-1915) was an advisor to the last two Tsars of Russia. He oversaw the industrialisation of Russia and was the author of the 1905 *October Manifesto*, which was written in response to the Revolution of 1905 and the subsequent need for democratic reforms, and was the precursor to the Russian Empire's constitution.—Ed.

[4](#) Evola omits this last sentence.—Ed.

Stolypin's Work: Capitalism and Property

Stolypin was not only the creator of countless estates, but also of what necessarily came with them, namely, as many individual liberties. The *bête noire* of liberal parties was in fact a great liberal, in that he created millions of free and independent men.

And it is not in spite of the fact that Stolypin was a feudal gentleman by breeding down to the very marrow of his bones, but precisely *because of this*, that he acted the way he did. His aim was to make the feudalism he loved a blessing for the whole nation rather than the exclusive privilege of one class, as it had been in the Middle Ages. The only people who will find what we are saying paradoxical will be those who struggle to grasp the true nature of feudalism, and only see its limits and shortcomings.

The detractors of the old regimes, whose job consists of distorting historical facts, have managed to confuse two completely different things: feudalism and servitude. Whereas the former reflects the relation between lords and their sovereign, or the mutual relation among lords, the latter describes the lords' relation to the peasants, their serfs.

Feudalism is a specific product of the Christian Middle Ages, by virtue of which all members of the landed aristocracy, including minor country squires, exercise independent sovereignty over their own lands – just as an emperor or king does over his territory. An emperor or king will be the suzerain of noblemen, but not their master. They, in turn, will not be his slaves, but rather his soldiers and military cadres, and this for their own personal safety – for each of them individually could never adequately defend himself in the event of conflict with other nobles or another king.

In modern terms, feudalism was a federation of independent owners with shared interests who held sovereignty over their domains – a federation ensuring the safety of each of its members. The one who wielded the greatest power by virtue of inheritance presided over the federation – as one might say nowadays. This person was an emperor or king, the suzerain of princes and dukes. Each of these princes or dukes, as intermediaries in the hierarchy, exercised the same role *vis à vis* the lower strata of the aristocracy.

All of Stolypin's efforts were directed at turning each man of the people into a small, independent lord and individual sovereign within his own domain, like a baron of the Middle Ages. Like barons, these men would have become vassals and tributaries of the crown: they would have been expected to obey its laws and conform to the rules of the Christian faith. They would have offered certain services to the king and received certain benefits in exchange. By contrast, the French Revolution had striven to turn each man of the people into an interdependent member and ideal representative of a collective, impersonal, and anonymous form of sovereignty.

Stolypin's idea was to create an individualist and decentralised society founded on private property. The idea of modern democracy is instead to create a collective and centralised society founded on anonymous capital.

Stolypin tried to push Christian feudalism to its final consequences through a process of

ennoblement and de-proletarianisation extending to the very bottom, just as the Revolution had pushed pagan democracy to its final consequences through a process of proletarianisation extending to the very top.

The tree planted by the revolutions to undermine feudalism (instead of extending it to the whole of humanity, as needed to be done) is the capitalist system, and its fruits are poisonous ones. We will die from them, since we cannot continue to live in this absurd manner forever.

We shall perish because the first commandment of our mercantile civilisation, created by Jews for Jews, is to only eat what has been purchased with money, after having sold what one has produced to get this money.

The outcome of this process is an extraordinary vicious circle. On the one hand there are people who are suffering from hunger because they are not able to sell their labour in return for money, which they can use to purchase food. On the other hand, there are people who are destroying their food stocks because they are not able to find anyone to sell them to in return for money which they can then use to purchase the labour of the aforementioned men, who would then have some money to buy food.

It is forbidden to live in any other way except through money. It is forbidden to produce what would enable one to live without it. Never have regulations been more strictly followed, nor conventions more carefully observed.

What we have is a country overflowing with essential goods in which half of the population lacks food, housing, clothes, or fuel, as it does not have any money for purchasing the things it needs. It could only get this money by selling its labour to the other half of the population, which is also short of money because – as we have seen – it suffers from an overabundance of essential goods which it cannot sell.

The state is quite rightly alarmed at the thought that those who have nothing, like a pack of hungry dogs, may end up attacking those who are suffering from an overabundance of goods. So it decides to act – just how, we shall now see.

The state collects the taxes paid by the rich, or rather those classified as rich – those suffering from overabundance. But these, as we have seen, are overflowing with anything but money, as they cannot sell their actual goods. They might consider themselves lucky if they manage to pay off the Shylock funding them and avoid declaring bankruptcy.

What the state is in urgent need of are rather supplies to feed the hungry, and clothes to dress those who are cold. It should ask the rich, then, who are overwhelmed by their abundance, not for the money they do not have, but for part of the stocks they do not know how to dispose of, and which would provide exactly what the poor need.

This solution would appear to be the most rational one, in economic terms. It would have the advantage of benefitting both parties, in other words the vast majority of humanity and its most significant minority. In quantitative and qualitative terms, this would include the people who produce through their work and those who produce by making others work. Yet, because a similar solution would go against the tiny minority of vultures who neither

sow nor reap, neither work nor make others work, but simply grow rich through the frenzied circulation of capital, the modern capitalist state prefers to adopt a different solution, one that beats all records of strangeness.

What the state does is ask those taxpayers who are overflowing with the goods the unemployed need for the only thing they lack: money. It forces them to sell some of their stocks at a low price to the aforementioned vultures, so that they end up being in even less of a position to offer workers any jobs. These cheap stocks the vultures then immediately sell at a high price to the unemployed, who purchase them with the money the state has taken from the producers of the goods.

The balance of this ingenious operation is most edifying: sheer loss for producers and employers, who sell their goods at a low price for the benefit of parasites; sheer loss for the unemployed, who purchase goods at a high price for the profit of the said parasites; and, finally, sheer loss for the state as well – adding to its other inevitable losses – along with a predictable rise in future unemployment rates. On the other hand, this operation means profit all round for the only middlemen manipulating the currency – in short, the absolute triumph of merchants and Jews, with the prospect of things automatically continuing in the same direction.

The misery of the workers, the ruin of those giving them jobs, the bankruptcy of the state and the threat of social turmoil are all considered preferable to the idea of giving up the intermediation of money – as if there could be no hope for humanity outside the capitalist system.

It cannot be denied that among these rancorous victims there is a steadily growing (and hence threatening) number of people who are already brandishing axes out of the burning, and indeed even legitimate and understandable, desire to fell this poisonous trunk – poisonous for all, that is, except the Jews and their acolytes.

One would be only too happy to lend these men a hand, were they proposing anything other than what other Jews paid by and accomplice to the former ones are whispering in their ears.

As might be expected, what the Jews are suggesting for Christians to do against other Jews as a way of redeeming the capitalist sin is actually – under the guise of a supreme remedy – the most colossal exacerbation of the same ill, namely: the despotic and universal pan-capitalism that, under the name of Communism, has been raging in Russia for over fifteen years,¹ bringing material misery, moral decadence, and complete servitude to 150 million people.

One is led to wonder whether there is any solution for humanity outside these two alternatives, the most recent of which is even worse than the old one.

Indeed, there is, and it consists of the pure and simple return to the path we have abandoned, namely property ownership of a feudal type, in which what matter are objects and living people – not figures and symbols. This time, the feudal regime could not operate for the exclusive benefit of a privileged class: whole communities – or, to be more

accurate, the countless individuals comprising them – would have to benefit from the system.

Herein lies the profound significance of the political, economic, and social experiment that Stolypin embarked upon between 1906, the date of his coming to power, and 1911, the date of his assassination.

We should add that, in order for a similar project to be feasible, it was not enough for there to simply be a man like Stolypin capable of implementing it: what was also required was a territory sufficiently vast in relation to the number of its inhabitants. And such was the Russian Empire.

Another advantage that should not be overlooked is the fact that the Russian people had not yet fully assimilated the capitalist mentality, which is so difficult to eradicate, and that, for the most part, it had not completely lost the habit of obeying.

Besides, it is most likely that Stolypin would never have conceived a project of this sort had he been a French, British, Italian, or American minister. To do so, one needed to have the old sense of property ownership running through one's veins; and in Western countries, even among the heirs of feudal families, this feeling had already been lost after a century of capitalist habituation.

Nowadays, people will hardly understand us if we say that, between a landowner and a king, or one's inheritance and one's country, there is only a difference of degree on the same scale of values. Indeed, for modern man, a landowner is only a type of capitalist; an inheritance, an investment of capital; a king, a magistrate in office; and one's country, an idealised consortium or trading post.

Stolypin, by contrast, had this innate feeling, which is becoming rarer and rarer nowadays. This is what made him a most formidable champion of economic and social conceptions which were radically opposed to those which emerged from the Reformation and the French Revolution. He was so formidable an adversary, in fact, that he was bound to be assassinated. Had he lived and governed for thirty years or so, and if peace in Europe had not been broken, it is most likely that he would have turned the anarchical and chaotic Russia of his day into an unprecedented masterpiece. Any comparison with democracies would have been rather unflattering for the latter: governed by collective economy, democracies owed their prestige and the fetishism they were made the object of to the fact that conservatives – or at any rate people labelled as such – had no better alternative to opt for.

The Russia Stolypin had in mind would not have been simply a federation of small farms: it would also have included middle-size and large estates. It is worth stressing this point, as it stands in open contrast to the blind belief according to which all men must necessarily be equal and alike.

As one might guess, Stolypin was not opposing the men of his class – the large landowners. Very wisely, he wished to create new large properties that could act as gravitational centres for the constellations of small properties in all the areas affected by

his reform.

Stolypin necessarily envisaged these new large estates as models of high culture and sources of far more effective moral influence upon surrounding peasant communities than the bureaucracy he quite rightly distrusted – for he was conscious of its corrupt nature and concealed revolutionary tendencies. Stolypin deemed the establishment of new large estates essential because he saw them as the starting point for a future process of industrialisation. He acknowledged the crucial importance of this process for a modern nation destined to become – because capable of doing so – the one country least dependent upon others, and at the same time that which others had most need of.

Still, Stolypin did not envisage this process of industrialisation in the same terms as his predecessor Witte had done, which is to say as a process based on conquest at the hands of anonymous capital and international Jewry of what Russian territory still remained unexplored, so as to turn it into an area of economic penetration, if not colonisation. Stolypin rather saw this process as a form of productive mutual cooperation between large estates on the one hand and the workers and resources of the small estates on the other. At the same time, he did not disregard the possibility that, especially in the first phase, support might potentially come from easily and swiftly redeemable capital. In this order of things, as in many others, there is nothing as dire as to neglect opportunities by stubbornly sticking to a rigid principle.²

Stolypin had long been acquainted with the sugar factories owned by country gentlemen in Ukraine. Each landowner would manage more than one plant – up to ten, at times – without incurring any debts to cover investments costs, without depending upon the market for the acquisition of raw material (for he would use his own beetroot, or those of his neighbour, through special arrangements), and without the help of any workforce other than farmers from surrounding areas. This was quite enough to make Russia one of the world's leading exporters of sugar.

Much in the same way, the country gentlemen who farmed sheep had set up wool industries without ever depending upon faraway investors or creditors. The owners of large forests had likewise set up sawmills and other workshops, such as paper factories (for which wood represents a primary resource).

Others had gotten together with relatives, friends, neighbours, or other partners – hereditary landowners themselves – and created important industries all over the country.

In Livonia and Courland – the province of Kovno in present-day Latvia – Stolypin had had many a chance to study the holdings established by the Baltic barons, admirable pockets of Western culture (in the best possible sense of the term). Here too, industry had done its best to accomplish the work of agriculture without any external help – hence without people forgoing their independence or running the slightest risk.

The principle generally followed by country gentlemen was the idea that the best and most logical investment of net revenue is not done through banks or by purchasing stocks and bonds for a business managed by unknown people God knows where. The best investment, they reckoned, was their own ancestral land, the object of their affectionate

attention and legitimate pride. From father to son, they would try to improve it and make it more attractive, as kings might do with their kingdoms: for they were not birds of passage, but actually lived on the land. In other words, each landowner was indissolubly tied to his inheritance, which represented his *raison d'être* and would often bear his very name. Money comes and goes, but land remains – although the times in which people believed this are long gone.³

In selling their wheat, beetroot, or wool to millers, sugar manufacturers, or weavers, landowners figured they had no reason to benefit external producers and middlemen: it made more sense for them to reserve such benefits for themselves. In such a way, very significant industries were gradually established without any credit, for the profit not only of their owners, but also of the surrounding areas, in which these gentlemen still exercised moral authority.

As what was done for the Russian soil could also have been done for its subsoil, which was just as rich, it is reasonable to imagine that, in a more distant future, both vertical and horizontal trusts would have been set up. This would have entailed the creation of what has now become the latest fashion in capitalism, yet in such a manner as not to infringe upon private landed property, genuine values, and relationships, and the dynastic stability of the holders of the strictly mutual credit, which would have been paid off within a closed circuit and covered through reciprocal personal services.

The attainment of this result would have clearly proven the superiority of the property system over the capitalist one. Only an unflattering memory would have remained of the days in which generations following the torch of Jewry believed the only choice for the human race was between Israelite capitalism and Jewish Communism.

A crisis such as the one we are currently experiencing – a paradoxical crisis of over-production – would have been quite unthinkable in a system based on landed property. In such a system, a crisis of this sort would rather have been regarded as a heavenly blessing.

In the day of Joseph, the son of Jacob and minister to the Pharaoh, seven years of good harvests were certainly not treated as an over-production crisis.

Capitalism thus disqualifies and condemns itself by formulating the astounding conclusion that over-abundance engenders misery, a conclusion matched by its assertion that credit equals wealth.

Regrettably, all this only appears to have gone to the profit of socialism, which is nothing but capitalism multiplied.

It is important to point out, therefore, that at the beginning of this century, which is even more foolish than the previous one, there was a man who had suggested a different solution and even started implementing it.

In this context, we wish to reserve a word of praise for Nicholas II. People usually compare him to Louis XVI. But if a bullet from a wretched Jew had not changed the course of history, the Tsar might rather have been compared to Louis XIII:⁴ for like the

latter, he managed to find – at least on one occasion – the right man and to keep him in power despite and against all.

Stolypin's foresight makes him a greater figure than Richelieu. By centralising France and seeking to destroy its feudal structure, the latter paved the way not only for Louis XIV's sun,⁵ but also – without realising it – for Louis XVI's guillotine. Had he had enough time, Stolypin would instead have delivered a mortal blow against the rising revolution in Russia, in such a way as to check the progress of world subversion for quite some time. He appears to have been the only man of his generation in power to have been clearly aware of the plan of Subversion.

The history of Russia in recent years thus shows that it is enough for a given human personality to appear not only for certain developments – caused by the deficiencies and foolishness of other men – to come to a clear halt, but also to turn this descending course into an ascending one. At the same time, it shows that it is enough for such a personality to disappear for the exact opposite tendencies to resume their course as if nothing had happened, thanks to the foolishness, blunders, and shortcomings of men who have reverted to their old ways.

Considering what was accomplished in Russia in the four years in which fate put the helm of the country in the hands of a man whose great genius chiefly consisted of never forgetting that two and two make four, it is easy to imagine what could have been accomplished in a quarter of a century.⁶

‘Our main goal’ – Stolypin once told a journalist – ‘is to strengthen the farming folk. In it lies the strength of the country, and we already have over 100 million farmers. Believe me, if the roots of the country grow strong and healthy, Russia's voice will resound with new intensity throughout Europe and the world. My motto is shared labour based on mutual trust. Tomorrow it will be the motto of all Russians. Give Russia ten years of peace and it will seem like a different country.’

Only four years had passed, and it already seemed like a different country. Russia's potential political enemies abroad, such as the Germans, were gnashing their teeth.

Social enemies were disintegrating, and the rift within the Social Democratic Party was growing wider and wider. The Mensheviks, the Right wing of the party, declared that they were ready to work peacefully with the government: they believed the revolution was dead and buried, and treated the Bolsheviks (the Left wing) as stubborn utopians who continued to hope in an upheaval – seeing the one of 1905 as a sort of dress rehearsal for it.

Many of the founders of the Party distanced themselves from the Bolsheviks and adopted a more conciliatory approach. Among these was Plekhanov,⁷ one of the party's pundits. Lenin, in his stubbornness, was simply treated as a maniac.

During the last congress of the party before the outbreak of the war – a meeting held in London in 1907 – the Bolsheviks only got the majority through the help of an officially Jewish organisation, the Bund for Latvian and Polish Social Democracy.⁸ Its most illustrious representative was the famous Jewess known under the pseudonym of Rosa

Luxemburg,⁹ who presented herself as a German eleven years later.

The last embers of the fire of 1905 had gone out. The pacification of the country was complete, and Stolypin's speeches in the House of Lords or in any other place were invariably met with thunderous applause. There was no reason to believe that things would not continue this way and get increasingly better. This enduring progress was not the result of a combination of circumstances or of more or less subtle manoeuvres of internal or external politics: it was due to solid and permanent causes that had nothing artificial or accidental about them.

¹ Evola substitutes, 'for twenty-one years'.—Ed.

² Evola omits the following four paragraphs.—Ed.

³ Evola omits this last sentence.—Ed.

⁴ Cardinal Richelieu was one of Louis XIII's advisors.—Ed.

⁵ Louis XIV (1638-1715) was the King of France when it was at the height of its power, and was known as the 'Sun King'.—Ed.

⁶ Evola omits this paragraph.—Ed.

⁷ Georgi Plekhanov (1856-1918) was one of the first Russian Marxists, and he opposed the Bolsheviks from 1905 onwards, feeling that their strategies did not correspond to the reality of the historical situation they were in.—Ed.

⁸ De Poncins may be conflating two organisations here: the General Jewish Labour Bund of Lithuania, Poland, and Russia; the Latvian Social Democratic Party; and the Polish Social Democratic Party, all of which supported the Bolsheviks at the Fifth Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party in London in 1907.—Ed.

⁹ Rosa Luxemburg (1871-1919) was a German-Jewish Communist leader and one of the founders of the Spartacus League, originally from Poland but who became a German citizen. She was executed by the Freikorps for her role in the Spartacist uprising in January 1919, during the German Revolution.—Ed.

Stolypin and the Jewish Question¹

As one might have expected, Stolypin's work came up against the hostility of Israel.

Certainly, Stolypin was not exactly fond of this race: like all well-informed Russians, he regarded Jewry as the enemy *par excellence*, the inherently hostile element behind all revolutionary attacks. Yet it is equally certain that no trace of injustice toward the Jews as such can be found in his government's policies.

At the same time, no Russian statesman, not even among the most heavy-handed ones, has ever been more hated by international Jewry than Stolypin.

To realise this, we only need to look at foreign newspapers, and especially British and American ones, which are almost invariably in the pay of Israel.

We still remember the first lines of an article that appeared in one of the leading London newspapers – an allegedly conservative one, too. From Saint Petersburg, the paper's foreign correspondent gave an account of the interview he had conducted with the Russian Prime Minister: 'Here I was, then, in the beast's den... I examined the surroundings, without noticing anything unusual about them...'²

We might expect to find similar language in the account of a meeting with Stalin or Trotsky, or perhaps Marat, Robespierre, or Cromwell – all of whom have spilled rivers of blood. But Stolypin had hugely benefited millions of poor farmers by delivering them from an unbearable yoke. The fact that this yoke had been imposed upon them by communes rather than lords did not make it any lighter – despite what certain petty sophists like to claim.

Stolypin never shed anyone's blood, except that of sentenced and executed revolutionaries, who would have met the same fate in any civilised country, under any regime. Republican France in 1871 had treated the Communards in exactly the same manner, and yet it continued to be regarded as the birthplace of the liberal, generous, and enlightened ideas of the age.

Stolypin had been forced to dissolve the parliament twice because it had become ungovernable. This can easily be seen from the transcripts of its sessions, which were no mystery to foreign journalists. If, after these two experiences, he also changed the electoral law, this was only to avoid having to set up a third parliament, which was bound to meet the same fate as the two previous ones.

Ultimately, Stolypin did not persecute the Jews more than any other citizens of the Empire. Even if we were to believe the widespread slander according to which the so-called 'pogroms' were caused by the Tsarist police, the fact remains that no 'pogroms' ever took place in Russia under Stolypin.

But while Stolypin never persecuted the Jews as individuals, he collectively did them more harm than if he had cold-bloodedly exterminated a few tens of thousands of them. Stolypin personally did the Jews far more harm than all the ministers, governors, and

Tsarist policemen in half a century. It is easy to see how, for all species of migratory birds living everywhere and constantly on the move, and all categories of parasites living off the sweat and toil of others, Stolypin's economic system threatened to turn into a real catastrophe.

Christians tempted and demoralised by others' bad example only led this sort of easy existence at the expense of hard-working and sedentary inhabitants occasionally, as a deliberate choice. At any time they could revert to their ancestors' lifestyle. But the Jews, who had never lived in any other manner, actually considered this way of life to be perfectly normal. So when it was brought to an end, they were forced to disappear and emigrate.

Never have there been so many passport requests from people in Russia wishing to leave for the United States as under Alexander I and Alexander II, when the Tsars partitioned Poland and inherited its Jews. The government was all too glad, of course, to issue these papers. Stolypin thus greatly contributed to increasing the population of the ghettos in the big cities of the New World.

Like their ancestors in the time of Moses, the wretched Jews fled Russia, which was like a new Egypt for them, even though they were not being forced to build any pyramids under the threat of the whip. Still – and this was even worse in their eyes – they felt there was less and less room for them and their methods in Russia. Their powerful brethren, however, who fabricated consensus and issued credit (after having made people believe it was the same as wealth), did not so readily accept the idea of losing incalculable profits in the Russian Empire. It is also likely that they were alarmed by the fact that a man had shown to his contemporaries, by means of experiments, that other ways of life and modes of human interaction existed apart from capitalism and socialism.

As everything in this world is relative, it is clear that for the above-mentioned milieu, Stolypin must have embodied what Lenin and Trotsky embody in the eyes of our honest Christian contemporaries, or what Danton and Robespierre were for eighteenth-century society: a dangerous threat to the social order and to established values. Stolypin, therefore, had to be portrayed as an oppressor of the people and an obstacle to progress. This is precisely what the thousand voices of the subservient press tried to do before the assembly of spellbound nations. The conclusion was that it was necessary to get rid of Stolypin as soon as possible, before he might have the time to carry out his plan, thus setting an example for others to follow.

We can now understand why Stolypin was seen as a beast by that journalist – so upset to find himself in its lair – even though he had never devoured anyone. Likewise, we can understand why only ruins remained of this formidable monster's den a short time later, the villa in Saint Petersburg which the state used to reserve for ministers in power. A bomb thrown by Jews dressed as officials exploded one day when the head of the government was giving a hearing. A hundred or so innocent people died: the minister himself escaped unscathed, but his young children were maimed.

This happened at the beginning of Stolypin's career as a minister. An unbroken chain of

attempts on his life followed, which the police managed to thwart. Stolypin was too intelligent a man to need any *memento mori* of this sort in order to realise that, once engaged in such a battle, he could hardly hope to die a natural death.

Throughout the fruitful years in which he was in power, Stolypin was ready to be summoned by God at any moment. A good Christian determined to fulfil his duty to the very end and die as a soldier, he serenely awaited God's judgement. ³

What was fatally destined to happen took place in September 1911 in Kiev, the old city which the Russians regard as the cradle of their civilisation. On the occasion of the inauguration of a monument to Alexander II, a gala event was organised which was graced by the presence of the imperial couple, the court, and the highest dignitaries of the Empire.

Seats were by invitation only, but a few had been set aside for the security agents (the Okhrana). During an interval, as the Prime Minister rested against the balustrade in the first row near the orchestra, engaged in an animated discussion with his entourage, one of the security agents in an evening dress – a man who happened to be Jewish – approached him unnoticed and fired his revolver. Just before collapsing, the fatally wounded Stolypin made the sign of the cross in the direction of the imperial box. His last thought and gesture must have gone to his sovereign. ⁴

Stolypin passed away a few days later. It was not only a minister who died; from a historical perspective, it was even more than a Tsar: that Jewish bullet fatally wounded Tsarism itself and Imperial Russia. While the latter did not immediately perish after the incident, it died of the wound a few years later.

The public – the general public as well as part of the people – foresaw what irreparable misfortune awaited Russia. Europe, however, paid little attention to the episode, whose implications it failed to grasp. To this day, Europe has yet to realise that, from the point of view of the overall chain of historical causes and effects, the murder in Kiev was probably as serious an event as the assassination in Sarajevo.

It is likely that if Stolypin had lived, there would have been no war; and if war had broken out anyway, Russia would have fared a lot better in it. As for the Revolution, it probably would have been anticipated and avoided despite the war. But fate or cosmic evolution – terms synonymous with occult conspiracy – had other plans.

Stolypin's unfinished work rapidly came to a standstill after his death. The great man Russia lost had no spiritual heirs capable of continuing his task. Besides, the World War was approaching.

Yet, genuinely superior men always leave some traces.

In Stolypin's case, the trace left is a deep, if not indestructible one, since it has not yet been erased by those powers which have managed to destroy the Empire, the Tsarist dynasty, the aristocracy, the bourgeoisie, tradition, and the social order of Russia under our very eyes, and even undermine its religion, without encountering any serious resistance. This trace, which represents the greatest obstacle standing in the way of Bolshevism,

consists of the presence of relatively well-off individual peasant estates.

All books written and published concerning contemporary Russia talk of *kulaks*, *sredniaks*, and *biedniaks*: wealthy farmers, medium-holding farmers, and peasants with no resources (comparable to the proletarians). The establishment of the first of these classes, and to some extent the second one as well, is largely, if not entirely, due to Stolypin's work. This class includes around three million farmers who were formerly under the *mir*, the rural communes created by Alexander II. Stolypin turned these peasants and their heirs into free estate owners – *beati possidentes*.⁵

Stolypin freed them from the yoke of the *mir*, which had a socialist foretaste to it. In today's fallen Empire, these men are the last champions of the principle of property ownership, the only ones whom the revolution funded by international Jewish capitalism must really reckon with: for the only way it can convert them is by exterminating them.

This is all very revealing: it was easier to cancel centuries of history than the recent and hardly begun work of a single man who stayed in power for only four years. And if the greatest attempt at collectivisation ever witnessed by humanity will ever fail, it will mean the triumph – twenty years after his death – of the great feudal innovator whose name our contemporaries have almost forgotten.

Bolshevism has easily triumphed over living men, and yet it is this dead man – whom Jewish bullets cannot kill a second time – who represents its greatest threat.

This is the most beautiful funerary oration Nicholas II's minister could ever receive, and it is being delivered on his forgotten tomb by History itself.

We shall end this chapter by comparing the work of the two men who found themselves in the limelight at the twilight of Tsarism: Witte and Stolypin.

If we forget about Witte's ties with Jewish milieus and his secret aspirations, he and Stolypin may be said to have pursued largely the same goal: the establishment of a powerful, solid, and wealthy state – a materially advanced state in which all latent potentials would have been put to good use in peacetime so that they could be mobilised in times of war.

Stolypin did not want Russia to be an exclusively agricultural country and did not shun the prospect of industrialisation, for this would have meant embracing conservatism in the most foolish of fashions.

Both men wished to have agriculture as well as industry, although they pursued this goal by following two radically different paths.

Witte envisaged the state of the future as a vessel beaten by the waves of credit in the ocean of fluid international business transactions. He dreamed of a state fashioned after the capitalist ones of Europe and America, which keep their balance not so much through their resources as through a sort of gambling that goes on until they have nothing more to stake.

In a more original fashion, Stolypin envisaged the new state as a fortress erected on the soil and subsoil of his country, its foundations set deep in the solid ground of his ancestors. More time was required to construct a state of this sort, but the only risk was that the building work might be interrupted before it was finished.

Witte automatically created an army of proletarians who had everything to win in the case of an upheaval. Without them, the Jews would never have found recruits for their revolution. Aware of this, Stolypin instead created an army of proletarians who were naturally and instinctively loyal to the social order and capable – as they still are – of serving as soldiers of the counter-revolution.

Witte worked for the triumph of international business: fatally, those who benefited the most from his method were the international of gold and the red international. Stolypin worked for the Tsar, for Russia, and for the Russians. Yet he did not reckon with his death and a premature World War.

Had Witte pursued his plans to the very end, Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, and their backers would have met few obstacles – indeed, they would still be meeting few today, fifteen years after their triumph. Had Stolypin had the time to accomplish his task, the Bolsheviks would never have found the lever they needed to stir up one-sixth of the world – their work would have been confined to isolated attacks against individuals.

¹ Evola entitles this chapter, 'The Jewish Question in Russia'.—Ed.

² Evola condenses the final part of this paragraph and omits the following three paragraphs.—Ed.

³ Evola omits this paragraph.—Ed.

⁴ Evola condenses this paragraph somewhat.—Ed.

⁵ Latin: 'blessed are they who possess'.—Ed.

The Revolution of March 1917¹

With the disappearance of its most illustrious servant, Tsarism entered its death throes.

While Stolypin's closest collaborators, Kokovstov and Krivoshein, had proved themselves worthy ministers – the former of finance, the latter of agriculture – no man was found who could take his place and hold sway over the political parties and the court.

Apparently, Stolypin's death hadn't changed a thing. The ministers were the same, as was the Duma, the bureaucracy, and even the staff. The intention to follow in the steps of this irreplaceable man who had passed away was still formally there, and was probably sincere enough. In reality, however, as the man who had died had been the only leader of 100 million people, everything had changed.

With Stolypin's death, everything fell apart and chaos spread, starting with the Imperial court. Things were bound to continue in this way not so much until the fall of the regime – for the regime in itself meant little – but until the rise of a new leader.

Unfortunately, this leader was Lenin, whose advent signalled the end of the agony and the beginning of Hell.

Following Stolypin's murder, Nicholas II's weakness and hesitation only increased.

Finding no one to support him, the Tsar could no longer tell if it was he himself who was swaying to and fro, or the world around him.

Pulled hither and thither, the Emperor did not know which way to turn. Born on the day of Saint Job, he saw this as a fatal sign. Nor did the Tsar know whom he could trust, as even his family stood divided on many questions. So he ardently prayed to God for inspiration. Soon, the only things he trusted were oracles, spiritualists, clairvoyants, and all the self-appointed magicians and initiates who started gravitating around Tzarskoye Selo,² which the Imperial couple hardly ever left.

The Revolution was imminent.

In unison, the Jews of both hemispheres got ready to put sentenced Russia to the sword: the day was fast approaching in which the bleakest pages in the history of mankind would be written. Meanwhile, in the capital of the Tsars, people were enjoying themselves and partying like never before. Even in the provincial towns, the carnival seemed to be in full swing. No doubt, an undefinable sense of unease was in the air, even if no especially unusual events appeared to be taking place.

On 8 March 1917, the Revolution broke out, soon growing to threatening proportions.

The Revolution received support – at least moral support – from the Entente. The future members of the Provisional Government held several meetings in the office of the British ambassador, Sir George Buchanan. The Tsar complained about this to Britain, alleging that its spokesman was lending support to the enemies of the Imperial government. The British replied that there was no one who could take Sir Buchanan's place. So the man

stayed.

Other forces were working against Tsarism, starting with international Jewry. 'The Social Democratic, the Socialist Revolutionary Parties, the Polish Socialist Party, all counted Jews among their leaders. Plehve was, perhaps, right when he said that the struggle for political emancipation in Russia and the Jewish question were practically identical,' a fanatical Jewish author and partisan of the Revolution writes.³ He then adds: 'To a greater degree than ... any other ethnic group in the vast Empire of the Romanovs, they [the Jews] have been the artisans of the Revolution of 1917.'⁴

The Tsar fell. A delirious cry of joy accompanied his fall.

The verdict of the press of the Entente was unanimous. Not a voice was raised in defence of the man who had been our loyal ally – until his death.

According to Princess Paley, Lloyd George claimed: 'One of the aims of the war for Britain has been met.' The Entente enthusiastically welcomed the new state of affairs.

'France in 1793 faced the opposition, if not of all the peoples of Europe, of all its governments. Russia in 1917 has all the democracies of the world supporting and assisting her, and helping her win', Mr Vandervelde wrote⁵ – one of the men whom the Entente sent to Russia to convey the regards of the Western democracies to the Revolution.

Great was the joy for this 'bloodless' revolution.

But despite such complacent claims, blood was indeed being spilled. Soldiers started killing their officers. The navy in Helsinki, Kronstadt, and Odessa witnessed genuine butchery. Admiral Nepenin was assassinated and his body exposed to the insults of the crowd for three days. Admiral Viren, the commander of the fleet at Kronstadt, was tied to a stake and burned alive before the eyes of his daughter. In the hospitals, sick or wounded officers were finished off with the bayonet.

The Tsar signed his act of abdication between 11 PM and midnight on the night of the 15 and 16 of March 1917.

At this difficult crossroads in history, the revolutionaries did not commit the irreparable imprudence of showing their real face. Without going too far, they could have talked of establishing a republic. But had they done so, they would have risked losing the support of most of the generals: for had the latter known that by abandoning the Tsar they would also be losing Tsarism, they would never have acted as they did.

Events have shown how well the invisible agents played their role by presenting themselves as being moderate in their demands.

Gutchkov, a delegate of the Duma, arrived in Pskov, the headquarters of the northern armies and the place where Nicholas II was based, and asked the Tsar to abdicate. The latter readily handed him the signed abdication act. Then, turning to one of his aides-de-camp, Nicholas II said the following words: 'If Stolypin had still been around, none of this would have happened.'

Nicholas II was right. The only unexpected thing was the fact that the Tsar was abdicating not in favour of his son – a sickly and debilitated minor he wanted to keep by his side – but in favour of his own brother Michael, making him not just the Prince-regent, but the lawful Emperor.

Unfortunately for Russia, the weakness and levity of this Prince matched his naivety. Besides, he had no wish to rule under such dangerous circumstances.

Morgantically married against the will of the head of his family to the divorced wife of an officer of the Guard, he had been exiled and only allowed to return to Russia after war had been declared. His marriage had caused a scandal, and the Grand Duke Michael was not the man for the situation.

He himself was perfectly aware of it. Two days after the abdication of Nicholas II, representative leaders of the Duma easily persuaded him that it would be a good move on his part to postpone his accession to the throne and wait for the alleged verdict of the nation, as expressed by the future Constituent Assembly, which would have been elected through equal, direct, and universal suffrage. *Vox populi vox Dei*:⁶ no one suspected or admitted that the *vox Dei* could only have been the *vox Judei*.

His was a way of abdicating without abdicating; of hiding behind words by paying a phonetic act of courtesy to the past. Thus, in less than a week, in two stages, Tsarism ceased to exist.

Greater skill could hardly have been shown in this conjuring trick, as achieving it in only one stage would never have been possible.

In Pskov, Nicholas II had genuinely believed he was doing the right thing by abdicating in favour of his brother. Had he known exactly what he was being induced to do, he would probably have refused to sign, as he was surrounded by generals who were not all traitors to the dynasty and regime. Everything suggests that civil war would have broken out at the Tsar's refusal.

Once in Tzarskoye Selo, the Emperor learned that he had in fact abdicated in favour of the republic, the advent of which no one doubted. He also found out, among other things, that the Empress had already been interned, and that he himself was a prisoner in his own palace. The servants of the Jew had not wasted any time.

Meanwhile, the provisional committee of the Duma had given way to a Provisional Government whose nominal leader – as Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior – was Prince Lvov. As his family roots apparently stretch back to Rurik, people used to say at the time that this aristocrat's lineage was more ancient than that of the Romanovs. The possibility cannot be ruled out that Lvov ultimately planned to take advantage of the turmoil and disorder in order to establish a new dynasty. He believed that nothing had changed since Boris Godunov's day.

Prince Lvov was surrounded by people more clever than himself. In turn, they were manoeuvred by others cleverer still, through a kind of left-hand chain leading to Jews – either by blood or spirit. The latter were getting ready, at the end of this cycle, to

implement a plan strangely similar to that of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*.

The rhythm of these eight months of preliminary revolution may be compared to that of Isis gradually removing her veils.

We shall list the leading ‘clever’ figures who controlled Prince Lvov right from the beginning and made sure he would not abandon his ambitious illusions.

The historian Milyukov, the head of the constitutional democrats some fifty years ago, was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. Milyukov enjoyed the friendship of an important Jewish-American financier, Jacob Schiff,⁷ who was a personal enemy of Tsarism. For this reason, the latter’s life was spared, while nonetheless he was thrown out the moment his services were no longer required.

The established myth according to which two distinct revolutions took place – a good and desirable one in March and a bad and detestable one in November – is utterly false.

The Russian Revolution occurred as a single dynamic unit. Three teams of workers – nothing but paid workers, we would like to stress – worked together for the same boss.

The first team consisted of Rodzianko, Shulgin, Nekrasov, Milyukov, Guchkov, and others. This team sowed or let others sow – which amounts to the same thing. The second one, that of Kerensky, Chernov, and all the rest, reaped, while the third, that of Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, and their comrades, served the food at the master’s table.

The latter, the boss, or rather the active party in charge of the demolition and reconstruction business, did not mind showing his feelings right from the start, without waiting for the November events.

As the Minister of Foreign Affairs of a provisional state that was no longer a monarchy, but had yet to become a republic, Professor Milyukov – this old leader of the Kadets,⁸ who in the eyes of the well-off were the members of a wisely liberal and moderate party – received a telegram from New York which could essentially be compared to what a sovereign might send his general to voice his satisfaction for some important victory in battle. This telegram was signed Jacob Schiff.

Any ordinary minister in Milyukov’s position would have been extremely surprised. But the wise professor – who continues to be held in high esteem in Paris, where he is regarded as a particularly interesting victim of the Russian tragedy rather than one of its chief authors – felt most honoured. He did not answer Schiff’s message with words such as, ‘Why don’t you mind your own business? Do I ever send congratulations to you when you strike a good deal on Wall Street?’ Instead, Milyukov expressed himself in terms that suggest – at the very least – a perfect mutual understanding between the two.

This fact is so significant that it is quite amazing: for once, breaking the century-old law of anonymity, a prince of the global conspiracy dropped his reservations.

This proves just how much those people believed the game had been won by 1917, not only in Russia, but all across the world. After the defeat of Germany, the Conference of Paris, which was dominated by Jewry, made the world submit to international Jewish

finance. These people's confidence in their success was so great that they no longer even felt the need to take public opinion into account.

Thus the men of the (fortunately short-lived) revolutions in Hungary, Austria, Bavaria, and Germany were almost exclusively Jewish by race, not straw men recruited by the circumcised, or puppets in the hands of Israel. This was something quite unprecedented. As soon as they realised that it was still early to act in this manner, they reverted to their old methods.

It was the March revolution, not the one in November, received a sort of investiture from Israel, through Jacob Schiff's best wishes. Some people naively believe that events unfolded in this way because only the March revolution was desirable from a Jewish point of view, whereas the November one – in its zeal – had gone too far, creating a sort of revolution within the revolution. The truth is that, in the eyes of the initiates, the second revolution was simply the follow-up to the first one; hence, there was no need to repeat the words which had been pronounced when the first brick had been laid. The edifice will only be consecrated once it is completed, which it still isn't. Through the prompt help of Europe and America, the work goes on,⁹ although nowadays it is called a quinquennial plan.

Once the abdication of the Tsar had been followed by that of Tsarism itself, and once the first decree had been issued, ruling out what hope still remained of launching a counter-revolution, and thus signalling the final victory of the chosen race, the cataclysm hit Russia for good.

*Prikase*¹⁰ no. 1 had been conceived with diabolical craftiness, which the workers and soldiers' delegates in the Saint Petersburg area would never have been capable of on their own. This document was not modelled after any historical precedent, for nowhere had a document of this sort ever been drafted in the aftermath of a revolution.

Prikase number 1 meant the murder of the Russian army. It broke not only the latter's drive and spirit, but also its skeleton and structure, turning it into a flabby and spineless body. As a national and counter-revolutionary force, the army was finished. One force – the national one – had deliberately been sabotaged, or rather stifled, so as to avoid having to fear the other – the counter-revolutionary. To act any differently would have meant compromising, or at least jeopardising, the dynamism of the revolutionary progression, which was meant to lead to the apotheosis of the Jew and the transformation of the fallen Empire into an exotic colony for the international Jewish bank, where Jewry will forge its weapons for conquering the rest of the planet.

We wish to stress the fact that one thing was quite deliberately and consciously sacrificed for another: the minor importance of Russia as an ally of France and Britain was sacrificed to the evidently superior interest of the chosen race – otherwise, we would have to conclude that the cultivated men who had received the heritage of the Tsars were nothing but complete idiots, which of course is far from the truth.

It was not Lenin and Trotsky's work that freed Russia from the yoke of Tsarism. It was

rather the work of the 'noble, generous, and enlightened spirits' who reached this goal with the benevolent approval of the Allied ambassadors. This work was warmly applauded by the French and the British – including many so-called conservatives – not to mention the United States, which appears to have waited for these events before abandoning its neutrality and declaring war on Germany.

Prikase number 1 did not dampen this enthusiasm, which nonetheless gave way to imprecations and insults the following year, when the Brest-Litovsk treaty was signed between Germany and those carrying on the work of the 'generous and enlightened men' who had made this treaty inevitable by destroying the Russian army and making it completely unfit for war.

Meanwhile, a general amnesty had been proclaimed. The doors of prisons and penal colonies were opened up, so that not only political prisoners but common criminals as well swarmed to fill the streets and roads.

All the terrorists who had bloodied the Tsarist empire over the previous quarter of a century, all those who had fled to avoid the gallows, all the dregs of London, New York, Paris, and Geneva, made their way back to Russia.

They were welcomed like dauntless and spotless heroes. In some cases, the Minister of Justice himself, Kerensky, was there to welcome the glorious martyrs at the station.

Finally, the third great act of 'progress' was accomplished on 14 April. A decree announced a radical agrarian reform: without any compensation, all landed properties beyond a certain number of hectares were to be confiscated. This was a way of begging the entire aristocracy. Men of leisure from the bourgeoisie, however, were left alone, as were stockholders, shareholders, people living from lucrative liberal professions, peasants, and so-called *kulaks*, or wealthy farmers.

Only twenty years or so later, once everything which had come before had been swept away, did Jewry feel strong enough to attack these categories of people. For the time being, farmers – whether large or small – were treated as the animals of the revolution, not unlike the workers and the proletariat. The aim was to give all of them the impression of benefiting from the upheavals which were taking place, and of forming a united front.

The inhabitants of the ancient Empire were divided into superimposed classes. At every new stage of progress, the class above was to be suppressed with the help of all those below. The ruling dynasty had already been eliminated with the help of the landed gentry, the rich bourgeoisie, the intellectuals, and the people. It was now the turn of the aristocracy, which had to be eliminated with the help of the bourgeoisie. The rhythm of the Revolution has remained the same from day one – it has never changed.

The nobleman Lvov, the cultured bourgeois Milyukov, the revolutionary lawyer Kerensky, the terrorist Chernov, Lenin and Trotsky, Stalin, and all the rest were – and are – merely the successive executors of the same original and unbroken plan.

The writers and historians who speak of the Russian Revolution as groping in the dark until the rise of Lenin are deeply mistaken, for they are considering it from the point of

view of the interests of the middle class first, then of the farmers, and finally of the proletariat. But if they were to simply consider it from the sole point of view of international Jewry right from the start – calling for the progressive elimination of the royal dynasty, the army, the landed aristocracy, the politically active bourgeoisie, and small rural properties – they would soon realise that the Russian Revolution is a seamless and dynamic whole carefully regulated with an admirable degree of consistency; and that no process of elimination ever took place without a previous one having averted all possible threats.

Yet, while Saint Petersburg and two or three other large cities were still celebrating their day of glory with processions, parades, speeches, and debauchery, in the countryside and the rest of the Empire, the Great Evening had already come. The whole of Russia was alight with old palaces, farms, parks, and forests on fire.

The primordial instincts of the *mujiks*,¹¹ whose savage nature had only been held in check by the fear of beatings, were suddenly awakened when they learned that they no longer had any God or Master to fear; or, rather, that they themselves were now this God and Master. Indeed, they were more so than the Tsar – they were told – because whereas his authority stemmed from divine investiture, by grace of God, the self-proclaimed heirs of Tsarism claimed that their own authority derived from them.

The *mujiks* concluded that, since everything was theirs and existed through them and for them, there was nothing left for them to do but to eat, drink, beat, pillage, rob, rape, torture, burn, destroy, and kill – if for no other reason than to prove that their power was real through such unquestionable attributes of omnipotence.

An orgy unfolded in Saint Petersburg, and torrents of blood stained the vast plains of Holy Russia, while people waited for rivers of milk and honey to flow – a prospect dangled before their eyes by the accomplices of the Jew, who to this day continues to predict such things for the future.

In this period, which the virtuosi of the pen continue to describe as an idyllic one, desolation and abomination reigned in Russia months before the Bolsheviks made their proper appearance. Russia's capital has been mistaken for the whole country. In Saint Petersburg, people still spoke of liberty, equality, fraternity, and justice. The foreigners in the city felt moved, as do many Russian citizens, who still believe that if Lenin had never arrived on that sealed train, the noble and generous revolution would have brought about a sort of Kingdom of God on one corner of the Earth.

Only the outer peel of the Russian upheaval – destined to disappear as soon as it touched the Earth – could seem liberal and humanitarian. The fruit itself was socialist and the seed within the fruit Communist, yet all of these were nothing but dead matter. The living bud that was the *raison d'être* of the fruit, and was destined to emerge as its concentric layers rotted or were absorbed, was Jewish. Thus the Gospel parable of the mustard seed proves equally applicable to the counter-Church that is being built by the ape of God.

Let us now briefly examine the historical details behind this revolution.

In early May, at the peak of this idyllic period, a new riot broke out in Saint Petersburg. Teams of workers armed by an unknown hand and supported by a regiment took on a menacing attitude. Milyukov and Guchkov, the man who had obtained an act of abdication from Nicholas II and tolerated *Prikaze* number 1 as Minister of War, resigned amid the roars of a delirious crowd shouting 'Peace!' Meanwhile, Mr Paléologue, the French ambassador, quit his place, along with all the defeated French socialists who had come to Russia to swoon before its liberating revolution.

As a consequence of all this, the Provisional Government had to be restructured. As one might have expected, this occurred by veering to the Left.

The new government was a coalition one, but the absolute majority now went to the Soviet, whose soul was Kerensky.

Within this new hybrid combination, Kerensky took the Ministry of War. He claimed he wished to raise the spirit of the army and halt the decay he himself had caused in the first place. He sought to defeat Germany not through strategy and tactics, but through dialectic and rhetoric. He also aspired to make the disintegrating divisions and brigades unstoppable through methods comparable to those Orpheus successfully used with wild beasts.

It is quite likely that Kerensky, like the Western braggarts in his party (Vanderwelde, Branting, Thomas, Henderson, and all the rest) naively dreamt of a so-called democratic white peace, to be reached by the so-called working classes of the countries at war by overthrowing the monarchical or bourgeois republican regimes in power: a peace which would bring the armed conflict to an end by common accord through a series of simultaneous strikes – the prelude to a general revolution.

Reasoning of this kind was quite logical coming from a socialist whose only goal apart from the pursuit of his personal ambition was the triumph of socialism. It was far from logical, however, from the point of view of Jewry, since for the latter, socialism was only a means, and not an end in itself. With other strings on its bow which its unwitting servants didn't need to know about, Jewry expected to pass this stage on the way to the Promised Land, or at least to turn it into a means for future conquests. Indeed, Israel was not mistaken.

It was at this point that the American sector of the world conspiracy, which had been kept aside until then, was invited to join the game.

An invitation from the Jewish consortium in New York was an order to the executive in Washington. The latter's representative, Woodrow Wilson, had no intention of being removed like his predecessor, William Taft.

No one has ever quite understood why the United States declared war on Germany. The German Empire posed no threat to either the present or future of the country. To bring about its collapse, they invested billions and sent almost two million soldiers, drafted in a hurry, over to the other side of the Atlantic.

Nothing like it had ever been seen before in the annals of this peace-loving republic.

The avowed reason for American intervention was to avenge the sinking of an English ship that had carried Americans on holiday, whom the German ambassador had actually warned not to make the crossing under the flag of the warring powers. The disproportion between cause and effect was so great that all the sentimental and bombastic phrases reeled off for the occasion could only be taken seriously by teenagers completely lacking any experience of adulthood, or by people who had been instructed not to investigate the background of these events.

It is just as difficult to explain why President Wilson, a spawn of Jewish capitalism, held back until mid-April 1917, allowing both warring parties to get their supplies from American industry. Nor is it easy to understand why it was only from this date that the whole mechanism of the transatlantic press turned violently against Germany.

Now, however, we can see where the simple answer lies: up until mid-April 1917, it was necessary to allow the German monarchy of divine right to crush the Russian one. By the date in question, this goal had been met, and hence only the big Western democracies had to be supported, so that all together they could crush the German monarchy of divine right.

Under these conditions, Russia was conveniently replaced by America, and could be left to its own destiny, which involved going beyond socialism, without thereby posing any threat to the future, in which ‘the world would be safe for democracy’.

¹ Evola adds, ‘American Intervention’.—Ed.

² The Imperial residence at the time, near Saint Petersburg.—Ed.

³ A S Rappoport, *Pioneers of the Russian Revolution* (London: Stanley Paul, 1918), p. 250.—Ed.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 288.—Ed.

⁵ Emile Vandervelde, *Three Aspects of the Russian Revolution* (London: G. Allen & Unwin).—Ed.

⁶ Latin: ‘the voice of the people is the voice of God’, a phrase which was first introduced by the Whigs in England in 1709.—Ed.

⁷ Jacob Schiff (1847-1920) was originally from Germany, but emigrated to the US and joined Kuhn, Loeb & Company in 1875, which at the time was one of the biggest investment banks in America. In 1885 he became its director. He also became the director of many other prominent American corporations, including Wells Fargo and the Union Pacific Railroad. In 1904, through Kuhn, Loeb & Co., he provided funds to the Japanese Empire which ended up totaling half of the funding the Japanese required to wage, and win, the Russo-Japanese War, which Schiff saw as retaliation for Russian anti-Semitism. While he financed loans to many nations, he refused to provide any funds for Russia until after 1917. The period between 1880 and 1920 is known as the ‘Schiff era’ in American Jewish history, as Schiff was the most prominent and active Jewish community leader and used his wealth to finance many Jewish causes.—Ed.

⁸ The Kadets were the members of the Constitutional Democratic Party, which favored democratic reforms and a constitutional monarchy.—Ed.

⁹ Evola has, ‘Through the prompt help of a certain Europe and America, the work goes on, under different names...’—Ed.

¹⁰ *Prikase* is Russian for decree.—Ed.

¹¹ Peasants.—Ed.

From Kerensky to Lenin

The efforts made by Kerensky in Russia to bring about a democratic peace through the mutual agreement of the socialist parties of the warring nations¹ were all in vain.

One thing was clear: if Russia had continued the war to the very end, the revolution too would have continued to the very end.

What Kerensky feared was not carrying the revolution to the very end, but the prospect of counter-revolution in Russia in the event of one of the two emperors of central Europe achieving victory. He reasoned as any man of the far Left would have, which is to say as any man sincerely devoted to Jewry, although he did not know what the final verdict of the world conspiracy was going to be. Kerensky did not believe that France and Britain were facing Germany and Austria-Hungary on a national level; rather, he quite rightly – for such was the deeper meaning of the conflagration – regarded the conflict as a titanic duel between barbarian medievalism and the smiling democracy which had emerged from the French Revolution.

The autocratic Tsar had fallen from his throne because he had ignored the occult nature of the war and embraced the cause of democracy against sovereigns who, in spirit, were the last representatives of the divine right. Kerensky, a democrat and socialist, quite naturally asked himself whether the new democracy of progress of which he was – or believed to be – the founder would escape the same fate, were he to abandon the cause of his comrades, the cause of the international Left, at a time in which it was fighting for world hegemony. And of course, he also wondered whether acting that way did not mean increasing the chances of counter-revolution on all the internal fronts in Europe – something which the victory of the monarchical bloc would certainly have led to – since neither him nor anybody else, apart from the initiates, ever suspected the one ‘as strong as God’ would bring America into play in order to avert such an abomination.

Kerensky and his men loathed the idea of working for kings and of being made fools, just as Nicholas II has unknowingly worked for the triumph of democracy. The Austro-Germans did not conceal their intentions regarding those regions they already effectively controlled. Vague talk was already being made about the prospect of having an Austrian archduke or German prince as the King of Poland, and even of uniting Poland with Austria under the sceptre of the emperor. And the possibility was also being discussed of having a member of one of the German princely families as the duke of Lithuania, Ukraine, or some other neighbouring country.

Kerensky was in a very difficult situation. Signing a separate peace treaty with Germany and Austria would have meant being marginalised by the democracies, as well as throwing oneself into the arms of the previously mentioned supporters of tyranny, while allegedly being on a crusade for progress.

But had Kerensky chosen to continue the war to the very end, he would have attracted the wrath of that revolution from Hell which had led him to the top. In either case he would have been blamed for having brought about a hopeless situation.

Kerensky had first of all suppressed the notion of divine right, which, for a people without any nationalism such as the Russians, represented the only motive for obedience and loyalty. Then he had broken the army by issuing *Prikaze* number 1. Finally, he had stirred the masses up into a frenzy by promising them to redistribute the land.

Kerensky, this small, garrulous, and crafty lawyer and petty demagogue, found himself at a complete loss. Posing as a tribune, thanks to a series of unexpected circumstances, he had been turned into a dictator. Yet, much to his own disadvantage, he was even less resolute and firm than Nicholas II; and while lack of leadership qualities may be excused in an emperor, it is something quite unjustifiable in the case of a revolutionary chief. To put it briefly, Kerensky, this amazing fence-sitter, had wanted the means but now rejected the end. He was defending himself against effects of which he had been the cause. Hence, he fully deserved the challenge to him made by Lenin, whose star was on the rise: 'You no longer trust the formulas of the past and are afraid of those of the future, yet you will soon swallow the latter and they will choke you.'

But what man was this, who was speaking in such terms, and where did he come from?

It was the leader of the Bolshevik Party, which had originally been the far Left wing of Russian social democracy.

In 1914, when war was declared, the Bolshevik group had been almost completely suppressed in Russia. Lenin had then written an appeal, launched by the central committee of the group, in which he called for the immediate transformation of the national war, described as an 'imperialist' one, into a civil war.

Because of this, the Bolshevik Party clearly diverged from all other revolutionary parties on a crucial question. In none of the warring countries had a revolutionary party dared take such a resolute stance on the matter and declare war on the war without restrictions or hesitations.

The internationalism of the other internationalist groups was only relative, and open to opportunistic compromises with their mutual feelings of xenophobia. The internationalism of the Bolshevik group was instead relentless and absolute. It is for this reason that it passed the crucial test of 1914 without giving in and betraying its principles.

Those party members who did not follow the chosen line – and there were quite a few influential ones among them – were ruthlessly struck off its list. Unlike other parties, the Russian Bolshevik one aimed for quality, not quantity.

This 'line' – of which much talk has been made lately in relation to the rivalry between Stalin and Trotsky – has always been followed by the Bolsheviks, who cannot deviate from it. This group has always had an inflexible discipline, which it has maintained through continuous purges.

The Bolsheviks, therefore, made up the chosen team. The leading consortium of international business had been keeping them aside until the day in which, following the anarchic and hence destructive phase of the revolution, it would have been necessary to proceed with the construction of the new Kingdom of Israel on the ruins of what had been.

In particular, the Bolsheviks made up the offensive element – that is, the openly and proactively offensive element of the world revolution – whereas the function of the other subversive parties would appear to have been the preliminary and simultaneous disintegration from within of the chances the existing order had to defend itself.

Hence, while Bolshevism may have outdone the other parties in terms of brutality and cynicism, it was outdone by them in terms of hypocrisy and treachery. Certainly, it was very straightforward and knew exactly what it wanted: it was the hard-liner of the revolution, which it sought to pursue to the very end; and what ‘to the very end’ meant in this case was ‘to the very Jew’.

The mission of Bolshevism was not so much to undo as to redo a world which the errors or oversights of the last Tsars had already begun undoing, and whose destruction had finally been brought about by the unspeakable anarchism of the revolutionaries.

In the last years of Tsarism, Bolshevism had only played a secondary role, a role so insignificant that the police had even shown indulgence toward it, reserving their harsher treatment for those groups which were responsible for terrorist attacks.

After war was declared, the Bolshevik Party completely fell from prominence. Its five deputies in the Duma and a few other members of its central committee, including the famous Stalin, were arrested and incarcerated on a charge of high treason.

The other revolutionary sects, which were enthusiastic about the democratic war, reproached the Bolsheviks. The old Plekhanov, one of the founders of the Party, left. Driven less by the demon of Leftist solidarity than by that of nationalism, he spoke out in favour of national defence, which coincided with the crusade launched by the democracies. The two hard-liners, Lenin and the Jew Zinoviev (Apfelbaum), fled abroad. And Trotsky, while not a Bolshevik yet, also crossed the border.

Later, the Judaising press of both hemispheres depicted these poor devils, who had carried their wretchedness to the most lowly dwellings of London, Paris, and Geneva, as the devil incarnate: as men who in the footsteps of the great prophets – including Christ himself – had awaited the fated hour absorbed in deep meditations.

Actually, the only hour these criminals were waiting for was that of the opening of the Judeo-American bank tills or their equivalent on the other side of the Atlantic.

The Holy Spirit that was to descend upon the future apostles of the counter-Church and turn these small *café-habitués* into tigers was manna, in the modern form of accounts opened in credit institutes. Those who were powerful in New York soon started raining down this manna, since they believed the time had come – until further notice – to play the card of democracy and anarchy by funding the old team, which had not yet completed its work of demolition.

According to a proverb that dates back to the remotest antiquity, but which is incredibly relevant to our age, there is no fortress which a donkey loaded with gold cannot approach.

By quoting this proverb, we do not wish to suggest that Lenin and Trotsky were donkeys.

Still, that's a long way from seeing Lenin, Trotsky, and their accomplices as infernal deities, or of considering what they have said or written to be imbued with mysterious powers that have changed a whole area of the world.

While it might be a bit much to give no credit at all to these thugs for the events of 1917, it is nonetheless true that none of them was the real conqueror of Russia; nor was it people like Milyukov or Kerensky. The real conqueror of Russia was the almighty god of modern mythology, Mammon, who has Israel as its envoy. It is always he who under different pseudonyms continues to act as the absolute master of the country sixteen years on,² under different pseudonyms.³

The Bolsheviks did not lack a desire for action. They could sense the decay of the Russian Empire. But there was not much they could do, because the hunter was keeping his dogs on a leash, waiting for the right moment to let them loose.

And what letting loose meant in those circumstances was financing.

In their hovels in Geneva, London, and Paris, the Russian Bolsheviks started growing impatient and distressed at the thought that they were being outdone by the other revolutionary groups. They made a show of goodwill by taking part in the Zimmerwald and Kienthal congresses, where they openly announced their plan for immediate revolution through the boycotting of the war. On the other hand, they also printed many revolutionary papers in which they advocated the most cursory methods. But given the painful absence of those other pieces of paper which issuing institutions print and credit establishments distribute, there was a huge disproportion between the sterile agitation of the Bolsheviks, who were left to their own resources, and the results they were destined to attain only a short time later.

Many years had passed since Trotsky had been expelled from Russia – and then Austria, England, and France. At the time of the March *coup d'état*, he found himself in New York, where he had arrived in the hope of moving his god to compassion by prostrating himself before the altar of Mammon. Received by his compatriot Jacob Schiff, the great pontiff who had telegraphed his satisfaction to Milyukov, Trotsky was only given permission to return to Saint Petersburg in order to keep a close eye on the orthodoxy of the team which had freed the 'land of captivity' from the new Pharaoh.

From that day onwards, Leyba (Lev) Bronshtein, known as Leon Trotsky, became the eye and ear of the Sanhedrim⁴ of the world conspiracy. And this was a great honour for the son of one of the many seedy Jews of western Russia.

Trotsky got the message and began making his way back, in the belief that if he fulfilled his mission, cash would soon start flowing.

Here, we would like to mention a juicy detail.

The Norwegian ship that carried Trotsky and his fortune was inspected by the British authorities at Halifax, in Canada.

Lenin's future right-hand man was arrested. It was Milyukov, Russia's Minister of

Foreign Affairs, who then rushed to diplomatically approach the British ambassador in Russia, Sir George Buchanan, asking his government to release the highly undesirable Jew and allow him to continue his voyage to Saint Petersburg.

We do not know whether it might have been Jacob Schiff who ordered the ephemeral minister of the Provisional Government to act in that manner, but it would hardly be surprising. Indeed, this is the only hypothesis that can explain the boundless stupidity of the man's gesture.

Clearly, no one knows the exact nature of the meetings that took place in New York between master and servant. Still, despite the conspiracy of silence on the part of all the big media, it is impossible to ignore that it was in the name, not of the uncircumcised Lenin, but of Leon Trotsky that an account was opened in the Stockholm branch of the Warburg brothers' bank, and that it was this fortune that brought the Bolshevik Party to power. We should add that one of the Warburg brothers was Jacob Schiff's son-in-law, while another was his sister-in-law's husband; and that their Stockholm correspondent, the banker Jivotowsky, appears to have been Trotsky's father-in-law.⁵

Lenin, who was not on such excellent terms with the elite of the chosen race, did not waste any time. At a certain moment – a psychological one for him, as worries about money were keeping him awake at night – he realised that his motto 'revolution through defeat', which in principle applied to all the warring nations, could in practice most readily be applied to Russia. Under these conditions, Lenin's motto could serve as the basis for a temporary alliance between the Bolshevik Party and the German High Command, which was still too much in love with itself to fear the German army or nation.

Pleased with his idea, Lenin entrusted a Jew by the name of Fürstenberg, who was living in exile in Stockholm under the Polish pseudonym of Ganetsky, with the duty of negotiating this alliance, which was intended to bring in some funding.

In case his ambassador failed, Lenin would disown him and pass him off as an agent provocateur of the Okhrana – for all this was taking place just before the *coup d'état* of March 1917. If Fürstenberg were shot, all the worse for him: the Bolsheviks have never had any regard for human life, including that of their own comrades.

Not that principles matter to them, either. According to Lenin, who in no way tried to conceal his ingenious idea, but was rather quite boastful about it, money knows no colour. It is always well to cash it in, when it serves a good cause (for the end justifies the means), and especially when the money comes from an imperial, royal, or simply a bourgeois treasury. In fact, in such cases, it simply means taking back part of what has been stolen from the proletariat and must be paid back – provided, that is, the Jew is the one to manage it with discretionary powers. The proletariat will then continue to suffer as in the past, but will be told that this is only for its own good; if it dies of starvation, it will be informed that it is for the prosperity of future generations.

Lenin's plan worked out very well. The Germans, who found themselves in dire straits and only considered short-term gains, wholeheartedly accepted. Fürstenberg, disguised as

Ganetsky, was not shot, but instead appointed trade commissioner of the people.⁶

The world thus witnessed an extraordinary event: the semi-feudal empires were the first to fund the action of the Bolshevik Party. Germany, however, was to pay a harsh price for its impious collusion in the aftermath of its defeat. The only one to benefit from all this was Lenin, at the detriment of the three monarchies of divine right. He had indeed guessed right.

The German funding was a sort of appetizer for the Bolsheviks, as they waited for the brewers of billions of international business to open their wallets.

We must insist on this point because of the enduring popularity of the disconcertingly absurd theory according to which Bolshevism is a sort of German creation. The aim pursued by the proponents of this theory is to turn people's attention away from the Jewish conspiracy of which Bolshevism is one of the effects and the most openly aggressive sector. And as this theory has the advantage of creating a misunderstanding which worsens the relations between Germany and its 1914-18 enemies, it is fervently embraced by nationalists, who in their blindness only fear the pacification of Europe and the establishment of a uniform Christian front, which is the only safe bastion against sweeping subversion in its triple aspect of democracy, capitalism, and socialism.⁷

Ultimately, what Lenin managed to snatch from the Germans – the Christians of the old regime – was saved up by the Jews. His resourcefulness attracted the benevolent attention of the New York consortium, who were soon to invest more in him, despite the fact that he was a goy, than they did in Trotsky, whose vanity devoid of idealism and constant desire to take a leading role inspired less confidence than Lenin's sincere and selfless fanaticism.

On the other hand, only the German High Command was in a position to enable this political exile's return to his native country, who had paradoxically become its ally. The March revolution had broken out in Russia, and no laws prevented the immediate return of all revolutionaries, including the most abject murderers, who were counted among the heroes and martyrs.

As soon as he received the glorious news, Lenin, who found himself in Zurich at the time, addressed some letters to his comrades, exhorting them to swiftly organise themselves toward the end of coming to power. Lenin did not conceal his impatience and anxiety at being abroad at such a crucial time.

He did not have to wait long. Without too much hesitation, the German government – perfectly realising what favour it was doing for the new Russian government, which insisted on not withdrawing from the war – agreed to allow Lenin to pass through its territory on a sealed train, as if he were a cholera bacillus, and with him many other revolutionaries, including his wife Krupskaya, Zinoviev, Radek, and Sokolnikov, the future ambassador to London. The latter three are Jews who have given themselves new names, as these people are wont to do.

And so it was that this agreeable party travelled the whole length of Germany and across Denmark and Sweden, skirting the Baltic Sea to the north, until it finally reached Finland,

which was still part of the old Empire.

[1](#) Evola has, ‘...peace through widespread sabotaging on the part of the socialist parties of the warring nations...’—Ed.

[2](#) Evola has, ‘after so many years’.—Ed.

[3](#) Evola appends, ‘At an even deeper level, it is the forces of the secret front, of which each revolutionary phenomenon is but an outer manifestation.’—Ed.

[4](#) A Sanhedrim was a council that existed in every city of ancient Israel.—Ed.

[5](#) The Jew Schiff had long hated Tsarist Russia: the Warburg-Schiff-Kuhn-Loeb group had already funded the Japanese in their war against the Russian Empire. Schiff had actually been awarded a great honour for this. As for the Warburg brothers, it should be noted that already in 1912, one of them had stated that the American banking trust which he chaired had been created with ‘the possibility of a war’ in view – a possibility quite unforeseen at the time. In his memoirs, the British ambassador to America between 1912 and 1917 writes: ‘Negotiating with Schiff and Warburg is like negotiating with Germany and the United States, as President Wilson himself has told me they are the arbiters of the US Department of the Treasury and that the government obeys them. He actually quoted the proverb: he who harms Israel shall know neither peace nor rest’ (Sir C Spring Rice, *The Letters and Friendships* [London: Constable, 1929]). In the World War, the Jewish international worked perfectly. One of the Warburg brothers (Max) stayed in Germany and another (Paul) in America, while a third (Felix) acted as an intermediary between the two. This way, regardless of which of the two warring parties won, Jewish interests would be secured. And it was indeed the Warburg brothers who were chosen as ‘financial experts’ for the peace conference in Paris! Light has also been shed on the links among the aforementioned Jewish financial trust, the British Intelligence Service, and one of the heads of the latter, the Jew Ernest Cassel, one of Schiff’s partners and the main shareholder of Vickers, a shipping and military hardware trust. Some important connections within the occult front thus become clear. It should be borne in mind here that by withdrawing from its commitment to furnish Russia with weapons, Vickers purposely contributed to weakening the Russian army; and it should further be recalled that Britain refused to allow Nicholas II to board a ship, when this might have allowed him to get away with his life. (Evola)

[6](#) We should also note the important role played in these negotiations with the German government by the mysterious international Jew Parvus-Helphand, who successfully upheld the thesis in Germany of the tactical usefulness of promoting extreme forms of revolt in Russia. (Poncins)

[7](#) Evola omits this paragraph from his edition.—Ed.

Lenin

As soon as he reached Russian soil, while still on board the train that had brought him there, with workers and soldiers getting off and on at each of the endless stops which were made in those days of general disarray, Lenin began his propaganda campaign against the war and for the redistribution of land. He was intelligent enough not to overdo things in his speeches: he only discussed matters everyone could understand, and only touched upon those issues people were most concerned with. And what the *mujiks* were most immediately interested in was to leave the trenches and gain ownership of the land which was being promised them. A skilled fellow, when establishing his first contacts Lenin did not make the mistake of talking about integral rural Communism.

The news of Lenin's return to Russia had not been made public. By her own account, his wife could not understand how the news had spread. Be that as it may, Lenin's reception was a triumphal event: it became clear that the bold gentleman with slanted eyes was a leader the very moment he stepped out of an ordinary car.

In all stations and along all the railway tracks, red flags were flapping in the wind. The sailors of Kronstadt, notorious for their bloody deeds, surrounded and acclaimed the man who was destined to guide them to victory, only to have them shot later. The streets of the capital were teeming with crazed workers singing hymns suited to the occasion. In the midst of an imposing procession, the future triumphant leader and head of the Third Communist International made his grand entry into what was to be known as Leningrad, without the so-called authorities even daring to show themselves. This was all very auspicious. Lenin addressed the workers and soldiers: 'No support to the capitalists' government! Down with the imperialist war! Long live the social revolution!'

It was mid-April, and the March revolutionaries, the 'glorious heroes' who had overthrown the 'tyrant', broken the discipline of the army, promised to give all the land to the farmers as its rightful owners, and announced the establishment of a Constituent Assembly through equal and universal suffrage, were already being treated like capitalists and reactionary members of the bourgeoisie.

Lenin spent the whole day haranguing large crowds from the windows of the hotel he had requisitioned. He hammered his ideas into the virgin and malleable substance of countless brains. His words were received with enthusiasm, for the things he said must have pleased the crowds and been easy for everyone to grasp.

His eloquence was mediocre and his rhetoric far inferior to Kerensky's, but he knew just how to convey his sincere and deep beliefs to his audience. Besides, Lenin had an intuitive understanding of the plebs and their subconscious instincts, enabling him to say what they were incapable of expressing in their own words. Lenin would speak without any restrictions, hesitations, or procrastinations. His speeches, while very down to earth, possessed a sober, substantial, and implacable logic.

Without any preambles or perorations, superlatives, or exclamations, Lenin would go straight to the point, drawing all the necessary consequences without ever slipping into

contradiction. He was like one of those simple particles or chemical elements that cannot be destroyed, since they are undifferentiated, and cannot decompose, since they are not composite bodies.

Whether we like it or not, the sparseness and rawness of Lenin's cynicism, free as it was of any trace of hypocrisy or human respect, had something great and terribly new to it, which cannot be found among any of the clowns of free thought and democracy.

Nor was there anything Jewish in this perfect instrument which Jewry had found and recognised for its shrewdness. Jewry knew how to make use of the unwitting Lenin to take an incredible leap forward toward the fulfilment of its age-old hope. Indeed, for better or worse, among all the reformers of humanity, Lenin was probably the one least aware of the aim he was accomplishing.

Most opportunely, Lenin had managed to make Wilhelm II and his generals work for the advancement of socialism. In all good faith, Lenin believed he could do the same with Jacob Schiff and his consortium. He believed this by virtue of his maxim that gold knows no colour, and that it is a good method of warfare to accept offers from emperors and capitalists as long as they may be used to overthrow their thrones and banks, since anything which helps do away with the impure is pure, and the end justifies the means. This time, however, Lenin was dealing with something more powerful and more evil than himself.

An internationalist to the very marrow of his bones, and one who judged others to be like him, Lenin failed to grasp how messianically nationalist the apparent internationalism of Israel really is.

A utilitarian, materialist, and atheist at the very bottom of his being, Lenin was incapable of sensing the negatively spiritual and malignantly religious aspects of so-called historical materialism in its chain of consequences.

Lenin suffered from a hypertrophy of cunning, malice, and intelligence, which took the form of a single recurrent idea: that of the class struggle for the trough, in the light of which he interpreted all the events of history and the problems of humanity. What Lenin was doing was applying Darwin and Haeckel's theories on a human level by directly transposing their hypothesis about the struggle for life as the starting point for all animal species. Humankind, as Lenin saw it, is vertically divided into two species: the exploiters, or replete, and the exploited, or disinherited. The only reason for this distinction lies in the stomach: there is no room for the spirit – and even less for divine or Satanic inspiration.

Given these conditions, Lenin regarded Jacob Schiff and his rich co-religionists as being on the same side as Nicholas II. In Lenin's eyes, this capitalist who was funding socialism against capitalism was no more evil than the sovereign who, by the grace of God, had loaned his armies to Masonic democracies in order to overthrow the monarchies of divine right.

Such was the simplistic view of this genius with blinkers over his eyes. And this is precisely what made him one of the best workers for the vine of Israel – the man destined

to render priceless services to Jewish capitalism, while firmly believing that he had consecrated his life to the emancipation of the proletariat through the application and implementation of integral socialism atop the ruins of capitalism.

Lenin's specifically materialist and Darwinist mistake was ignoring the fact that, while the human body might be a brother to the animals, the soul – of which he wanted to know nothing – is a sister to good or bad angels. Because of this, unlike in the animal kingdom and in agreement with what Scripture suggests, the spiritual element comes first. What has really been dividing the offspring of Adam ever since Cain and Abel is not the struggle for life or the class struggle, but the war between the good angels and bad who inhabit the flesh of the rich and poor alike, making no distinction between the two – a war that stretches back to the beginning of time and is bound to continue until the end of the centuries.

Lenin only believed in the beast and the offspring of the anthropoid ape. He believed in neither the devil nor the serpent of Eden, which has become the blazon of the chosen race. This is the reason why he served Israel and served it so well, while believing he was exploiting it. And it is precisely because Lenin never realised that class struggle only serves – incidentally and on specific occasions – as an inconspicuous and secular front for two religious dispensations, the prodigious fate of this man inspires more pity than hatred. His cunning with respect to the men who were his dupes is outdone by his ingenuousness with regard to the Jews,¹ whose unwitting tool he always was.

Prior to Lenin's arrival, the Mensheviks and the various other types of socialists had made up the staff of the Soviets, whose pole star had initially been Kerensky.

On the occasion of their first pan-Russian congress, known as the Soviet of Soviets, which took place in mid-April, the delegates of the Bolsheviks – who were still a minority at the time – assembled in a separate meeting to listen to the words of their leader.

Lenin read out his theses. The reaction to his words was far from positive. Plekhanov, the person who had first brought Marxism to Russia and who up until a few years earlier had been regarded as one of the most uncompromising revolutionaries, described Lenin's speech as sheer madness.

The gentrified Left which had overthrown Tsarism called Lenin a traitor in Germany's pay. The Marxist Mensheviks and revolutionary socialists treated Lenin as a lunatic, and even the Bolsheviks – according to Milyukov – felt 'the wind had been taken out of their sails.'

The leitmotiv of this first blow which was delivered by Lenin was the following: 'Peace and fraternisation with the German soldiers; the immediate distribution of all land to the farmers and of all factories to the workers; all power and all control over production to the Soviets.'

These words, which shocked intellectual cadres, went straight to the heart of the real people, whose immediate interests they perfectly expressed. And the people, who were tired of formalities and promises, replied through tumultuous demonstrations, which led to

Milyukov and Gutchkov's resignations and to the establishment of a Provisional Government which was even more Leftist than the one before it.

Compared to what Lenin was preaching, this result did not amount to much. But Lenin knew as well as anyone else that Rome had not been built in a day. And ultimately, this striking 'première', despite the uproar it caused, was a success, since it marked the beginning of a new shift to the Left.

Meanwhile, thanks to the incomprehensible intercession of the moderate and allegedly patriotic Milyukov with the British parliament, Trotsky arrived from New York and immediately joined the Bolshevik Party.

Vladimir Ilyich Ulianov, otherwise known as Lenin, the son of a Russian official, was a practical ideologue. He was bona fide. In contrast, Leyba Braunshtein, also known as Leon Trotsky, who had been born in a ghetto and was filled with the humiliated pride of his race, cared very little about Christian farmers and workers, whom he hated just as much he hated nobles and priests. Trotsky was aware of the exclusively Jewish purposes of socialism. This was to turn humanity into a single, impersonal corporation with equal shares;² this society would have found its capital throughout planet Earth as a whole, exploiting the labour of all creatures. Israel, possibly along with a few straw men at first, would have made up the dictatorial administration council of the new society.

The third point in the plan, known to initiates alone, escaped Lenin for the psychological reasons we have previously illustrated. It was the only thing that distinguished him from Trotsky. Yet, this did not prevent him from operating in favour of the implementation of this plan with conviction and zeal, in the genuine belief that he was building the future dictatorship of the proletariat over the ruins of a capitalist society, which the Jews did not completely control and hence regarded as only a lesser form of human progress.

Lenin considered the religious question to be merely something accessory within the framework of the materialist struggle between undernourished apes and well-fed ones. The very opposite was true for Trotsky, the son of the Promise, despite his superficial agnosticism: socialism he simply perceived as the harbinger of Judaism. But in practical terms this was of no importance, since the plan had been drawn up in such a way that the two goals were indistinguishable.

Lenin was the incorruptible ascetic of pure idealism. Because of his faith, which spoke to the long-repressed instincts of the masses through genuine sympathy, he was completely disinterested in both his own person and his race. As a fighter he was therefore superior to the ambitious Israelite, who was probably more concerned about his personal exaltation, while basking in the messianic glory of his people.

These two men were destined to complement each other, and it is most likely that in the mind of the New York consortium they were to keep an eye on each another as well, to make sure they would not stray – one through his ingenuousness and the other through his vanity – from the shortest path toward the triumph of Israel, or at least the next stage in its Exodus throughout the ages.

Just as Trotsky was making his way from the west on board an ocean liner, rushing to join Lenin at the head of the march of progress, another collaborator – one called to a higher destiny – ended his exile in Siberia, where he had patiently been waiting for the revolution to devour its first children, and headed for the capital.

We are talking here about the Georgian Jugashvili, who was already known under various names as a terrorist, including that of Stalin, which went down in history. In Russian, ‘Stalin’ means ‘man of steel’, just as ‘Lenin’ means ‘man of the Lena’ – this being the big Siberian river near the penal colony where the founder of Bolshevism had spent some years.

Stalin took up residence in a small and very modest dwelling in Saint Petersburg, together with his close friends Skriabin, otherwise known as Molotov, a former student of the polytechnic who had become Stalin’s assistant, and Dzerzhinsky, who was a genuine Pole and who was destined to become the chief of the terrible Special Commission, better known as the Cheka.

By May 1917, the high command for the next stage of progress was thus complete: a Russian, Lenin; a Caucasian, Stalin; and a Pole, Dzerzhinsky; all the others were Jews, starting with Trotsky, Sverdlov, Zinoviev, Kamenev (Trotsky’s brother-in-law), and Radek (whose real name is Sobelsohn). They represented the extreme wing of the Revolution in the provisional council of the Russian Republic. This was a temporary institution between the Duma, which had been pirated and then buried, and the future Constituent Assembly, which had yet to be established. The Bolshevik Party only had sixty seats out of six hundred, which were occupied by various socialist groups and a certain number of ‘bourgeois’ ones – mostly fence-sitters.

Still, despite their political weakness, the Bolsheviks gradually gained control of the streets. The inner circle of the Party, committed to action, was always vigilant. The German High Command, who by now regarded the Russian army as a negligible force, halted its funding. Through the banks in Stockholm, however, American gold soon started flowing into the Bolshevik coffers.

Not a stir came from the government. Its members were caught in hair-splitting discussions to decide whether the death penalty was compatible with the sacred principles of democracy. The orators who shared the stage engaged in rhetorical challenges of an almost scholastic nature.

Exactly the same symptoms as those which had already been witnessed during the French Revolution manifested themselves in Russia. In France, in August 1789, the National Assembly, which consisted of relatively moderate revolutionaries, was passing laws on regarding the ‘Rights of Man and of the Citizen’. The Keeper of the Seals,³ reinforcing a claim previously made by Necker, had then raised a cry of alarm during one of the sessions: ‘Properties are being violated in the provinces. Arsonists are ravaging the homes of citizens. The proper forms of justice are being ignored and replaced by assaults; proscriptions and licentious behaviour are given free rein; the laws are not in force, the courts are closed, and trade and industry have come to a halt. And it is not poverty alone

which is leading to all these troubles: the greatest cause of all ills is the complete subversion of the police and all regular authorities.’

A century and a quarter later, the same causes in Russia led to the same effects. In Russia, just as in France, the usurpers perished by the sword of usurpation.

The success met by the ideas of Trotsky and Stalin led the Bolsheviks to wonder whether the moment had come for them to seize power by force, since no one at the time really seemed to be in charge. Lenin, however, the Fabius Cunctator⁴ of the Russian Revolution, a strategist of social upheaval who spent his nights reading the works of Clausewitz no less than those of Marx, believed – or so it seems – that the time was not yet ripe for action and that it was better to wait, particularly as time was working in their favour.

If what people say about Lenin’s opposition is true, the ‘old man’, as he was called by his comrades, was quite right. It was not at all necessary to climb the tree, and risk falling from it, to pick fruits which would soon be falling anyway.

It is claimed that an appeal inviting the masses to overthrow the Provisional Government, and which was supposed to be issued through the official paper of the Party, *Pravda* (Truth), was withdrawn at the very last moment. Rumours of this plan, however, had already spread, and were enough for the sailors of Kronstadt, the *enfants terribles* of the Bolshevik sect, to show up in Saint Petersburg in armoured vehicles crammed with machine-guns.

In the month of July, for two days, what echoed through the streets of the capital were not the chants of parades and banner-filled processions crowned by the usual public speeches, but rather the sound of rifle shots. Machine-guns crackled as well. Bullets killed several bystanders and onlookers who had dared gaze out of their windows just to see what was happening. This time, a few cavalry regiments assembled in a rush were not enough to scatter the rioters.

The Bolsheviks later claimed they had simply organised a large demonstration, and that this had been enough to scare the government. The incidents that had regrettably occurred had thus been due to an act of provocation by the government.

It is extremely difficult to know the real truth about the matter.

As we personally witnessed during those days in July, we believe – but are far from categorically stating – that what occurred was a real, but failed attempt at insurrection.

Lenin and the Jew Zinoviev were forced to flee to Finland in disguise. Perhaps to remind him of the good old days of Tsarism, Trotsky was arrested and imprisoned in the Peter and Paul Fortress. Many other sensational arrests were made.

No doubt as a precaution, Lenin and Zinoviev only showed up in Saint Petersburg again in October. Most of the arrested revolutionaries, however, were soon released by order of the Provisional Government, which clearly found it difficult to accept that it could have any enemies on the Left.

Still, people could hardly believe it when they found out that Kerensky himself, the

actual leader of the regime, had gone out of his way to apologise to one of those who had been caught in the act, and to personally free him from the police station.

The person in question was an Israelite called Nakhamkes, who operated under the Russian pseudonym of Steklov, the 'man of glass'.

The behaviour of the real, if only nominal, head of state seemed bizarre, to say the least – if for no other reason than because the government at the time appeared to have passed the challenge as the undisputed and confident victor, and so could have been expected to deal with Bolshevism once and for all, and to re-establish order.

To attain this result, it would have been necessary for the government to rely on the force which had already saved it, namely the army – the antidote to all revolutions. The army showed at least some degree of loyalty toward the government, although it is difficult to say whether this was inspired by attachment to the established order, or rather the fear of things worsening even further.

A large portion of the army, however, was, if not literally Bolshevised, at least profoundly demoralised and anarchical. So it would be more exact to say that the government could have relied on some cavalry regiments, particularly the Cossacks. These formed a sort of autonomous militia based in a specific area, and were less open than the old serfs to any fanciful prospects of agrarian reform.

For many generations, these Cossack regiments had been the Jews' nightmare and the terror of all subversive movements. A government which emerged from the triumph of subversion, under the auspices of the chosen race, was bound to harbour inborn feelings of mistrust or even repulsion toward the Cossacks, feelings someone like Kerensky could not overcome. Besides, even if there were no other means of salvation apart from these methods which were hardly in keeping with democratic orthodoxy, it is likely that Kerensky could not have adopted them without betraying himself.

Under the protection of the Cossack *nahaiki* (special whips), Kerensky felt no safer than a mouse protected by a cat or the devil hiding in holy water. But it is certainly ironic that this demagogue had no other way of remaining in power for a few weeks more than to resort to the guard dogs of the old regime!

The Bolsheviks may have been defeated in reality, but they were the moral winners. The circumstances of their defeat revealed the distress of the Provisional Government, which needed to throw itself from the arms of the Bolsheviks into those of the Cossacks in order to endure. And while in the former case it would have been completely strangled by the revolution, in the latter it would have been strangled by the armed reaction of a symbolic *knout*,⁵ which would never have stopped halfway. Faced with these alternatives, the small 'garrulous and cowardly' lawyer – to quote Lenin – 'followed the virtue which appealed to him the most': democracy. Practically speaking, this meant he chose an utterly acrobatic balance, a condition impossible to keep up for long.

In the aftermath of his Pyrrhic victory, this winner, who was in a far more difficult position than the defeated, began by dismissing his saviours, whom he was terribly scared

of, without even thanking them for having risked their own lives and lost several horses, which they had paid for with their own money and which according to custom ought to have been replaced for them. This militia was bound to bear a grudge against Kerensky, who had harmed them whenever he had the chance to do so.

Immediately afterwards, Kerensky set out to get rid of some of his colleagues, and especially Prince Lvov, who was certainly out of place in that milieu. The pretext he invoked was the need to create strong democratic compactness.

What compactness meant here was the fact that democracy had to be concentrated in the hands of Kerensky as Prime Minister, Minister of War and of the Navy, and in fact minister of just about everything, not to mention *generalissimo* of the troops at war.

The '*generalissimo*' Kerensky, while highly confident of his rhetorical skills, realised he needed a sword. He believed he had found it in General Kornilov, the son of a simple Cossack soldier and a man who had won his ranks on the battlefield during the Russo-Japanese War, and on the Austrian front during the Great War.

General Kornilov was the perfect exemplar of a rough soldier. Incapable of any pretence, with no diplomacy at all, he was harsh and even brutal, but also brave and just. Kornilov was loved by his men for his uprightness and frankness.

Kornilov's democratic affinities had already been sufficiently examined, since in the aftermath of the March *coup d'état* he had been appointed as the military governor of Saint Petersburg. In these crucial hours, such an appointment was a sign of great trust. It was Kornilov who had been charged with notifying the Empress of the fall of the Tsarist dynasty and who had put her under arrest in her palace at Tsarskoye Selo, which the Emperor had not returned to after his abdication.

With this sensational act of loyalty towards the new regime – an act Kornilov only agreed to carry out once he had been assured that the two legitimate heirs had renounced the throne, otherwise he would have broken his oath to the Tsar – the General had severed all ties with the legitimist reaction, which was now bound to regard him as a traitor. Once he had irreparably compromised himself, Kornilov could no longer reasonably aspire to monarchic restoration.

Under these conditions, General Kornilov served as the sword which democracy and the republic were dreaming of – to the extent, at any rate, that they could dream of a sword. Harsh necessity forced them to temporarily depart from the 'immortal principles'; and as the one in question was no tin sword, and the person bearing it a man of war, it represented exactly what was needed to make up for what the '*generalissimo*' Kerensky was lacking.

Nevertheless, on this occasion the psychological skills of the garrulous lawyer once again failed. The man of stage battles and that of real ones had nothing in common. Kerensky had not reckoned with the fact that a soldier by vocation, and the descendent of a long line of professional warriors, even when contemptuous of privileges of birth and wealth and of imperial favours, was bound to condemn the demagogic methods which *Prikaze* number 1

had introduced into the army.

This document, which Jewish malice had inspired democracy to adopt in its madness as a way of averting the threat of a reactionary conspiracy by the officers, had managed to exasperate even those among them who had initially welcomed Nicholas II's abdication. Indeed, everyone realised that it was impossible to lead an army to victory when it was being governed by parliaments elected through equal and universal suffrage, and its leaders were little more than representatives.

Sure enough, only a short time later, the Austro-Germans, who had received some reinforcements on the western front, inflicted a disaster in Ternopil upon what had once been the Russian army.

For Wilhelm II, this Russian defeat was only a fleeting triumph and consolation, but for Lenin and Trotsky it meant a great victory. Their idea of immediate peace and international proletarian fraternisation gained much ground; and realising this, they chose to make the most of it.

Caught more than ever between the hammer of reaction and the anvil of radical revolution, Kerensky turned to Kornilov as a providential figure.

As the person directly responsible for the army's disorder, which had in turn inevitably led to the bloody defeat at Ternopil, Kerensky took the chance to summon General Brussilov, a former officer of an aristocratic regiment of the Imperial Guard. It was on this occasion that, by parodying Nicholas II's gesture, Kerensky proclaimed himself *generalissimo*, with Kornilov as his first lieutenant. And then the inevitable occurred.

The plebeian Kornilov, just like the 'former' Brussilov, did not feel he could win or even continue the war with sovietised troops and an army in which those whose task it was to obey were called to control those whose duty it was to give orders.

When it comes to the real facts of life, no democratic principles hold. A choice had to be made, and there were only two options. The first was to make peace with the central empires; and as neutrality was practically out of the question, this would have meant siding with them in the World War, where divine right faced off against alleged popular sovereignty. This would have been a paradoxical approach for the socialists, who were supported by the Left in both hemispheres.

The second solution was to continue the war after re-establishing and reinforcing military discipline and the soldiers' respect for hierarchy by reinstating the death penalty and martial law, and of course suppressing decree number 1. But for Kerensky and his fellows, this would have meant making a break with those agents who had brought them to power and were keeping them there.

The wretched and self-loving dictator had imagined that General Kornilov would prove a docile subject, easy to manipulate. Instead, aware of the enormous responsibility he bore towards Russia and confident on account of the unquestionable services he had rendered to the blooming revolution, as soon as he had reached the headquarters and taken stock of the situation at hand, Kornilov showed himself to be even more categorical than his

predecessor.

With the rather brutal frankness of a soldier from the people, and with a military-like brevity which left little room for dialectical subtleties, Kornilov – as one might say – did not mince words. And this way of acting was not at all to Kerensky's liking or in keeping with his style.

To win some time, Kerensky tried negotiating. He beat around the bush as he was wont to do, and dodged issues, vaguely promising the reinstatement of the death penalty and a few other partial measures. But the discussion dragged on, and the communication between these two utterly different men was far from pleasant. The rough soldier who had arrested the Empress because – as he put it – he cared more about Russia, finally lost his temper and gave Kerensky an ultimatum, asking for the immediate abolishment of all the changes that had been made in the military since Nicholas II's abdication.

This time, Kerensky no longer hesitated. Clearly, it was a matter of *non possumus*⁶ for the counter-Church. Realising the threat being posed to the achievements of Jewry and the Revolution, Kerensky switched from softness to harshness: dismissing Kornilov, he ordered him to immediately come to Saint Petersburg. Kerensky had forgotten that the General he was dealing with was not a sycophant he could impress with some official thundering, but a hard-boiled man who had made his career through the blows of his sword in a regime based on favouritism. Refusing to obey, the furious General marched what he regarded as his loyal troops on Saint Petersburg.

For a moment, the shiver of counter-revolution passed through the capital. Right-thinking milieus, forgetting the way in which Kornilov had behaved towards the imperial family, drew a sigh of relief and turned to him as a possible saviour. But this moment was short-lived.

Kornilov and his lieutenants, the brave generals Krimov and Krasnov, could not clean the Augean stables⁷ of the dung of the Revolution, for on this dung the seeds cast by Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, and their accomplices had already produced a rich harvest of poisonous weeds. The generals had not taken account of the sovietisation of the troops and its effects.

Warned of the impending danger and struck by the joy shown by honest men, Kerensky mustered a desperate cry towards all those who were moving about or slumbering on the Left side of the line that cuts across the hearts of men – those whose bodies, according to the Gospel, will attract eagles or vultures. His call was answered by the temporary losers of the July days: the Soviet of workers' representatives and the military Soviet of Saint Petersburg, created and led by Trotsky, along with the gangs recruited from among the dregs of the people and armed by Stalin with weapons from the state arsenal.

In the face of this sudden offensive, those who, up until the previous day – when they thought they had vanquished their common enemy for good – had been talking about slitting one another's throats, immediately made friends. They remembered that, despite their bloody family quarrels, they were all sons of the same counter-Church.

The herd of the world conspiracy, apparently divided and heterogeneous, closed ranks.

In those September days, Kerensky and Lenin, the March revolution, and the future November one, formed a single, uniform bloc. In acting thus, they were refuting future historians' claim that they represented two mutually contradictory and opposite revolutions, as well as the suggestion that democracy can serve as an antidote to Bolshevism.

For Kerensky, there were no more enemies on the Left. The voice of the blood had spoken.⁸ A hundred thousand rifles and machine-guns came to Kerensky's defence, since he had become the sacred war banner of the whole Revolution.

Kerensky, by contrast, saw nothing but enemies on the Right, starting with those who had saved him from the Bolshevik ambush in July.

One last time, Providence was offering Kerensky and his partisans – many of whom were destined to die in penal colonies or be tortured to death like common great dukes or simple feudal lords – the chance to save themselves and save Russia from the final cataclysm. But clearly these men must have been bound by some mysterious oath or terrible commitment, for whereas in the past they had always dodged issues and beaten around the bush, they did not waste a single moment when faced with this higher interest or categorical imperative of their demonic conscience.

They declared the military leaders who had openly rebelled to be outlaws. This included General Kaledin, the *ataman*, or highest chief of the Cossacks, who on no clear grounds was suspected of being in league with the rebels. It was Kerensky's way of taking revenge for the insult the Cossack regiments had perpetrated against him by saving him from the Bolsheviks.

From that moment onwards, the situation was no longer paradoxical. Brothers more advanced on the path to the Promised Land of the chosen people saved Kerensky from the infamy to be crushed'.⁹

The Bolsheviks then realised that they were the only real force of the Revolution, since the person who had allegedly defeated them in July now owed them his new victory over the former allies who had helped him achieve the previous one.

Besides, the latest victory did not cost the hundred thousand thugs mobilised by the Bolsheviks in St Petersburg a single bullet to help the threatened revolutionary avant-garde. Revolutionary groups and cells had done their job among Kornilov's troops. They had explained to all those stunned illiterates that they were being marched off to overthrow a government which was bent on ending the war and giving everyone the land of the rich. These words soon produced the desired effects.

Along the paths leading to the capital, under the heat produced by the revolutionary fire, the troops melted like wax without engaging in a single battle. Kornilov was forced to flee, while many of his lieutenants blew their brains out.

Kerensky, who had triumphed over the absolute revolution in July with the help of the relative reaction, now triumphed over the relative reaction only thanks to the support of

the absolute revolution.

Stalin wrote to Lenin, who was still living in refuge in Finland at the time: 'We are virtually the masters. Day after day, we are gaining an increasing consensus among the masses of soldiers and workers. We have one thousand rifles at our disposal and this is more than enough to put the Provisional Government to flight, which only has its women's battalions to oppose us. You can confidently return to our head: I cannot see who could be as foolhardy as to order your arrest.'

Such was the assessment made of Kerensky's second victory. It signalled the beginning of the death throes of the semi-Jewish or Judeo-democratic regime of transition between that of the Tsar and the one hundred percent Israelite one. And if these death throes lasted about two months, it is only because Lenin was still mistrustful.

Lenin did not allow himself to be hypnotised by events in Russia. He very carefully scanned the European horizon, where men who were party to the secrets of government chancelleries – if not those of the gods – could already catch the signs of a peace without winners or losers.

Several months had passed since Emperor Karl had taken the place of his great-uncle Franz Joseph on the throne of Austria. He had entrusted his brother-in-law, Prince Sixtus of Bourbon-Parma, with unofficially negotiating with the French government.

It was later found out, through sensational revelations, that Wilhelm II had also envisaged this possibility, and that his advisers had agreed with his view – except for a few pan-Germanists who had learned nothing from historical events.

Had it not been for the ill will of those who pursued the triumph of capitalist Judeo-democracy and the abolition of the last vestiges of feudalism at the expense of the good of their own countries and of the whole of humanity, the mutual extermination would have ended much sooner, and an honourable peace, advantageous for both sides, would have been signed.

But a very different outcome was being sought, even if this was to cost hundreds of thousands of women and children the lives of their husbands and fathers.

The infamy had to be crushed. And the infamy was not Wilhelm II, although he had violated the neutrality of Belgium, his troops had committed a number of reprehensible acts,¹⁰ and his submarines had torpedoed ocean liners.

The infamy was rather what Wilhelm II stood for, and even more than him the harmless and innocent, but Catholic, Karl of Austria. Indeed, both were sovereigns by divine right: under their sceptre they brought together the traditional nobility attached to its landed estates. And this nobility, despite all, still maintained its position, both in terms of rank and in the political, economic, and social domains.

This is what had to be done away with. Everything has been sacrificed to this madness, which all peoples, with the sole exception of the chosen one, are now digesting, at the risk of losing their lives because of its toxic effects. This madness represented the undisclosed

and long premeditated aim of the World War and the reason for the unprecedented release of hatred that came with it, and which was constantly fed by propaganda funded for that specific purpose. This is the reason why any kind of peace which would not have achieved this goal, no matter how acceptable to the two warring parties, was angrily dismissed as a defeatist and premature solution: for it might have served as the basis for real European pacification and the establishment of a united Christian front against the one common enemy.

Still, a moment came in 1917 when, faced with the enormity and uselessness of the sacrifices that were taking place every day, many European heads of state – slightly less Judaised than their colleagues – awoke. A ray of hope flashed across the stormy sky.

In the chancelleries – clearly, within closed doors – talk was heard of this allegedly defeatist and premature peace. But there was no danger of the priests of Mammon and the pontiffs of Zion allowing this peace to be signed, as it would indeed have been premature, since the infamous medievalism had not yet been crushed, and Europe had not yet been politically, economically, and socially subverted.^{[11](#)}

The letter sent by the Emperor of Austria had no effect, the intervention of the Catholic King Alphonse XIII and of Pope Benedict XV fruitless, and the good will of several French ministers perfectly useless.

Kings, emperors, and popes have no power nowadays; likewise, the heads of democratic governments, parliaments, and even electoral bodies have no influence over global developments. Proof of this is the fact that, for another fifteen months, men of all races continued to butcher one another for the sole profit and glory of that small people which is in constant exodus across time and space towards a prestigious future. And this future, which its prophets have been heralding for the last twenty-five centuries or so, now seems to be taking shape before our very eyes.

The plan of subversion had to be carried out to the very end, for this was the real occult meaning of the expression ‘to the very end’ as opposed to ‘defeatism’. Otherwise, it would be difficult to understand why a peace advantageous for France, Britain, and Italy, as well as Germany and Austria, which would have been signed before the collapse of the last two countries, should have been described as defeatist.

It was essential for Germany to fall so that it could then be forcibly converted to democracy.^{[12](#)}

If the ‘noble, generous, liberal, tolerant, and enlightened spirits’ in 1917 were unwilling to accept any peace with Germany unless the country was exhausted and ‘on its knees’, this was because they knew it would only ‘convert’ once crushed.

By October of the same year, all hope of a general peace had been lost in Europe. From then onwards the Russian government had only two options: a separate peace, or war to the bitter end.

Lenin’s triumph was a matter of days, or weeks at most.

1 For 'the Jews', Evola substitutes 'the occult forces'.—Ed.

2 Evola omits the preceding phrase from his edition.—Ed.

3 The Keeper of the Seals, later known as the Minister of Justice, was Charles Louis François de Paule de Barentin at the time.—Ed.

4 Fabius Maximus (280-203 BC) was a Roman general who fought in the Second Punic War, who was given the title of Cunctator, or 'delayer', due to his use of guerilla tactics to fight against the forces of Hannibal, who had superior numbers in comparison to the Roman army.—Ed.

5 A whip.—Ed.

6 Latin: 'we cannot', which refers to a story in which the Roman Emperor Dioceltian forbade the early Christians from having a copy of the Scriptures or from meeting on Sunday, which led to the famous reply, leading to their martyrdom.—Ed.

7 This refers to one of the labours of Hercules, who was challenged to clean up the stables of King Augeas, who owned a large number of cattle, in a single day, a feat he managed to accomplish by digging trenches to two nearby rivers and flooding the stables.—Ed.

8 The same was later the case with the establishment of the so-called 'popular fronts', which bridged the apparent gap between the two internationals. (Evola)

9 This comes from an epigram by Voltaire, who stated that religion and superstition were an 'infamy to be crushed', claiming it as his watchword.—Ed.

10 Evola omits the previous phrase from his edition.—Ed.

11 In the Jewish magazine *Der Jude* (January 1919, p. 450) we read: 'The fall of these three power (Tsarist Russia, monarchical Germany, and Catholic Austria) in their ancient forms would mean *crucially facilitating the directives of Jewish politics.*' The famous Jewish 'writer' Emil Ludwig (in *Weltbühne*, no. 33, 1931) adds: 'The World War was waged to impose modern political forms upon central Europe, of the sort in force in all surrounding countries (i.e., liberal-democratic governments)... We only made it by a hair's breadth: the partisans of a separate peace *might have saved both the Tsar and the Kaiser, preserving a Europe unbearable to us.*' (Evola)

12 Evola adds, 'as a prelude to Marxism'.—Ed.

The *Coup d'Etat* of November 1917: The Triumph of Bolshevism

In the early days of October, the ultra-revolutionary movement grew throughout Russia. The countless city Soviets which up until then had been dominated by the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries – the two groups which favoured Kerensky and Chernov – soon turned Bolshevik. And the Soviet in Saint Petersburg, which was the most important one of all, elected Trotsky as its president.

The municipal elections proved to be a real disaster for the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries. In Moscow, three hundred and fifty Bolshevik councillors were elected – making up about half of the assembly – and only two hundred Kadets, and just over a hundred Social Revolutionaries.

Spurred by Bolshevik agitators, many Russian soldiers fraternised with the Germans, who in turn were encouraged to behave in the same way by the Austro-German High Command. The latter believed this was contributing to the moral disarmament of what remained of the Russian army, whereas the Bolsheviks' aim was to contaminate the Imperial German and Austrian army, so that the emperors by divine right would aid the cause of the international revolution, ever confident that what was happening to their neighbours could never happen to them.

The Bolshevik Party wasted no more time. Since it had been driven out of the Kschessinska Hotel in July, it requisitioned an institute for young aristocratic ladies, the Smolny Institute, which it turned into its headquarters. The party had four printing presses, which issued half a dozen newspapers and hundreds of thousands of pamphlets and leaflets. The insurrection and *coup d'etat* were not simply approaching: they were announced as imminent.¹

As Stalin had written to Lenin, Kerensky only had a few female battalions at his disposal, comprised of women who had put on a uniform in a bout of patriotic exaltation and learned how to handle firearms.

We might correct Stalin by pointing out that Kerensky could rely not only on these women, but also on the cadres of the military school of Saint Petersburg. A few hundred women and teenagers! What wonderful support for this abject regime, which, even more than that of Nicholas II at its eleventh hour, had managed to alienate everyone from its cause. How applicable are the Gospel words to it: 'Since you are lukewarm and neither hot nor cold, I am going to spit you out of my mouth.'

There was nothing left for the Provisional Government and its no less provisional leader to do than to die as they had lived: the former by debating questions of democratic orthodoxy; the latter by holding speeches. And it should be mentioned that this gloomy perspective did not prevent Kerensky from drinking from the cup of life while lounging about in the luxury of the Winter Palace, which he had made his residence, and treating the ballet company of the Opera as his personal harem.

At the same time, Kerensky fidgeted like a devil in holy water and generously cast the pearls of his rhetorical treasure about in an attempt to create a homogeneous coalition within the Provisional Committee of the Russian Republic, which was still serving as an interim body for the parliament. Despite his efforts, all he got from this heterogeneous and anarchical assembly were five utterly different agendas. A probably unprecedented event in parliamentary history was the fact that while the matters at stake were all crucial ones, such as whether to continue the war or not, no majority consensus was ever reached. The previous eight months had witnessed an endless succession of revolutionary ministers – only Kerensky seemed to always keep his place. These men had been invoking the Constituent Assembly as a means of salvation, yet appeared to be in no hurry to convoke it.

This, of course, was not such a bad thing in itself, since a collection of unbridled rustic appetites could hardly lead to anything good. Still, there was something very unusual in the fact that no one felt the urge to convoke the Assembly among the people who swore by it. And while the Bolsheviks were no fans of Western-style parliamentary institutions, it was easy for them to take advantage of the situation and portray the victors of March as an oligarchy shamefully presenting itself under the guise of democracy, but which was actually sold out to financial power: an oligarchy that was putting off the convocation of representatives of the sovereign people out of fear that they might ask for the immediate settlement of the capitalist war and the distribution of land to those who would farm it with their own hands.

Those who had benefited from the March revolution failed to understand – or refused to believe – that the cause of what was happening was the desire of farmers to individually own land, of workers to collectively own their factories, and of all people to end the war and have peace.

This is the sheer truth of the matter; the idea that the Russian nation was instead dreaming of liberal institutions, alleged political liberties, and forms of civic equality is nothing but fiction.

The *mujiks* in uniforms were quite ready to stand at attention before those who had a right to this honour, just as in civil life they would lower their hats before lords, lords' retinues, and state officials.

For centuries the *mujiks* had been accustomed to obeying people of a higher social rank. For generations they had been accustomed to being ill-treated, and indeed of paying their respects the more they were ill-treated. This all seemed quite natural to them – a matter of order established in times immemorial by divine Providence as a way of regulating social relations.

What had passed the limits of their endurance was the fact of being exterminated by the thousands without knowing why – or for whom, after the fall of the Tsar – and without even being able to defend themselves, most of the time because of a lack of ammunition. At least they could fight back as they awaited their deaths.

The Russian farmers rose up against the war and its contingencies: against the butchery

which was reaching colossal and unprecedented proportions and had been going on for three long years. The farmers were not rising up against discipline in itself; or, rather, their revolt against discipline was merely a consequence of their revolt against the war.

Until then they had been told that it was one's duty to sacrifice oneself for the Tsar, God's regent. And they had agreed to do so, although they were growing less and less convinced by the day.

Then all of a sudden people had started telling them that it was for the collective Tsar, which is to say for themselves, that they had to litter faraway lands with their own dead bodies: that they had to continue enduring this martyrdom for the love of their country!² It was like telling these men they had to fight and die for the love of Minerva and Juno!

Such august and abstract myths were incomprehensible to them. The farmers got the clear impression they were being mocked even more insolently than in the past.

While continuing to ignore what the *mujiks* feared and wanted, thoughts, desires, feelings, ambitions, and forms of susceptibility were attributed to them whose meaning they themselves did not understand.

Soldiers were given the right to forsake discipline and the shocking privilege to collectively command those whom they had to obey as individuals, when all they were asking for was the right to peace, safety, health, and life.

Farmers were given the right to govern their communities, districts, and provinces, and indeed Russia itself through deputies they were meant to elect. And yet, they continued to be denied that small plot of arable land each of them wanted, so that he could cultivate it without meddling in his neighbours' business.

For the *mujiks*, Kerensky and his fellows were like those priests who promised them each Sunday that they would enjoy their Heavenly Father's inheritance in the hereafter, provided they accepted their misery in this life.

Switching from talk to action, Lenin announced he would convene his own parliament, the Pan-Russian Congress of Soviets. The sixty Bolsheviks who made up a weak minority in the Provisional Committee of the Republic noisily left the Assembly.

With this resolution, the Bolsheviks severed their ties with the regime and opened hostilities. The decision had been taken during a secret meeting of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party presided over by Lenin himself, who had finally left Finland. In order to not be recognised during the journey, he had shaved his beard and covered his bold head with a wig.

Thus plans had been made for the *coup d'état* which went down in history under the name of the October Revolution, according to the Russian calendar, or the November Revolution, according to the Gregorian one.

The prelude to the new phase of the Revolution was an article by Lenin which was published in five hundred thousand copies and distributed by the Soviet, even in the

remotest corners of Russia.

The article stated: 'In the collectivist world whose advent we salute today, each worker will have the right to a plot of land which he will be allowed to cultivate himself, or with the help of his family and relatives, without having to resort to wage labour.'

These words went straight to the farmers' hearts. All that remained to be done was to organise a coup to seize power, which was in nobody's hands, really. With this aim in view, a commission was set up comprised of the Caucasian Stalin, the Pole Dzerzhinsky, and three Jews known under the pseudonyms of Sverdlov, Bubnov, and Uritsky. The specific duty of the commission was to organise the uprising of the troops; hence, its members were also enlisted in the revolutionary military committee headed by Trotsky.

The Bolsheviks' tactic was not to openly attack the government, but rather to take advantage of the disorder and anarchy in order to gain control of the state's vital organs, which were concentrated in the capital. These included the telegraph and telephone exchange, the powerhouse, the gasometers, the railway stations, and the bridges over the Neva. In such a way, the insurgents would cut the government off and paralyse it.

All Trotsky needed to reach this goal were a handful of resolute men carefully chosen among the technicians of the various services that had to be paralysed. These men would be helped by others armed with hand grenades, who would cause a moment of panic in the ongoing disorder. Indeed, for this plan to be feasible, an orgy of disorder was needed of the sort impossible to imagine for those who were not in Saint Petersburg in that cold and foggy autumn of 1917.

Trotsky easily found the men he needed in the underworld of Saint Petersburg, which was teeming with countless hungry deserters and political criminals, as well as ordinary ones, since the gates of the penal colonies and prisons had been opened.

Still, the cunning Jew who had conceived this daring plan, which was destined to produce such a disproportionate effect, kept his daring within strict boundaries, as is customary for his race. He did not personally expose himself, but had an idealistic and unknown *goy* pull the chestnuts out of the fire: Vladimir Antonov-Ovseenko, a former Tsarist officer who had spent much of his life in a penal colony.

This group of rascals easily infiltrated the services they were familiar with and took control of them, while their comrades spread panic outside. While the ministers and Provisional Committee, unaware of what was happening, continued quibbling about democracy, the government was put out of action.

Immediately afterwards there was the attack on the Winter Palace, where the dummies in power had assembled under Kerensky's presidency.

The sailors of Kronstadt had seized the *Aurora*, a warship anchored on the Neva. They opened fire on the old Imperial residence, without the batteries of the Peter and Paul Fortress on the opposite bank of the river doing anything at all to defend the palace. Other armed men later made their way into the meeting hall and arrested all the ministers except Kerensky, who somehow managed to escape.

Trotsky's partisans, who are eager to give their hero all the credit for the November coup, claim that this is how things went.

Stalin's partisans uphold a different claim. According to them, it was the committee headed by Stalin which was responsible for everything, since it inspired the garrison troops to rise up.

We believe there is some truth to both versions. In fact, nobody on that historic day knew exactly what was happening, including Lenin, who was hiding in a suburb of the capital, and up until the last moment remained unaware of the fact that he was already the master of Russia – just as Kerensky did not know for certain that he no longer was.

The question of who is to take credit for most of the events of that day is of no interest to us at all. Behind men like Lenin, Stalin, and Trotsky, just as behind Milyukov, Guchkov, Kerensky, and Chernov in the first act of the tragedy, lay Jacob Schiff and the international Jewish consortium.³ And even before the birth of this visible author⁴ of the Russian Revolution – who remains unknown to most of our contemporaries⁵ – the work which led to it had long been underway. Indeed, other valets have replaced Lenin after his death and Trotsky after his banishment, just as others will replace Stalin when he is no longer be around or will have become a troublesome figure.

These servants and successive leaders of the world conspiracy will pass. But the initial plan will remain and be forever carried on: its perfect progression does not depend upon their ephemeral existence.

Riots broke out in the streets of Saint Petersburg, and the city's dismayed inhabitants were no longer sure just who their master was. Meanwhile, alone in a small room of the Smolny Institute, Lenin spent the night drafting a decree on the expropriation of the land of the nobles, the Church, and the state.

Lenin knew perfectly well that there are minutes in history that count as years, and which decide the fate of empires.

When the loyal Stalin came to inform him about the progress of the insurrection, Lenin – who had not yet been in the streets – showed him the paper he was writing, adding these highly revealing words, which have been recorded by a witness: 'If we are still in time to issue it, no one will ever manage to drive us out of here.'

The time they had was quite enough. Lenin's prophecy has come true.

On the evening of 8 November 1917, as the rioting and revolution swept across Saint Petersburg, the Communist insurrection triumphed.

It was exactly 8:40 PM when thunderous acclamations announced the Soviet committee's entrance at the Smolny Institute, with Lenin – the red Tsar – as the master of the hour.

He stood up. Resting on the ledge of the platform, he scanned his audience with flashing eyes, apparently impervious to the huge ovation which had been going on for several minutes. When it wore off, all he said was: 'We shall now proceed to construct the socialist order.'

And so his famous decree was issued.

Another tremendous outburst shook the hall.

Thursday, 8 November: the Sun rose over a city at the height of fervour and confusion, over a nation carried away by a tremendous storm.

A new era in the history of the world was about to begin.

It opens the age of the final apocalypse.

1 Evola omits this paragraph.—Ed.

2 Evola has, ‘of their democratic country’.—Ed.

3 Evola adds, ‘the occult front of world subversion’.—Ed.

4 Evola has, ‘birth of these visible authors’.—Ed.

5 Evola omits this phrase from his edition.—Ed.

Europe Strikes Back¹

Following the rise of Bolshevism and the signing of the peace treaties, events have followed one another in Europe with such a pace that it difficult to provide any overall picture of them.

It initially seemed as though the anti-traditional bloc controlled by Freemasonry and Jewry in its various forms – the democratic, capitalist, and socialist-Communist one – had secured such a great triumph that it would long enjoy undisputed hegemony. After the major obstacles had violently been removed and three of the greatest European monarchies destroyed, a series of revolutions in both the winners' and the losers' countries were meant to complete the work of the War: an attempt was made to employ proletarian and workers' movements as assault squads, to pave the way for the achievement of the most far-reaching goals. Simultaneously, an attack was launched against two sectors of crucial importance: the cultural and the financial.

The history of so-called inflation, just like that of many other aspects of the occult war, still waits to be written: for here too the current opinion, according to which this phenomenon is one neither provoked nor carefully directed, but something simply bound to happen on account of impersonal causes, is yet another of the erroneous views intentionally spread by the front of world subversion in order to conceal its action. Inflation struck not only the countries which had lost the war, but ultimately those which had won it as well. Through the wide-scale plundering of liquid wealth, it led to the attainment of two specific goals. First of all, inflation destroyed the independent financial power of the nations affected by it. Secondly, it led the masses into such misery and hence exasperation as to turn them into passive material in the hands of the agitators. The two manoeuvres thus converged – the indirect one, carried out through the speculations of high finance; and the direct, revolutionary, and proletarian one.

At the same time, an offensive was launched on the cultural front with the aim of suppressing and demeaning all values, ethical principles, and customs. These forms of so-called 'cultural Bolshevism', which are current in the fields of art, theatre, criticism, cinema, and in the intellectual world, have essentially been spread by Jews. Their action is either concomitant or preparatory to that of militant Bolshevism and social subversion proper. Piling disrepute upon all notions of authority, tradition, race, family, heroism, religion, and idealism, while emphasising internationalism and cosmopolitanism, has been the aim of this offensive of the secret revolutionary front in its pursuit of what are ultimately – as we were saying – global goals. Generally speaking, it sought to engender physical, economic, and moral exhaustion, apathy, the confusion of ideas and values, defeatism, and materialism and corruption among both winners and losers to such an extent that all nations would be stripped of their independence and turned into mere tools in the hands of the same forces which had triumphed in Russia.

Even in those places where Communist revolts were contained through various cultural or political forms – democratic, humanitarian, communitarian, or even national ones at

times – the hegemony of these forces proved no less tangible in the immediate aftermath of the War. It may be argued that what needed to be done was to again carry out a sort of broad, sweeping action. Politically, the main task appeared to be to carry out a timely convergence manoeuvre to link the two big international fronts, which were largely controlled by Israel and only apparently – for the tactical reasons we have stressed – mutually opposed: the financial international, wearing the mask of ‘democracy’, and the Marxist and Communist international.

A series of unexpected events occurred, however, which hindered this attempt to complete the anti-traditional arrangement and Judeo-Masonic victory. The real men behind this triumph, bolstered by their success and certain that the field was theirs, must have forgotten that one of the crucial factors of their success was the fact that they had acted behind the scenes, in secret. In their self-assurance, and confident their enemies had been vanquished, they had started acting openly. This proved a fatal move on their part. Deep-seated forces stuck back of the sort which tend to manifest themselves in an organism when it is experiencing a life-threatening crisis. It is to these forces which Europe, on the brink of the abyss, might owe its salvation.

The first setback suffered by the revolution in the aftermath of the War – one that went almost unnoticed at the time – was the overthrowing of Communism in Hungary after four months of dictatorship (Bela Kuhn, Jew). This was followed by the quashing of Spartacism, a German form of Communism, in Munich (Kurt Eisner, Jew; Levin, Jew) and Berlin (Liebknecht, half-Jew; Rosa Luxemburg, Jew). Then the red troops were defeated at the gates of Warsaw, and this stopped the Bolshevik invasion which was about to sweep over central Europe.

A new and unexpected event suddenly occurred not long afterwards which really worried the secret leaders of world politics. The Fascist reaction against the Bolshevik peril which had surfaced in Italy changed this country – which had long since slipped into democratic anarchy and become a hotbed of Masonic sects – into a new and independent nation destined to lay the initial foundations for a positive reconstruction of Europe. The first consequence of this was the suppression of Freemasonry in Italy, an unprecedented event in contemporary history, and one which struck the front of world subversion as a real challenge.

The latter, however, did not pay too much attention to Fascism at first, which it regarded as merely a local and passing phenomenon. The front was busy working elsewhere, upholding the territorial clauses of the Treaty of Versailles and preventing any form of revisionism.

Meanwhile, Portugal too freed itself from anarchy and began to undergo a profound regeneration, which also entailed the suppression of Freemasonry. Then Marxist Social Democracy (Julius Deutsch, Jew; Otto Bauer, Jew) was crushed in Vienna, and Hitler’s rise to power signalled the end of all prospects for Communism in central Europe. But National Socialism did not simply attack Freemasonry: it also turned against Jewry in an even more resolute way. This was an event of decisive importance: for the first time, a big state was challenging Jewish supremacy, just when Jewry believed to have finally become

the master of the world. Not long afterwards, Germany quit the League of Nations and broke off its relations with the United States, which in the immediately previous period had fallen under the almost complete control of Judaised finance. Italy is now standing on Germany's side, since it shares its revisionist views. Thus an age of new rapprochements has begun: between Germany and Poland, Germany and Hungary, Italy and Germany.

We are witnessing the formation of a new front of nations lined up against Jewry, Freemasonry, internationalism, and Communism. Faced with such a serious and broad threat, the secret forces of world subversion have felt the need to take up a defensive position, or even to counterattack by deploying new techniques.

Particularly significant, in this respect, is the creation of the 'Popular Front'. In order to bring about the unity of socialist and revolutionary forces on the level of the anti-Fascist struggle, first trade unions joined forces, then an alliance was formed between the Second and Third International, and finally mutual solidarity was fostered among the 'national fronts' of various countries. The Italian feats in Abyssinia are enabling the mobilisation of all pacifists and democrats against anti-Masonic Italy; yet the tool of the League of Nations, which is being used for this purpose, is actually producing the opposite effect: it is revealing its incapacity to impose any sanctions as well as its inner inconsistency, when it was intended to serve as a Masonic-democratic super-state for controlling all peoples.

One of the few Catholic monarchies to have escaped the collapse of traditional Europe was the Spanish. Through a combination of circumstances, Spain has become the focus of this directly revolutionary action: one by one, the moves of the occult war are being repeated in this country. Like the Tsar, the King of Spain was tricked into abdicating: he was told that this was the will of the nation, when actually in the elections – merely municipal, not general ones – the majority of votes had been in favour of the monarchy, except in some major cities. The farce of a democratic republic followed, which soon showed its real face by giving way to Communist radicalism. But in the most critical and decisive moment of a battle it already believed to have won, here too the Judeo-Masonic front which is in cahoots with Moscow suddenly found itself faced with an unexpected reaction: the counterattack of the nationalist forces led by Franco. Spain turned into an international battlefield: for the first time, the forces of the red international clashed with the legionary forces of the anti-revolutionary international.

At the same time, the internal situation in Russia worsened. The numerous executions of Soviet leaders and the literal decapitation of the leading officers of the Red Army reveal just in what a state this Judeo-Communist paradise is in. The anti-Communist pact among Italy, Japan, and Germany further poses an insurmountable obstacle to it. Another serious symptom of Russia's awareness of its own weakness, and of the inefficiency of the so-called 'Red Army of the world revolution' when faced with the prospect of a bitter war, is the fact that it has failed to react against the war waged by Japan upon Communised and fragmented China. Thus, in that well-known and serious frontier incident, Russia deemed it best to avoid all complications rather than use the event as a pretext for counterattacking and paralysing the Japanese.²

Over the past twenty tumultuous and uncertain years, however, the most serious defeat

suffered by the forces of world subversion has been the Czechoslovakian crisis. Czechoslovakia constituted a real centre of interest for the democratic powers – and indirectly Russia itself – as it controlled all the routes across central Europe. The territorial definition the country was given in the peace treaties was essentially the result of tactical reasons: these treaties, which had invoked the nationality principle in order to destroy the Hapsburg empire, completely ignored it when creating Czechoslovakia, a puzzle of nations and races far more absurd than former Austria, since no higher principle or genuine shared tradition was there to provide any unity in diversity. Only strategic reasoning could justify the structure of the state which had Prague as its capital and which was placed under Czech mandate, so to speak, by virtue of the traditional and deep-seated anti-German and anti-Hapsburg feelings harboured by this Slav people, and especially its Masonic leaders. Czechoslovakia's function was to prevent any restoration in Austria and to control the Bohemian basin, which is a key strategic area in central-Danubian Europe. Czechoslovakia enjoyed the support of the two other powers of the Little Entente:³ Romania and Yugoslavia. According to the original plan drawn up by the 'big democracies', the role of these countries was to act as a 'block' to prevent not only defeated Germany, but also victorious Italy, from entering central Balkan Europe.

This system too was shattered. The first blow was the new politics of Yugoslavia, which were favourable to both Germany and Italy. The second – and decisive – blow was the annexation of Austria to Germany. This is a typical example of a 'counter-blow' caused by anti-traditional hatred. Czechoslovakia, with its Masonic dictatorship masked as a democracy, still feared the ghost of the Hapsburgs. On several occasions, Benes formally declared, 'We do not like the prospect of an *Anschluss*, but if we were to choose between it and the restoration of the Monarchy, we would not hesitate to choose the *Anschluss* and immediately react against the Hapsburgs.' This is a typical case of blindness, since through the country's eastern frontier (the Austro-Czech), now German and far weaker than the western one (the German-Czech), the solution adopted here was destined to profoundly damage the strategic position of Czechoslovakia. Because of the impact of the *Anschluss* on the Sudeten Germans, it was also destined to make coexistence between the latter and the Czechs impossible, thereby bringing about the crisis of the Czechoslovakian state.

While it is German national interest which has benefited the most from these events, it should nonetheless be observed that real solidarity now exists among anti-Masonic, anti-Jewish, anti-Communist and nationalist⁴ political forces, whose prestige, far from waning, is increasing by the day. The front of world subversion must reckon with these forces, since they are now counterattacking in all sectors.

The most serious danger, in this respect, is that the attack – or rather counterattack – of the secret forces of corruption might take place in another domain: not externally, in terms of international political forces realised through wars and conflicts, but internally, through actions analogous to that which has so often turned a certain kind of nationalism into a tool for revolutionary, anti-traditional, and anti-hierarchical change. What will prove decisive in future struggles, and for the prospect of a general European reconstruction, is

the ability of the new national movements to steer clear of certain forms of extremism: for while these may provide a purely defensive and tactical temporary defence, they leave no room for any superior idea – for a transcendent point of reference capable of leading the movements within the framework of a new, sacred unity. Bolshevism, externally vanquished, must not resurface internally under the guise of new levelling myths or ‘social’ formulas detrimental to the traditional values of spiritual personality, difference, hierarchy, and authority from on high. The anti-democratic ideals of strength, power, virility, and empire must not degenerate into the materialistic forms of a new paganism; instead, they must find – as in our best Middle Ages – a superior justification and real transfiguration, so that the final clash against world subversion will not be merely a fight between enemies situated on the same level, but a war waged by a new ‘Holy Alliance’, or genuine ‘holy war’, between the forces of the spirit and those of the anti-spirit, between matter and chaos.

The supreme form of the ‘occult war’ is that which is taking place on a subtle level through a careful and imperceptible deformation and deviation of the ideas and principles upheld by those who are striking back against the most outward forms of decadence and subversion. Today, now that this counterstrike is in full swing, the various national movements of restoration must watch out for any action of this sort, many examples of which have been noted in the present book. Strict adherence to the traditional spirit is the most effective weapon in this respect, for it is the spirit of truth itself, and is stronger than all myths which have been developed to meet the needs of an uncertain twilight age laden with the rubble of so many past catastrophes. When our front will have grown steadfast in this inner and spiritual field as well, and free of any attenuation or compromise, in the face of all future contingencies it will be entitled to pronounce that ancient, magnificent formula in its full meaning: *Non praevalébunt*.⁵

¹ This final chapter was not part of the original French edition. By agreement with de Poncins, it was written and added by Evola himself.—Ed.

² In the summer of 1938 the Japanese, who were then occupying China, sent troops into the Soviet Union through Manchuria, believing that the Russians had misaligned the border between the two nations which had been established by the Treaty of Peking. This led to fighting between the Red Army and the Japanese army which lasted into the following year, and which ultimately led to an armistice and a proclamation of neutrality between the two powers.—Ed.

³ The Little Entente was a series of agreements for collective defence signed by Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia in 1920 in the event of an attack by Hungary, as it was feared at the time that Hungary might attempt to reabsorb these territories as part of a restoration of the Hapsburg monarchy. Although this danger quickly passed, the Little Entente was maintained as a collective security arrangement against the Soviet Union and other threats, supported by France, and later even began to serve as a means for economic integration. It gradually weakened and eventually collapsed in 1938.—Ed.

⁴ Evola typically uses ‘national’ in place of ‘nationalist’.—Ed.

⁵ Latin: ‘they shall not prevail’.—Ed.

APPENDIX I: Considerations On The Occult War¹

Julius Evola

The occult war is that war waged by the forces of global subversion from behind the scenes, utilising means which are almost invariably invisible to ordinary methods of investigation. The notion of occult war belongs, so to speak, to a three-dimensional view of history, whereby history is considered not superficially, according to the two dimensions of apparent causes, events, and driving forces, but rather according to its third dimension, that of *depth*: an underground current of decisive forces and influences often irreducible to the simple human element, be it individual or collective.

It is worth clarifying the meaning of the term ‘underground’, as it is not to be identified with any obscure and irrational substrate of objective history – something which stands in relation to the known face of history as the subconscious stands to the waking consciousness of the individual. This, by contrast, might be an apt analogy for those who are *objects* rather than *subjects* of history, according to this three-dimensional view of events: people who show no awareness of the real influences affecting them in their thoughts and actions nor of the aims accomplished through them, and thus appear to be centred more on their subconscious and unconscious than on their waking consciousness. In this respect, it is on the level of the subconscious that the most decisive steps of the occult war are taken. Yet from the point of view of the real *subjects* of history, matters stand rather different: we should not speak here of the subconscious or unconscious, but rather consider forces that are more than intelligent – forces that know perfectly well what they want and what the most opportune means might be for them to reach their goals. It would be an extremely dangerous mistake to suppose that this substrate of history is comprised of the ‘irrational’, ‘life’, ‘becoming’, or any other of those ill-defined entities which modern historicism has come up with in its attempt to transcend positivist historiography. Indeed, I regard this as one of the suggestions that have been promoted via occult means in certain milieus precisely as part of the strategy of the occult war in modern times. But I shall explain things more clearly later on. For the time being, suffice it to note the following point: we should not shroud the third dimension of history in the fog of abstract philosophical views; rather, we should regard it as being inhabited and occupied by specific ‘intelligences’ that almost invariably have manifested themselves through certain secret societies and organisations, without ever entirely coinciding or reaching absolute fulfilment through any of them.

Among the various conceptions of history to be found in the West, the one most likely to lead to such views is probably the Catholic one. This conception typically regards history not as a mechanism regulated by natural, political, economic, or social causes, but as the unfolding of a sort of plan (a ‘providential’ plan) opposed by enemy forces and their historical emissaries. These take on either the moralising designation of ‘forces of evil’, or the religious, Christian one of anti-Christian forces, or the forces of the Antichrist. A conception of this sort represents a good starting point, provided it is transposed from the

theological level to the practical one, by turning it into a general principle for a detailed interpretation of events. Once generalised, this conception is also to be tested in relation to non-Christian civilisations. With reference to the latter, and to human institutions, it will be more appropriate to simply speak of forces of Tradition² and anti-Tradition, of spiritual hierarchy and revolutionary subversion, of *cosmos* and *chaos*. Naturally, from one particular perspective, the anti-traditional forces will be seen to coincide with the anti-Catholic ones, as according to Catholic tradition the latter seek to fight the traditional spirit in general by undermining the bases of all hierarchy and thus overthrow its historical representatives.

One cannot stress too strongly the need to embrace a view of this kind today, which should be regarded not as a philosophical speculation among many others, but as an essential aid to true action. I would here like to quote a passage from the famous *Protocols*, which I already drew attention to in the past: ‘The purely brute mind of the GOYIM is incapable of use for analysis and observation, and still more for the foreseeing whither a certain manner of setting a question may tend. In this difference in capacity for thought between the GOYIM and ourselves [the Elders of Zion] may be clearly discerned the seal of our position as the Chosen People and of our higher quality of humanness, in contradistinction to the brute mind of the GOYIM. Their eyes are open, but see nothing before them and do not invent (unless perhaps, material things)’ (XV). The term *goyim* is used to describe non-Jews in this particular passage, where Israel is presented as the main agent of world subversion. Yet the term may also be more generally applied to those people I have described as ‘objects of history’. It is truly alarming to note how often this verdict concerning *goyim* still holds true today. The point of view of most so-called ‘men of action’, when compared to that of their concealed enemies, may well be regarded as childish: these men focus all their forces on what is tangible, but are incapable of discerning relations of cause and effect except in extremely limited fields of application, which are almost invariably of a gross, material nature. Besides, they show a complete lack of principles, for in the vast majority of cases they believe that the point of view of action cannot be ‘dogmatically’ subordinated to any principles, as it must meet the ‘compelling needs of the present’. Regrettably, this is still the level of many counter-revolutionary forces today. This situation may be compared to that of someone who is perfectly equipped for high-altitude mountaineering – with hiking boots, a sleeping bag, a rope, and an ice pick – and has passed many difficult trials, but then when faced with an expanse of water, a lake or the sea, chooses to throw himself in enthusiastically, in the belief that his equipment will still be of use to him and will help him advance. Actually, he will simply sink faster.

The occult war is waged in the field of what – to borrow an image drawn from the empirical sciences – we might call ‘imponderables’ or imponderable quantities. This war often causes almost imperceptible changes, from which striking effects gradually, but fatally, proceed. It hardly ever operates by opposing given forces against others; rather, it manipulates existing ones so as to obtain the desired effects. What Wundt³ once called the ‘heterogeneity of ends’ plays a crucial role here: it is a matter of ensuring that while

certain forces or men think they are striving for and reaching a given aim – and doing it alone – they may actually bring about or foster something very different, something which reveals the presence of an influence and intelligence transcending them. It is for this reason that on another occasion, in the pages of this very same magazine, I argued that an examination of the ‘differential’ between what is willed and what takes place, between principles or programmes and their actual historical consequences, provides the best evidence for those wishing to find out what the real forces at work in history may be.

In this article, I wish to move beyond general matters to discuss some of the methods most frequently used in our age by the masked forces of world subversion in their attempt to cover up their own actions, prevent those of their enemies, and maintain their influence. The reader should be informed that in what I am about to say, I will often be drawing upon observations René Guénon has made in various works of his. I believe that when it comes to such matters, Guénon’s expertise is unmatched by any contemporary Western author.

1. *The positivist suggestion.* We should grow accustomed to the thought that the so-called ‘positive’ manner of writing history and considering events is not so much the spontaneous product or the prejudice of a narrow-minded worldview as much as a *suggestion* which the anti-traditional forces have methodically spread in modern culture with the aim of ‘covering up’ their own actions. Those who believe that history is simply made by men and exclusively determined by economic, political, and social factors fail to see anything beyond this. But a world that ‘fails to see anything beyond this’ is precisely what is needed by those wishing to act in a subterranean way. A civilisation dominated by the ‘positivist’ prejudice offers an ideal condition for the pursuit of action in the ‘third dimension’ – and this is exactly the case in contemporary civilisation.

Above, I referred to interpretations that are no longer ‘positivist’, but rather based on abstract ideas such as ‘becoming’, ‘life’, or even the ‘Spirit’. This leads us to consider the way in which a second instrument of the occult war is applied, namely:

2. *The technique of surrogates.* This technique is adopted whenever there is a risk of ‘awakening’ and certain energies threaten to transcend the mere level of ideas, where the forces of subversion can more easily pursue their occult strategy. In the aforementioned case, vague ideas such as those of ‘becoming’, ‘life’, and ‘absolute Spirit’ merely serve as bait thrown to those no longer satisfied with the positivist approach, to prevent them from turning their gazes in the right direction. The field of action becomes as shrouded in the fog of these ideas as it was in the dark night of positivist agnosticism.

The ‘technique of surrogates’, however, is developed in a far more characteristic and effective way as:

3. *The tactic of counterfeits.* Once the effects of this destructive work reach the material plane, they may give rise to visible phenomena, to the point of eliciting a reaction. This reaction will then seek vague symbols and myths which might serve as the basis for an attempt at reconstruction. Indeed, some may even be found that are well suited to the purpose. These will almost invariably be symbols and points of reference that draw upon the traditional past in their historical aspects, which will then be evoked from ancestral

depths by the forces of an organism that feels threatened with utter destruction. In such cases, the occult war is not waged in a direct manner: the symbols chosen are not opposed; they are rather prevented from circulating, or else distortions of them are promoted. As a consequence, the movement of reaction is curbed, deviated, or even led in the opposite direction, so that it might become subject to the very influences present in the evil it was intended to counter and the very decadence it was meant to rise above – and indeed will still believe itself to be rising above.

This tactic may be adopted in various domains, from the political to the spiritual, and is proving particularly effective today. A few examples will be in order.

The most typical example is that of ‘traditionalism’. A vague desire to return to tradition – i.e., to a hierarchical and qualitative order centred on transcendent spirituality and an elite of its qualified and legitimate representatives – will be deviated into the form of ‘traditionalism’. What this consists of are vague assumption of an amateurish or militant sort that confuse Tradition with customs and routines, leading to a narrow particularism which is limited to transmitted forms whose spirit is never truly grasped. This is fair game for the enemies of Tradition and those who, under the pretext of anti-traditionalism, seek to deliver a genuine blow against Tradition and to further encourage revolutionary subversion. In such a way, the forces of reaction are held back and the manoeuvre easily attains its goal.

What has just been described may well occur in certain extremist milieus in relation to the idea of race, on account of specific materialist and zoological assumptions. The same applies to the Nordic-Aryan idea as well as that of the pagan. These are all ideas that could unquestionably promote creative action and attempts at restoration among certain peoples of the North, provided they are grasped and presented anew according to their genuine nature and ancient spiritual and traditional significance. As they are found in the aforementioned milieus, however, they suggest the influence of diverting action of the kind I have just described: first of all, because of a lack of principles; secondly, because of the serious misunderstandings and distortions surrounding the notion of ancient ‘Aryanness’; and finally, because of the tyranny of contingent interests and irrational impulses. In the context of the new Italy, everything should be done to avoid this happening when Romanness is sometimes evoked. The idea of ancient Rome is no doubt among those ideas which might contribute the most to reconstruction: we must thus ensure that its effectiveness will not be paralysed by counterfeits, mere rhetorical exhumations, or academic, erudite, archaeological, or even simply juridical and political assumptions, which naturally tend to completely ignore the central force and soul of Rome as a symbol.

4. *The tactic of inversion.* The secret forces of world subversion knew perfectly well that the fundamental premise behind the order to be destroyed was the supernatural element: the spirit conceived not as a philosophical abstraction, but as a superior reality and the final goal in a process of transcendent integration of one’s personality. Once they had limited the influence which the Catholic tradition still exercised in this respect (and we will not go into the details of what means were adopted to accomplish this goal), the forces of subversion strove to deviate and paralyse all new aspirations towards the

supernatural that might have surfaced outside the dominant religion. The whole of what may be termed *neo-spiritualism* – and which includes all the various Theosophical, Spiritualist, Orientalising, and ‘occult’ sects – may be said to derive from this manoeuvre. Again, what we find here are almost exclusively distortions, counterfeits, and the perversion of spiritual doctrines on the part of unqualified people who often appear to have succumbed to a genuinely demonic influence.

The result achieved was twofold. First, it was easy to extend the discredit that in numerous cases rightly fell on these counterfeits to the doctrines themselves, thus putting the latter in a condition to no longer pose a threat. One may also mention the fact that in recent times this manoeuvre has been accomplished by playing on political factors: there are certain circles which, in all good faith, see nothing but ‘Freemasonry’ (which they consider synonymous with revolution, opposition to Christianity, and internationalist subversion) wherever secret associations and esoteric symbols are discussed, even when one is referring to ancient traditions whose originally spiritual and aristocratic nature should be known to all.

Secondly, through misunderstood theories and false practices, all those forces which, having been stifled by materialism, were yearning for something extra-natural have been channelled not towards the supernatural, but towards the sub-natural, which is to say the subconscious, Spiritualism, and more generally a world that, far from representing any integration of one’s personality, can only foster its collapse and disintegration – to the point of turning the individual into a tool in the hands of the most obscure ‘influences’. Through neo-Spiritualism, the threat posed by genuine spirituality has been contained and reduced to a minimum.

5. *The tactic of the ricochet attack.* This consists in causing one of the forces which are to be struck down because of their enduring traditional character to take action. Such action will first target a force similar to the original one, apparently strengthening and increasing the latter. Eventually, however, it will ricochet against the initial force and bring it to its ruin, just as it has done with the second force. Thus by means of specific forms of infiltration, the secret forces of world subversion often lead the representatives of a given tradition to defend it by discrediting other traditions: those who yield to this manoeuvre do not realise that by attacking tradition as embodied by another folk or civilisation for self-serving motives or contingent and inferior reasons, they are causing their own tradition to be attacked through a ricochet effect sooner or later, so to speak. The forces of world subversion heavily rely on this tactic and do their best to submit higher ideas to self-serving interests, pride, ambitions, and proselytising tendencies: for they know full well that this is the best way to erode all genuine unity and solidarity, and thus bring about a state of conflict that will make things much easier for them.

Under this category we might also list any Machiavellian use of revolutionary forces. Short-sighted political leaders have often believed that fostering or supporting revolutions in hostile nations was the best way for them to defend the interests of their own countries. Without realising it, in doing so they were bringing about the opposite result: while they thought they were using the revolution as a tool, they were actually becoming tools of the

revolution themselves. Eventually, the revolution reached them, after having swept across their enemies. It may be said that modern history, particularly since the French Revolution, has been the theatre of a subversion that has tragically occurred in this manner. One cannot emphasise too much that only absolute, ascetic, and unflinching loyalty to an idea can provide a safeguard against the forces of the occult war: whenever this level is abandoned and obedience is merely given to contingent factors, the front of resistance will be broken – and with it, any chance of real autonomy.

We should mention here the most recent manifestation of this sort of manoeuvre: the ideology based on the ‘nationality principle’, the ‘self-determination of peoples’, and imperialism – as promoted by the Allies in order to mobilise all forces against the Central Empires and vanquish them – represents the best possible ideology for sparking a wide-scale revolt of the so-called ‘coloured’ nations against the great European powers in an attempt to strip the latter of their supremacy.

6. *The tactic of the scapegoat.* When the occult forces of world subversion fear they may be exposed to some degree, they make sure that their enemies will focus their attention on certain elements which are only partially responsible, or only in a subordinate fashion, for their misdeeds. Reaction will thus target these elements exclusively, which will serve as scapegoats. The occult forces will then be free to resume their work, as their opponents will believe they have identified the enemy and dealt with it. We have often warned certain anti-Semitic extremists that they must be careful, lest by seeing the Jew everywhere they fall victim to this sort of trap. The same warning may also be given to those who see Freemasonry or Protestantism everywhere – and these are but a few examples, for similar processes take place in many other domains as well. One must be wary of one-sidedness and bear in mind the general plane on which the occult forces we must fight are operating.

7. *The tactic of dilutions.* This represents a particular aspect of the ‘tactic of surrogates’. To understand its nature, we must start from the idea that the process which has led to the current general crisis has remote origins and has developed through various phases (corresponding to specific forms of civilisation, state, ethics, and so on – see our book *Revolt against the Modern World*).⁴ In each of these phases the crisis was already present, albeit in a less acute and more diluted form – potentially rather than in actuality. The theory of ‘progress’, or evolutionism, may be regarded as one of the suggestions spread by the occult forces of subversion with the aim of diverting people’s attention from its origins, so as to further the process of dissolution through false mirages, such as the illusion of the triumphs of the techno-mechanical civilisation.

The tragic events of recent times, however, have partly stripped this hypnosis of its efficacy: for many have begun to realise that the alleged march of progress is nothing but a race toward the abyss and that it is necessary for us to make an inversion. The occult front has thus employed all available means to prevent any new radical reaction. One of its favourite methods has been the spread of prejudices against ‘anachronism’ and ‘what is no longer suited to our times’. It has also driven those forces which looked toward their origins to turn instead towards one of its preceding stages, in which the crisis and evil

were present in less advanced, and hence less visible, forms. This trap has also worked well. The leaders of world subversion know, of course, that having reached this stage the threat has been averted, as it is simply a matter of following along the same route again, and then bringing about the dissolution of the forces that had awoken and sought to react by turning back.

For this tactic, too, many historical examples may be mentioned, recent as well as remote ones. It is particularly the leaders of contemporary anti-subversive movements who should watch out for this tactic. In all frankness – for lack of frankness in such matters would be a sin – there are certain aspects of contemporary nationalism which it would be worth examining in detail from this point of view. It is common knowledge that, in the past, the idea of nation possessed an anti-traditional, anti-hierarchical, and revolutionary character with respect to previous oecumenical, imperial, and feudal civilisations. Today, it is the nation which is chiefly invoked in the fight against the most extreme forms of crisis and subversion, as embodied by the various red internationals. It is necessary, therefore, to develop a different concept of nation from that which renders it a step along the itinerary which is leading toward what we must now fight. Already many years ago, in the pages of this very magazine,⁵ I sought to provide the necessary points of reference to address and solve this problem by drawing a distinction between two kinds of nationalism. Readers should refer to this essay of mine.

8. *The tactic of the replacement of principles by people.* It is undeniably the case that, in many respects, the decay of traditional institutions began with that of their leaders and representatives. Yet the latter were not its sole cause: for genuine dissolution and involution to take place, the tactic of the replacement of principles by people must first be adopted. This is an additional tool of the occult war, and operates as follows: when the representative of a given principle proves to be unworthy of it, criticism is extended from this person to the principle itself. One will not conclude from this that the single representative is not at the level of the principle and must be replaced by someone else capable of embodying it; rather, the conclusion reached will be that the principle itself is false or harmful, and must be replaced by a different one.

Is it not the case that the attack against degenerate, vane, or dissolute aristocrats has all too often turned into an attack against the principle of aristocracy itself and into an instrument of demagogy? And is this not also the case with the subversive and heretical action of Luther, which found its alibi in the corruption of the representatives of the Church of Rome? History is rich in episodes of this sort, each coinciding with a given moment in the process of world subversion. Let us bear in mind that the ancient hierarchical order consisted of spiritual authority, under which stood a warrior aristocracy, followed by the bourgeois class, and finally the working masses. The collapse of this traditional order was in many ways brought about by means of the tactic I have just mentioned. Thus the warrior aristocracy rose up against the fallen representatives of purely spiritual authority not in order to replace them with other, more worthy representatives of the same principle, but in order to emancipate themselves by making a claim to supreme authority. At a later stage – in other words, in a later civilisation – the

Third Estate⁶ rose up against the degenerate warrior aristocracy, not so that the latter might give way to genuine aristocrats, but merely to seize power for itself. To consider yet another phase, the process working against capitalism and the bourgeoisie (which is to say against the Third Estate) in its destructive and negative aspects does not pursue any reform, but is merely a pretext for the revolt of the proletariat and its usurpation of power – sunk lower and lower – on the part of proletarians (via Bolshevism and Communism).

* * *

The fact that, due to space restrictions, I have only provided a few examples and chiefly focused on illustrating certain principles will not, I hope, prevent readers from realising how widely these principles may be applied and what results may be attained by qualified individuals wishing to methodically adopt them in any given field. It may safely be argued that there is hardly any area in which the forces of world subversion have not waged their occult warfare. In fact, those areas which might seem less likely to be affected by such things are precisely the ones that, in principle, should be approached with the greatest caution.

It is worth stressing once more that it is not a matter here of ‘philosophical positions’, but of something quite tangible. No leader or fighter on the front of counter-subversion and tradition can claim to be prepared and up to his real tasks unless he has first developed an ability to clearly discern this underground network of causes. He must readily identify the action of those invisible tools our enemy employs in every age which, like the present one, heralds a time of ultimate decision-making and the final struggle for an entire cycle of civilisation.

¹ Originally published as ‘Considerazioni sulla guerra occulta’ in *La Vita Italiana*, vol. XXVI, no. 298 (January 1938), pp. 27-37.—Ed.

² Evola is here using the term Tradition in the same sense as René Guénon; namely, to refer to a set of transcendental metaphysical principles which lies at the heart of all authentic religions, and which remains the same even when there are differences in the exoteric practices and doctrines.—Ed.

³ Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) was one of the first psychologists. Wundt first discussed his idea of the ‘heterogeneity of ends’ in his 1882 book, *Ethics*, to denote the phenomenon of how an individual can pursue a particular goal with a certain end in mind, only to discover and introduce other goals into the process along the way which alter one’s original intentions.—Ed.

⁴ *Revolt against the Modern World* (Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions, 1995).—Ed.

⁵ ‘Due facce del Nazionalismo’, *Vita Italiana* 216, March 1931. German translation: ‘Der Doppelantlitz des Nationalismus’, *Europäische Revue* 8, October 1932. (English edition: ‘Two Faces of Nationalism’, in Julius Evola, *Fascism versus Tradition* [London: Arktos, 2015].—Ed.)

⁶ In pre-Revolutionary France, the general assembly of the French government was divided into three States-General: the clergy (First), the nobles (Second), and the commoners (Third).—Ed.

APPENDIX II: Review of Emmanuel Malynski and Léon De Poncins' book *The Occult War*

(July 1936)

René Guénon

Emmanuel Malynski and Léon de Poncins. *The Occult War*. (Gabriel Beauchesne, Paris). – Like the previous works by Mr Léon de Poncins which we have had the chance to discuss in the past, this one contains many entirely correct considerations when it comes to formulating a critique of the modern world. The authors, who rightly denounce common errors such as the belief that revolutions are ‘spontaneous movements’, are among those people who think that modern deviation – whose development over the course of the nineteenth century they examine in particular – must necessarily correspond to a carefully fixed plan, which is known at the very least by those who are leading this ‘occult war’ against everything which presents an intellectually or socially traditional character. Yet when it comes to attributing ‘responsibilities’, we have certain reservations to make; matters, it must be admitted, are not quite as simple or straightforward, since – by definition – what is at work here is not something which shows itself externally, and its apparent pseudo-leaders are more or less little more than unwitting tools. In any case, there is a tendency here to considerably exaggerate the role of the Jews, so much so that they alone are supposed to be the ones ultimately running the world, without making the due distinctions. How can the authors not realise, for instance, that those who are taking an active part in certain milieus are Jews entirely cut off from their own tradition and who, as is often the case, have merely preserved the defects of their race and the negative sides of its particular mentality? Several passages (especially in Chapter 9) closely touch upon certain truths concerning ‘counter-initiation’: it is indeed accurate to say that it is not a matter of common ‘interests’, which merely serve to move vulgar tools, but rather of a ‘faith’ which constitutes ‘a metapsychical mystery that is quite unfathomable even to the developed mind of ordinary man’; and it is no less accurate that ‘[a] Satanic current parallel to the Christian one flows through history’. But this current is not simply directed against Christianity (indeed, this excessively narrow way of viewing things is the likely cause of many ‘errors of perspective’); it is just as much directed against all traditions, be they of the East or West, including Judaism.

As for Freemasonry, the authors may be shocked to learn that the infiltration of modern ideas, to the detriment of the initiatory spirit, has made it not one of the agents of the ‘conspiracy’, but on the contrary, one of its first victims. Besides, by considering some of the contemporary attempts to ‘democratise’ Catholicism itself, which will certainly not have escaped them, by analogy they ought to have grasped what we mean... We dare add that a certain will to divert enquiries by stirring and feeding various ‘hatreds’ (whether of Freemasonry, the Jews, the Jesuits, the ‘yellow peril’ or of anything else) is itself an integral part of the ‘plan’ the authors seek to denounce, and that the ‘hidden agenda’ of certain anti-Masonic attacks would be particularly revealing in this respect. We know all

too well that by insisting on this point, one runs the risk of proving disagreeable to everyone, on all sides; but is this a good enough reason not to speak the truth?

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